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PREFACE

This study began with a desire to combine
political science

research with a contribution to social
justice.

My initial involve-

ment in political organizing in 1976 was a
bicentennial gift to

American politics— a low- and moderate- income
community organization,
That experience made a lasting impression on
me both for its sense
of having accomplished something
significant and for its whetting of

my curiosity about low- and moderate-income political
organizing.
Ten years later, both of these feelings are still
strong and have

contributed to the writing of this study.
There are numerous individuals who have aided in the successful completion of this effort.

The success of my work in 1976 is

largely due to the help and cooperation of Wade Rathke, Alice Baudy,
and Zach Pollett

.

They are three remarkable individuals who were

extremely helpful in that effort.

Since that time, my continued

involvement in ACORN has borne fruit only because of the acceptance
and warmth of the members and organizers

I

encountered in my activi-

ties with ACORN and in informal settings.

This study of Boston ACORN was aided on two ends, in Boston
and in Amherst.

In Boston,

I

had the privilege to work with Barbra

Gross and her staff and the members of Boston ACORN.

They were not

only informative and insightful but a pleasure to know.

The time

spent in the research in Boston was dear to me as a result.
v

In

I

Amherst, on the academic end of the project,
particular thanks are

due Jerome Mileur whose careful and
patient guidance throughout was
essential to the entire project.

Debra Gross provided essential

substantive input complemented by Glen Gordon’s
profound sense of
good scholarship.

I

also wish to thank the members of my
committee

Gordon Sutton, whose insight has been invaluable
and John Fenton,

whose participation is highly regarded and
appreciated.

Also

essential to the success of this study was Brian
Anastasi, whose

careful work and extra effort to meet schedule eased
the entire
process tremendously.
I

also wish to express my appreciation to my parents, who

so often provided the wherewithal, materially and
supportively,

to complete this work.

Finally,

I

owe my wife, Beth, a tremendous

debt and wish to thank her for her support throughout

were going smoothly and when they were not.
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ABSTRACT

Alternatives in American Politics:
A Study of the Association of

Community Organizations for Reform
Now
(September 1986)

Daniel M. Russell, B.A., University
of New Orleans
M.A., University of New Orleans

Ph.D., University of Massachusetts

Directed by:

Jerome M. Mileur

The study of political organizations has
been an important

topic in American political science from early
in its development.
This is due to the importance of political
organizations in the

shaping of public policy, influencing other institutions
in the
political system, and shaping the political behavior of
individuals.
This research

is

a case study of those who are participating in the

Boston chapter of a specific organization of low- and moderateincome people, the Association of Community Organizations for Reform

Now (ACORN).
This study researches questions that have been basic to

political science studies of political organizations by using

information obtained by the researcher's participant-observation in

ACORN over

a

period of ten years and responses to interviews with

twenty-four members and organizers of Boston ACORN.

vn

The first chapter discusses the
development of the political

science literature on political
organizations, emphasizing those

concepts that are important to lowand moderate- income organizing
and developing the concept of an
"organizing strategy."

chapter discusses theories of low- income
organizing.

The second

The third

chapter examines the .organizing strategy
that ACORN uses in its

organizing
The second part of the research discusses
the responses of
the organizers and members to the interviews.

It identifies the

issues that they consider important and compares
responses of the

organizers and members regarding their involvement in
ACORN.
Chapter four discusses the organizers' responses,
chapter five, the

members'.

Chapter six ties together the literature and the inter-

view responses, raising issues about the problems of understanding
the complex behavior of individuals in such an organization.
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INTRODUCTION
Enough is enough. We will wait no
longer for the
crumbs at America's door. We will
not be meek, but
mighty. We will not starve on past
promises, but
least on future dreams.

—ACORN People's Platform 1
The assertion of dissenting political
views in American

politics is protected by Constitutional
guarantees; there are no

guarantees that efforts to promote those
views will succeed.

The

authors of the statement above, members
of the Association of

Community Organizations for Reform Now
(ACORN), have chosen a goal
that is particularly difficult to attain:

empowerment of low- and

moderate-income Americans through a national organization
of community organizations.

To the degree that it has been successful,

it

is due to a well-considered plan executed
by dedicated and talented

professionals and volunteers.

The researcher has been privileged

to have the opportunity to join in ACORN political
activities on a

number of occasions.

He became involved in ACORN out of political

conviction, but quickly discovered that there was much to be learned
about the American political system from this group of people and
their organizational efforts.
The researcher's association with ACORN over the last ten

years has convinced him that they are a remarkable group of people.
His conversations with them and his observations of their activities

xii

have provided him with numerous insights
into politics, communities,
and organizations.

It is for that reason that he
has chosen ACORN

as a subject for study and chosen to use
the perceptions of ACORN

participants as a primary source of data.
The method used is a case study based on
structured inter-

views with a non-sc ient if ic sample of the people
involved in the

Boston chapter of ACORN.

The most recent studies of voluntary

political organizations, Terry Moe
Wood,

3

2
,

and David Knoke and James R.

use surveys and statistical analysis of survey responses.

Norman I. Fainstein and Susan S. Fainstein 4 use interviews
and
historical data.

As yet, there are no major studies of low- income

organizations that have used participant-observation.
Each approach has its strengths and weaknesses.

Surveys

give the researcher a large body of respondents that assure a valid
sample.

Moreover, they provide data that can be statistically

manipulated to determine relationships among variables.

They do

not allow the researcher to probe the respondents’ responses to

assure a common understanding of terms or to allow respondents to
offer their own ideas of what is important.

Finally, as Sidney

Verba and Norman Nie’s attempts to determine the causal relationship

between variables related to organizational membership illustrates,

establishing causality is also problematical.^
Interviews give the researcher opportunities to delve into
the respondents’ minds and explore their ideas.

Open-ended questions

allow respondents to contribute their own insights and to clarify
xiii

points that the researcher may not
appreciate at the beginning of
the study.
The number of interviewees must
remain small, however,
raising the possibility of an
unrepresentative sampling of the

population being studied.

The data derived from interviews
is also

vulnerable to potential bias in the
interviewing process.

The

participant-observation process also places the
trained social
scientist in a situation to report experiences
and perceptions.
This process contains the potential for
bias that interviewing does,

perhaps in even greater degree as the
participant comes to share

values and orientations of the group.

Thus, each technique offers

opportunities and contains pitfalls for the researcher.
Interviews for this study were designed to ascertain
how

Boston ACORN has succeeded (as have ACORN chapters
in other places
since 1970) in attracting and maintaining members since
1980.

The

method of data collection is open-ended interviews with
volunteer
activists, leaders, and organizers of Boston ACORN.
The interviews probed the following kinds of questions:

*

1)

What incentives does the organization use to attract
members and keep them active?

2)

To what extent do members get involved in the
activities of the organization?

3)

What do the members perceive as the goals of the
organization?

4)

How much consensus is there on important political
issues among members and between members and organizers?

See Appendix

I

for the interview questionnaire.

xiv

5)

How are important decisions made in
ACORN?

6>

176 thE mem ers
Perceptions of the means by which
i’
Amo/ pursues political
ACORN
goals?

7)

What are the members’ feelings of
efficacy and perceptions of politicians?

'

Responses to these questions yield a picture
of the means
by which ACORN, a voluntary organization,
is able to get its

constituents to join and contribute their time,
energy, and other
resources to the organization on a sustained
basis.
it

In addition,

provides insights into the internal politics of
the organization

and the self -perceived impact of membership on
the constituents.

The Interviews

The researcher drew volunteers for interviews by asking
the Head Organizer of Boston ACORN to provide him with a list
of

willing interviewees.

The Head Organizer asked the organizers in

the office for possibilities and these names were given to the

researcher to contact and schedule.

There is no sense, therefore,

in which the interviews constitute a random sample of ACORN members.

Several of the interviewees signed up at a board meeting of the

organization; others were contacted by phone by the organizers.
The data shows that the sample is biased in favor of older members
and leaders, but includes some who are less active and newer.

(The

researcher interviewed all of the professional organizers who were
assigned to that office at the time.)

The interviews were scheduled

on enough weekends to enable working members to be included as well
xv

as retired members or those on welfare.

The questionnaire is designed to
satisfy three criteria:

addresses the basic questions raised in
the literature;

1)

it

it

is sufficiently open-ended to

2)

stimulate independent responses

from the interviewees; and 3) it addresses
experiences that might

result from ACORN activities, e.g.,
confrontational tactics,

neighborhood organizing, and participatory
membership.

The inter-

view was administered in a conversational format
and, at the end
of the interview, respondents were asked
if there were any topics

they felt were not covered adequately by the
questionnaire.

added comments about their experiences.

Several

Finally, interviewees were

asked to complete a second questionnaire, the text of which
is also
in Appendix I,

AH
accuracy.

to determine pertinent demographic information.

interviewees agreed to have the interview taped to insure
The researcher advised the interviewees that no part of

the interview would be attributed to them without their explicit

permission in order to preserve confidentiality.

All interviews

with members took place in private homes with the exception of one
that was held in the ACORN office in a private room.

The inter-

views with organizers were conducted in private at the ACORN office
or in a deli across the street.

The interviewees were quite generous with their time and
ideas.

The data from the interviews, most of which is included in

this study, provide many insights into the experiences and percep-

tions of the dynamic and interesting group of people engaging in

xvi

an unusual pursuit and belonging to an
unusual organization.
Their comments provide a useful contribution
to the understanding
of voluntary political organizations.
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CHAPTER

I

THEORIES OF POLITICAL ORGANIZATION
On July 12, 1980, thirteen delegates
to the Republican

National Convention that chose Ronald
Reagan as its presidential
standard bearer accepted an invitation to
tour the poorer neigh-

borhoods of Detroit.

It came from a leftist organization
that

represents low- and moderate-income people
called the Association
of Community Organizations for Reform
Now (ACORN).

The organiza-

tion was trying to point out the contradiction
between tremendous

development in Detroit's Renaissance Center and
neighborhoods
outside of the commercial district that had not benefitted
from
federal development grants.

The ACORN members rode with the

delegates on a church bus and offered their solutions to the
problems
of urban decay in a document they called "ACORN's
People's Platform."

Their suggestions included federal public housing, low- and
moderate-

income representation on corporate boards, and bank financing for

rehabilitation of low- income housing. ^

According to the New York

Tlmes reporter, Iver Peterson, one delegate, a Ms. Joanne Mueller,
of Hibbing, Minnesota, made an interesting comment:

"I tried to

tell them if they had a concern they should get involved in politics,

that's what

I

did."^

Despite her willingness to participate in ACORN's tour of
1

2

Detroit and her concern that
social problems be addressed
through
political action and membership
in political organizations,
Ms.

Mueller failed to recognize
political activity when it confronted
her.

Moreover, she failed to recognize
a relatively sophisticated

form of political activity, undertaken
by people from the lower
end of the income scale who are
generally noteworthy for their

lack of participation in American
politics.

Indeed, what is perhaps

most striking about the event is that
low- and moderate-income people
participated at all in an organization that
staged a media event to

demonstrate a contradiction within federal
urban policy by interacting with the more conservative of the
two major parties at the
time it was nominating its most conservative
candidate in almost

twenty years.

Political scientists have not taken such activities
for
granted or failed to recognize how unusual they are
among low-income

Americans.

Rather, they have attempted to develop theories to explain

when and how such activities are likely to occur.

While the most

rigorous of these arguments apply to middle— and upper-income
Americans, the long commitment of the left in American politics to

organizing and mobilizing lower income people has shed some light on
that phenomenon as well.

This study attempts to clarify certain

issues in the general literature on political organizing by applying
them in a case study of ACORN.

Organizational theories will be

tested against ACORN's efforts to organize low- and moderate-income

people for sustained political action.

The discussion begins with

3

a

review of the basic concepts

in the

literature on political

organizations.

Theories of P olitical Organization
It

is precisely the kind of
activity in which ACORN

engages-overt attempts to influence public
policy-that provides
the impetus for the study of
political organizations in American

political science.

Arthur F. Bentley, writing in
1908, attempted

to develop a systematic understanding
of political behavior divorced

from rhetoric and constitutions. 3

He emphasized the role of groups

and group interests in American politics,
arguing that neither

Fourth of July speeches about freedom nor
constitutional language
on the powers of the president is the
engine that drives the American

political system.

It

is,

instead, the interaction of political

interests expressed by groups in the political
system.
goal was to "fashion a tool" for this analysis. 4

Bentley's

His work prompted

subsequent studies by Pendleton Herring, E. E. Sc ha tt
schneider

5

and others that eschewed the traditional study of
political ideas
and government institutions.

From that time onward, a major theme

of political science would be the activities of groups and

organizations.
The post-war study of political organizations in political

science dates from David B. Truman's seminal work, The Governmental

Process

,

published in 1951.

It prompted renewed attention to

interest groups and other forms of non-electoral political

4

organization

6
.

Truman developed a theory of
Ameriean politics that

explains political outcomes as a
meshing of interests expressed
by
the various groups in society.
He directed attention to both
organized and unorganized groups,
which could be identified by
their shared interests.

Truman's influential work provoked
an out-

pouring of studies of interest groups—
how they interact, express

preferences, and form organized groups
as institutionalized expressions of their interests.
Two of Truman’s arguments have a
special relevance for this

work.

First, he says that organized groups
form during periods of

stress or rapid changes when people with
shared interests interact

more frequently.

Second, he contends that behavioral and
internal

dynamics of political groups are "shared in their
essential features,
with non-political patterns of social interaction.

The first of

these claims has become a pivotal point in the study
of the formation
of political organizations, while the second
has become a precedent

for studying the behavior of political organizations.

Truman

s

first point suggests a sociological model of group

formation that sees political organizations as emerging from "a

disturbance in an institutional pattern... or frustration in varying
degrees of the habits of the participants, a circumstance that is
always unpleasant and may be extremely painful.

Truman’s claim

is rooted in apparently rational patterns of behavior

— people

responding to stress by seeking others with whom they can alleviate
that stress.

Truman’s assertion which views political organizations

5

as operating on essentially
the same principles as
non-political
organizations leads him to borrow
theoretically from anthropology,
sociology, and organization theory 9
and to use concepts developed
in research on work
organizations and bureaucracies to
develop
insights into political organizations.

follow Truman's lead in this respect,

Many subsequent studies
other studies, however,

challenge this understanding of
political organizations, claiming
instead that political organizations
are unique and operate on
their own principles.

James Q. Wilson and Peter Clark, for
example, apply general

principles of organization to the study of
political organizations 10
.

They argue that all organizations "provide
tangible or intangible

incentives to individuals in exchange for
contributions of individual

activity to the organizations ." 11

Their analysis borrows an incentive

classification from Chester Barnard and claims that "much
of the
internal and external activity may be explained by
understanding
their incentive systems ." 12

Barnard, in his analysis of bureaucratic

organizations, 13 identifies three basic types of incentives:
solidary, and purposive.

material,

Material incentives are exchangeable,

referring to tangible rewards such as salary, tax benefits and the
like.

Solidary benefits are intangible socially-derived rewards,

such as status, social interaction, and conviviality.

Purposive

incentives are motivations deriving from a desire to achieve a

worthwhile goal.

Clark and Wilson argue that this "incentive system

may be regarded as the principle variable affecting organizational

6

behavior n1 ^
.

Other studies of political
organization have challenged
this approach, arguing instead
that political organizations
are

unique and operate on their own
principles.

Mancus Olson, Jr.,

an economist, applied economic
and marketing theory to the
question
raised by Truman’s analysis of the
formation of political groups.
His analysis, though strictly limited
to economic interest groups
and argued within an economic
rational choice model, raises serious

questions about Truman's sociological
model of group formation 15
.

Olson shows that one cannot take for
granted that it is logical
for people to respond to threats to
their interests by contributing

resources to an organization.

His application of economic

statistical analysis, using rational economic
models, casts new
light on the organization of interests and
suggests that it is not

reasonable to assume that organizations will form
in the political
system except under specific sets of circumstances.

Olson's argument rests on the distinction between
collective
and selective benefits.

everyone equally.

Collective benefits are those that affect

Selective benefits can be divided only among

those who have contributed to their creation.
it

Olson contends that

is unreasonable to expect an individual to expend resources

toward collective economic benefits expecting to "return a profit."
The only circumstances under which it is reasonable to expect people
to join and contribute to an organization are those in which there
is a positive balance of costs and benefits.

Olson claims that the

7

only way to create such a
balance is to (1) offer unrelated
selective
benefits to contributors, like
group insurance, (2) apply
legal
coercion, such as union shops and
medical associations do, or
(3)

only organize small groups
that are able to profit by
their efforts. 16
Olson
analysis is of particular importance
to low-income organizing
since success requires recruitment
of relatively large numbers.

Numerically, the most successful
attempt to organize low-income
Americans, the Congress of Industrial
Organizations, did not really
grow steadily until legal coercion
was implemented in the form of
the union shop.

Even then, however, unions continued
to provide

selective benefits such as job-training,
conviviality and newsletters.
Robert H. Salisbury's research on political
organizations once

again borrows from another discipline,
operating from Truman's premise

regarding the universality of organizational
17
dynamics.

He applies

exchange theory from sociology to devise a
theoretical approach to the

formation and maintenance of political groups.

He claims that a

political organization is an exchange system in which
an entrepreneur/
organizer offers inducements to consumer /member s to join,
participate,
and pay dues.

The model he proposes is similar to Olson's marketing

concept but personalizes it in the form of the entrepreneur.
is

neither true nor false but to be tested by its intellec—

tual utility." 18
it

His

Its importance stems from the historical insights

provides by focusing on "origins and originators" 19 of organiza-

tions as calculated acts and rational actors.
The above studies have laid the groundwork of basic concepts

8

and approaches to political
organizations, borrowing from
social
psychology, anthropology, organization
theory, economics, and
marketing theory. Recently, several
social scientists have tested
and evaluated these theories
using behavioral social science

approaches.

--

Two studies in particular, Terry
Moe's The Organization
20
Interests
and David Knoke and James R. Wood's
Organized for

Action,

1

have taken this approach and develop
syntheses of the

above theories backed by empirical
social science arguments.
Moe

s

research focuses specifically on economic
organizations

in an effort to test the model he
develops based on Olson's analysis

He includes the Minnesota Farm Bureau
Association, the Minnesota

Farmers Union, the Minnesota Retail Association,
the Minnesota-

Dakotas Hardware Association and the Printing
Industries of the
Twin Cities, all economically oriented organizations
that pursue

their goals by political means, principally lobbying.

From his

study, Moe offers revisions in Olson's theory of
interest group

formation that expand the scope of Olson's analysis to make the

explanatory model "simple enough to clarify the nature of individual
and organizational behavior, yet elaborate enough to address

questions that are obviously important to a more comprehensive

understanding

.

77

Moe's analysis addresses three areas pertinent to an

understanding of political organizations:

the decision individuals

make to join, the organizational framework, and the internal
politics of political organizations.

The membership decision

9

involves the prospective member's
rationale for joining an
organization. Moe argues that,
in Olson's economic
rationality
model, the assumption of perfect
knowledge of costs and benefits
restricts unduly the applicability
of his theory.
In Moe’s model,
actors possess "bounded rationality,"
and "imperfect perception of
the objective situation...."^

Moe retains the collective/

selective distinction but expands the
concept of benefits to
include the typology Clark and Wilson
offer—material, solidary,
and purposive— rather than strictly
economic benefits.

By

increasing the complexity of individual
motivation, Moe injects
a

clearly political dimension into the
analysis that Olson fails

to do

.

The organizational side of Moe’s analysis
includes an

entrepreneur/leadership concept as devised by Salisbury,
accompanied
by staff and other paid personnel such as
lobbyists and researchers.

The entrepreneur serves as a focus of attention to
examine

entrepreneurial options under varying conditions...." and
their
r\

effects on the organization.

f

He includes the internal politics

of organizations to add depth to the model and the
degree to which

the decision making process includes members, leaders and groups

within the organizations.

Moe is eclectic in his choice of concepts and analytical
techniques.

He relies heavily on variations in Olson’s analysis,

yet expands it to make it more inclusive, to inject more of a

political dimension, and to reflect as much as possible the kinds

10
Of organizations and phenomena
one is likely to find

in the

political system.

[0]nce we move beyond the idealized
world of perfect
information and economic self-interest,
we are no
longer led to Olson’s non-political
perspective. We
are led, rather, to a broader view
that leaves a good
eal of room for political action
and that outlines
the theoretical roles of perceptions
and values in
explaining why political action occurs.^

Moe’s model, for example, includes the
possibility of an entrepreneur

manipulating information critical to the
decision to join.

It is both

possible and likely that entrepreneurs will
exaggerate members’
efficacy and the value of benefits, and
also minimize the costs of

joining and participating in order to persuade
people to come into an
organization.

In this way, Moe seeks a median point
in his analysis

between the simple and theoretical, the complex and
real.

Knoke and Wood emphasize the role of internal controls
as a

determinant of organizational success:

The internal social control system plays an essential
role in an organization’s ability to acquire resources
necessary to sustain collective life. Resources
available to the organization, in turn, are crucial
for the attainment of the group’s external goals.

Their organizational model highlights what they consider the three

most important determinants for success:

purposive incentives,

opportunities to participate, and the legitimacy of leadership.
They reason that an organization must mobilize its resources in
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order to achieve its goals.

Mobilization occurs when the
organi-

sational control system can elicit
commitment from membership and
apply resources toward
organizational goals. Their findings
indicate that

Associations trying to develop high
levels of membership
enthusiasm should try to foster all
three conditions
conducive to more effective organizational
selfregulatiou: a n emphasis on the
purposive benefits from
affiliation, widespread opportunities
for membership
participation in making important decisions,
and ties
to supralocal units that
exercise formally legitimate
restraints on local policy.

By arguing for the importance of
purposive incentives, Knoke

and Wood favor the Truman approach
to group organization.

Their

arguments for the importance of participation
and legitimacy diverge
from Olson's analysis of benefit
distribution problems.

Their

findings, however, should not be seen as a
refutation of Olson's

claims, especially in light of what Moe argues:

Olson's view is

limited to a specific type of organization, and the
applicability of
his analysis to that organizational type is further
limited by his

ideal type economic model.

This discussion of political entrepreneurship and incentive

theories of political organizations strongly suggests parallels

between political organizing and product marketing.

Olson's writing,

in particular, develops analogies between these activities.

It

useful, therefore, in both an analytical and practical sense, to

think of political organizations as products to be marketed.

In

is
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this case study of ACORN, the
market is low- and moderate-income

citizens and the product is membership
and participation in a
political organization. Owing in
part to the peculiar nature of
this market and product, this
analysis focuses on a somewhat

different notion:

the idea of an "organizing strategy."

concept familiar to community organizing
professionals and

It

is a

a

term

that Moe uses at least once. 28
An organizing strategy is a long-range
plan for creating

and maintaining a political organization.

The components of an

organizing strategy are (1) the targeted
constituency,
terms of the exchange relationship, and
structure.

(3)

(2)

the

the organizational

Each component is dependent upon the others
and plays

a crucial role in the life of the organization.

While the

relationship between these organizational features
obtain in any
kind of political organizing, no matter the constituency
or goals
of the organizer/entrepreneur,

the concept of organizing strategy

has not been fully articulated in the political science
literature.
It is so basic to

so

much of politics, however, that analysts have

discussed parts of the concept, either directly or indirectly, and

occasionally used the Salisbury thesis in this way. 29

But the

notion has not been applied as explicitly as its centrality to
political action demands.
The targeted constituency is the segment of the entire

population from which a political organizer attempts to draw members.
Many criteria are possible:

sex,

income, race, age, occupation.
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ideology, and so on.

The choice of criteria
shapes every other

decision the entrepreneur makes,
including the incentives to
offer,
resources to seek from members,
organizational structure, and issue
agenda
Like the market in the economy,
the constituency one chooses
to attract determines the
terms of exchange.
The question must be
asked. What can I offer, and what
can they give? The incentives
the organizer offers must be
suited to the tastes of the
constituency
to motivate prospective members
to join,

resources.

m

be active, and contribute

The constituents’ status in society—
the role they play

the social, economic, and political
spheres— determines the

resources they can most easily and
effectively supply to the organization.

Harry Spence, for example, notes that
"The exercise of

economic power by the poor to relieve their
condition is foreclosed
to them by definition.

power or violence....

They have only the choice of political
Thus, the organizer /entrepreneur must

offer the targeted constituents something they
need in return for

something they have and can afford to expend.

Organizational form is the physical shape of the organization.
It

includes factors such as the size of constituent groups, the

presence or absence of meetings, dues, the physical location of

organizational headquarters, and so on.

One need only consider the

differences between community and workplace organizing or mailing
list and grassroots organizing to appreciate the importance of this

factor in an organizing strategy.

While this concept is not
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entirely distinct from the exchange
relationship-the higher the
dues, for example, the greater
the demand made on the constituentsit

is useful to account for the
differences that unit size makes to

the operation of an organization
and its ability to attract and

sustain members, for example.
Thus,

strategy

it is

possible to distill the concept of
"organizing

from the literature on political
organizations.

The

concepts of incentives, entrepreneurs,
rational choice, and

marketing strategy all suggest such an
approach.

Like a marketing

strategy, however, an organizing strategy
must suit its constituents,
and some approaches are more fruitful
than others.

The next chapter

will discuss the kinds of organizing strategies
that have been tried

with low- income organizing and attempt to formulate
some research
questions that might yield a better understanding of
political
organizing.
7)

Some of the questions to be addressed are:

1) Under what circumstances will targeted constituents
decide
that it is in their interests to join a political
organization?

What kinds of incentives are used in the circumstances found
in this specific case and why?

2)

3)

Are those the same incentives that keep members active?

How do members perceive the purposive incentives the
organization offers?
4)

5)

Are purposive incentives shared by members and organizers?

6) How important is participation in the decisionmaking
process as perceived by the members?

What role does the organizational structure play in the
success or failure of the organization?

15

This study concentrates on the
activities and perceptions of
members and organizers of one low-income
group ACORN with the

—

—

goal of shedding new or additional
light on the questions

pertaining to political organizations.
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CHAPTER

II

PRINCIPLES OF LOW-INCOME ORGANIZING
Major studies of political participation
show a clear,

consistent and strong correlation between
socioeconomic status
(SES) and membership in political
organizations:

higher income

and upper status citizens participate
more, both quantitatively

and qualitatively, than do those at the
other end of the income
and status continuum. 1

While many studies document the relationship

between SES and group membership, Sidney Verba
and Norman H. Nie
explore the implications of that relationship
for public policy
and power relationships.

They find, in cross-national studies,

that the correlation between political
participation and SES in the
U.S. is as high or higher than in any of the
other nations studied.

2

They note, for example, that 57% of the respondents
who scored in
the highest one-sixth category of participation on their
scale were
in the upper third of the SES index.

lowest third.

Only 14% of them were from the

Hence, the upper SES people who participate at the

highest rates numerically outnumber the lower two-thirds SES group.
It

is not a statistical sleight-of-hand that makes SES and political

participation seem so closely connected.

As Verba and Nie explain,

the "relationship that looks so moderate from some perspectives
(the correlation between our SES and participation scales is, after
18

19

all, only .37) is in fact
a quite striking one
from the point of
view of what it implies about
the
4

composition of a population."

Verba and Nie speculate as
to whether group membership
is a
factor that increases or
decreases the impact of SES
on political
participation. They find that for
an individual group
membership
increases the amount of participation
more for low SES participants
than for high SES participants.
Given the higher rate of membership
among upper SES citizens, the
overall effect of group membership
in
,

American politics is to "push in
the direction of increasing
the
5
disparity” of influence between
class.

Table 2-1 illustrates the organizational
activity of people
in different SES categories:

TABLE 2-1

PROPORTIONS ORGANIZATIONALLY ACTIVE IN LOWER
MIDDLE
AND UPPER THIRD OF SES (in per cent)*”
1

Lower SES

Middle SES

Upper SES

Total

Nonmember

56

34

20

38

Passive Member

23

22

21

22

Single Active

16

28

24

22

6

16

35

19

101

100

100

101

Multiple Active
Total
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The findings of Verba and Nie
strongly suggest that lack of

participation in political organizations
by lower SES groups
reduces their influence on public
policies that affect their lives.
Truman’s sociological model of
group formation is problematic
for the study of low-income
organizations.

He argues that political

organizations emerge in times of stress,
yet low-income Americans
are in a more or less continual
state of distress but join organizations in lower numbers than higher
income Americans.

Truman

points out that while low-income people
suffer unemployment and
other dislocations during economic
slumps or adjustment periods,
their low rate of political participation
means they have no

organized channels through which to express
grievances.

This

increases the potential for radical political
movements, which have
not internalized the prevailing political
folkways that encourage

stability in the political system.

Short of a radical outcome,

Truman believes that government will continue to be
skewed in favor
of upper-income citizens at the expense of
lower-income interests.

The lower rate of low-income participation in political
organizations

thus both renders the political system less stable and denies
a major

portion of society equal opportunity to express its political interests.
The concern of political analysts for the low rate of

participation among low- income Americans spans the political spectrum.
The question of how to attract and maintain low-income members is of

critical importance to both leftist organizers and conservatives,

although for different reasons.

It

is a widespread belief among
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leftists that the way to achieve
social justice in American
politi,
:ics
ia through sustained,
organized political

power of the lower classes,

which has led among other things
to their support for the
labor
movement. Saul Alinsky premised
his early organizing and
writing
on this idea.
Conservatives have also considered
ways to build
organizational ties among low-income
Americans as a way to stem anomie
and potentially destructive
radical mass movements. Among
social
scientists, however, there is little
agreement about the most

effective way to organize low-income
people.

To understand the

debate and the possibilities for success
in this endeavor,

it

is

first necessary to examine the
explanations commonly given for the

difficulties encountered in organizing low-income
people.
Organizat ional Problems in Low-Income Organizing
Almond and Verba, as well as Verba and Nie,
suggest hypotheses
to explain the lower rate of organizational
membership among lower-

income respondents.

They suggest that factors contributing to

upper SES activism might include higher levels of social
and

organizational skills, socialization processes that encourage group
activity, greater resources like time and money, stimulation
by
their active SES cohorts, and a higher sense of efficacy with respect
to political activism.

At this point, however,

to determine the flow of relationships.

it becomes difficult

For example, which of the

following most accurately depicts reality?
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—* GROUP

1

SES

2

SES

GROUP MEMBERSHIP

3

SES

GROUP MEMBERSHIP

l

EFFICACY

MEMBERSHIP
EFFICACY

EFFICACY

Survey data that is available does
not permit determination of
the
causal flow with any certainty. Verba
and Nie, for example,

qualify their claim that "organizations
do have an independent
effect over and above any such general
propensity toward activity”

because "participation proneness" can only
be measured indirectly

8
.

They are clearest in connecting the
importance of low-income group

membership to political participation and
political outcomes in
the U.S. when they point out that, while
group membership's effects
on political participation exaggerates
upper-income political

influence, this is not the case in other political
systems:

Participation, looked at generally, does not necessarily
help one social group rather than another.
The general
model of the sources and consequences of participation
that we have presented could work in a number of ways.
It could work so that lower— status citizens were
more
effective politically and used that political effectiveness to improve their social and economic circumstances.
Or it could work, as it appears to do in the United
States, to benefit upper-status citizens more.
It
depends on what organizations, parties, and belief
systems exist, and how these all effect participation
rates.
Participation remains a powerful social force
increasing or decreasing inequality.
It depends on who
takes advantage of it
.

Hence, those seeking political equality would do well to engage

low-income people actively in voluntary organizations, especially
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those that deal with community
problems and political issues.
To
do so requires an understanding
of the problems encountered
in lowincome organising, and the
political organization literature

provides limited guidance in this
area.

W11S ° n,S

argues that low _ inCQme

citizens are best organized around
material incentives, solidary
incentives that provide "opportunities
for vivid and uninhibited

expansion of core lifestyles," and
purposive incentives that
"involve personal and intense, not
anonymous or vicarious
experience.

He claims too that low-income activists
operate in

a relatively shorter time frame
than do upper-income activists . 12

That claim is echoed by Saul Alinsky and
others who have studied
the organizational politics of low-income
citizens 13
.

As a result

of this shorter time frame, low-income
activists need to be

constantly working on issues or member activism
diminishes.

Thus,

the combination of incentive types and shorter
time frame requires

political organizations of low-income citizens to produce
a stable
supply of what Sherry Arnstein terms "deliverables," 1 ^
i.e.,

outcomes of political demands expressed by the organization and
conceded by government or other opponents in the political system.
Arnstein'

s

analysis closely parallels Alinsky' s contention that

low- income organizing requires the delivery of "wins," that are

quickly achieved and yield visible benefits wrested from political
and economic institutions 15
.

Without a steady supply of

"deliverables," building a political organization of low- income

24

citizens is thought virtually
impossible by Arnstein and Alinsky.
Hence, it is necessary for an
organizer of low-income people
to
include ways and means of procuring
such benefits on a regular
basis.
This leads Alinsky to enunciate
three basic tenets of

community organizing:

1)

issues must be winnable; 2) tactics
must

entail confrontation; and 3) the
organizing process must provide

opportunities to express anger and overcome
fear.
These analyses yield useful insights
into participation of
low SES individuals.

None of them, however, adequately
explores

the perspectives of the groups least
likely to participate in

political decisionmaking:

racial minorities and low-income people.

A full study of why certain groups in
the system are participating
far less regularly and effectively should
examine the experiences

and perceptions of those groups more carefully.

It should also

examine the integral relationship between power and
participation.

A recent study of politics and power in Appalachia by
John Gaventa
takes this approach."^
Gaventa’

s

analysis is a study of power.

He argues that

neither the pluralists nor their critics explain enough about
the

relations between the powerful and the powerless, nor does either

adequately identify the causes of class differences in participation
rates.

He claims that there are three dimensions of power in

American politics, the first treated by the pluralists, the second
by the critics of pluralism, and the third primarily by sociologists

like C. Wright Mills and Steven Lukes.
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The pluralists, Gaventa argues,
accurately depict power

struggles in American politics,
but only those that pit
reasonably
evenly matched opponents within
decisionmaking institutions.
These
struggles are based on democratic
principles of conflict and involve
opposing arrays of strategies and
resources applied in public policy
settings. When an issue arises between
less evenly matched opponents,
however, the stronger side is able
to apply resources to deny
the
other side access to decisionmaking
institutions and can thereby

prevent an issue from being placed on
the political agenda.

Schattschneider describes this as the "mobilization
of bias," and
it

is the second level of power
analysis.

Gaventa, however, sees a

"third face of power."

This third dimension of power exists when
power resources are
so highly skewed in favor of one group
that they are able to go

beyond

bias."

This

third face of power is more extreme.

It

influences, shapes, or determines conceptions of the
necessities,

possibilities, and strategies of challenge in situations of
latent

conflict."
c[uo;

18

Hence, powerless people do not challenge the status

they accept it as legitimate and inevitable.

Gaventa suggests

a number of processes by which powerholders maintain
consensus

through apathy and quiescence of the powerless despite clear
conflicts of interest:

1)

controlling information and manipulating

symbols; 2) instilling fatalism by consistently denying opposing
claims; 3) denying the benefits of participation, including political

education; and

4)

manipulating emerging attempts to challenge the
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status quo 19
.

In the case of low-income
citizens who attempt to become

politically active by promoting
economic issues that will
redistribut
wealth, the third dimension of
power works in the following
manner:
public and private institutions
withhold as much information as
possible and couch their arguments
as defending free enterprise
1)

against "creeping socialism";
2) the low-income activists are
easily
intimidated as they have no experience
or tradition of political

victory to bolster them;

the activists are also somewhat
weak

3)

in their convictions since they
do not have a background of

political activism to educate them "in
the broadest sense" 20 about
their rights in a democratic society;
and 4) for the above reasons,
the activists are easily intimidated and
misled by the arguments and

strategies of their opponents.

Thus, where the pluralist political

system is populated primarily by upper-income,
better educated
people, and Schatt Schneider

’

s

analysis adds only one dimension to

the process by which large portions of the
citizenry are excluded

from the political process, Gaventa explains much
more and in terms
that are testable and therefore suited to the tools
of political
sc ience

Gaventa applies his theory of power relations to an

explanation of apathy and quiescence among people in Appalachia who
are clearly receiving a disproportionately low level of benefits
from society.

In his view,

it

is not a matter of cultural values,

consensus, or a lack of resources as pluralists claim,

nor is it
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merely a matter of the
.obligation of bias successfully
excluding
them.

It

is, rather, a situation
in which "power serves
to main-

tain [the] prevailing order
of inequality.

..

through the shaping of

beliefs about the order's
legitimacy or immutability " 22
that makes
it difficult to organize
low-income citizens into unions,
welfare
rights organizations, or groups
like ACORN.
Robert Botsch, for
example, interviewed North Carolina
furniture workers who objected
to union organizing despite
the clear benefits of increased
wages,
safer working conditions, and the
fairer work practices they agreed
unions provide, and concluded that
people who have been dominated
tend to lose sight of the possibility
for change 23
.

In his analysis of power, Gaventa
offers a process by which

he claims powerless groups can build
power that will enable them
to bargain and compete successfully
in a genuinely pluralist

fashion.

His theory is essentially a reversal of the
three

dimensions of power by developing a "consciousness
of the needs,
possibilities, and strategies of change "; 24 then,
they must "over-

come the mobilization of bias "; 25 and finally,
they must develop
resources with which to conduct political action in
decisionmaking

areas of the first dimension of power.

It

is,

in fact, only in

the first dimension of power, Gaventa claims, that
"genuine

participation" takes place:

"self-determined action with others

similarly affected upon clearly conceived and articulated
grievances.
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Gaventa' s prescription for arriving at that point and his
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analysis of the dimensions of
power suggest the basic
tenets of
community organizing. First,
winnability is crucial, because
a
"single victory helps to alter
inaction owing to the anticipation
of defeat, leading to more
action, and so on. Once
patterns of
quiescence are broken upon one set
of grievances, the accumulating
resources of challenge-e.g.
organization, momentum, consciousness,

may become transferable to other
issues and other targets ." 27
Second, confrontational tactics~"to
err on the side of too

much action"

help to overcome institutional
barriers against low-

income activism.

Confrontation gives institutional leaders
reason

to want to include the activists
without having to be subjected to

confrontational politics.

activists has what

it

Clearly, if an organization of low-income

considers effective access to an institution’s

decisionmaking process,

it will not

take the trouble to fill

meeting rooms with raucous, shouting protestors.

If they must,

however, the resistance that they experience
demonstrates for the

politically uninitiated the nature of institutional
barriers and
their effectiveness in preventing grievances from
being aired in

the institutional agenda.

The members who learn this lesson are

then better able to begin working on bringing down those
barriers
and perceive others more readily.

Finally, when low- income activists have dealt effectively

with their anger and fear, other things being equal, they are
prepared to use their available resources more effectively in power

struggles with government and corporate leaders.

It

is at that
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Point that Dahl's advice in

M^ejlevclntion?

is apptoptiate:

In order for those who
are politically weak to
push
through a crucial if still
incompleted process of
democratization, they have to learn
howto pyramid
h e ir political resources
very much in the way that
xn the economrc realm,
an aggressive young man-onthe make sometimes arranges
to transform his personal
situation from poverty to riches. 28
’

Prior to that, however,
resources, energy, strategy and
organization
must all be focused on the highly
unequal struggle to achieve
some
degree of political parity on
the road from quiescence to
meaningful
activism. Gaventa argues that, in
addition to the special problems
that Wilson and others cite in
organizing low-income people, the
power relations that exist prior to
any organizing attempt are a

critical factor in the means by which
the organizing must be

conducted.

According to Gaventa, the three dimensions
of power

determine the course of any organizing
projects by requiring the
three techniques mentioned above.

low-income organizing.

Clearly, they are mainstays of

There are, moreover, other considerations

that play roles in determining the most
desirable organizing

strategies to use in low— income organizing.

Constraints and Available Choices

There are constraints on the organizing strategy that an

organizer must accept.

Constituents cannot give what they do not

have, will only respond to meaningful incentives, and require a

profitable exchange before they will join and maintain an organiza-
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tion.

The resources the organizer
wishes to offer must be available in some form at a price
that "customers” are willing
to pay.
In addition,

the organizational form the
organizer adopts must

suit both the constituents
and the resources the
organization seeks
to offer.
Richard Rich describes a
"political economy" of

community organizations that
delineates many of the constraints
that community organizations
face 29
.

He argues that the two

major costs are decisionmaking
costs and deprivation costs 30
.

Decisionmaking costs are the resources
expended in collective
decisionmaking, while deprivation costs
are the price of "being
bound by group decisions that run
counter to their [individual]

preferences ." 31
is the

The decisionmaking process with
the highest cost

unanimity rule, i.e., it requires much
more effort to

achieve unanimous agreement than majority
agreement to binding
decisions.

The highest deprivation costs are
experienced in

oligarchical groups in which a small leadership
cadre makes and
enforces binding decisions on the membership
as work organizations
do.

The interplay of these factors means that the
rational choice

for communities with few resources and high
demands is to remain

unorganized and risk nothing or to adopt an "exit choice,"
i.e.,

allow for an option to quit, both of which would minimize both
types of costs. 32

Rich argues,

'From the individual's short-term perspective,"

voluntarism may be a highly rational response to the

resource situation of poor citizens, even though it may handicap
OO

the community in the long run."

Thus, minimizing risk-taking

31

for individuals and making
the der-icinr,
aecislon to join more attractive
8 tne
•

.

weakens the organization that
nay subsequently be created.
The need to form voluntary
organizations with exit choices
in low-income neighborhoods
leads to an increase in the
costs of

organizational maintenance and the
reliance on selective and
purposive incentives as substitutes
for coercion 34
.

Rich compares

neighborhood groups from communities
of varying SES and finds that
the higher the SES, the greater
the likelihood that coercive

organizations— property owner groups and
community development
organizations

will exist.

The greatest concentration of

neighborhood organizations of any kind
was in middle-income
neighborhoods, since low-income neighborhoods
are handicapped by
the dynamics described above and
upper-income neighborhoods reflect

individualist strategies to meet residential
needs.

In addition to

the higher maintenance costs of the
voluntary organizations. Rich

found that coercive organizations were more
effective in obtaining

collective material goods for their neighborhoods.^

Hence, Rich

argues that the choices available to low-income
neighborhoods are
limited and not very attractive.

Moreover, they impose additional

constraints on the organizer as well.
It

is generally agreed among those studying voluntary

organizations that the problems posed by Olson regarding rational
choices in pursuit of collective action demand that organizers
adopt two somewhat contradictory strategies:

reliance on purposive

incentives and stimulation of maximum constituent participation.^
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This dynamic Is exaggerated
among low-income constituents
where
1) purposive incentives are
easily obtainable, while
material
goods are not, and 2) the
lack of material resources
requires that
low-income constituents contribute
their
11 iaDor
labor to
tn bU
the organization.
Moe argues that these dynamics
conflict, since purposive
incentives
or ideology increase the
power of professional staff
and frequently
displace the goal of
organization-building. 37 H e argues
that the
staff "who control political
information and expertise and
perform

valuable political services will
find they have a stronger
basis
38
for influence."
Goal displacement occurs when
"the group's goals
are not a means to. ..ends, but are
ends in themselves that take
on

value because of the ideological
nature; they are, from the
entrepreneur's standpoint, the raison d'etre
of the association." 39

When goal displacement occurs, Moe
argues, "entrepreneurs" or
organizers attempt to prevent constituent
input into goal-setting
by developing other incentive
structures, propagandizing, manipulating

group activities toward group goals only,
and hiring staff according
to their beliefs rather than their
competence AO

Constraints therefore pose real problems for
organizers

attempting to build low- income organizations.

The effect of these

constraints is that organizers are forced to rely on
voluntary
organizations, develop some form of purposive incentives, and

stimulate constituent participation as much as possible.

Accomodating

these constraints, however, are only the first set of choices to
be
made.
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Available Choices
The idea of constraints on
choices of organizing
strategies
is of course theoretical.

Organizers have historically
chosen a

wide variety of exchange
relationships and organizational
fores
with varying degrees of
success.
To develop further the
notion of
organizing strategy and to
delineate the available options
requires
an exaeination of different
organizing strategies that
have been
attempted with low-income
constituents.
One of the more closely studied
organizing strategies for
low-income constituents is that of
the National Welfare Rights

Organization (NWRO)

.

The constituency of the short-lived
NWRO

was welfare recipients, mostly
female, black, and clearly lowincome.

Lawrence Bailis found that NWRO members
had an especially

intense dependence upon governmental
service agencies for their

livelihood and that many were not receiving
nearly the amount of
government benefits to which they were
entitled.

This clear and

easily remedied gap between entitlements
and benefits provided a

unique opportunity for organizers of the NWRO.

It offered the

chance to obtain "tangible benefits that are
quickly realizable ."^ 1
An exchange relationship could thereby be created
in which

material incentives were offered to members by the
organizer's

ability to manipulate welfare entitlement regulations while
making
the least possible demand on their welfare constituency.
put it,

demands on the membership should be minimized:

As Bailis

the less
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asked, the better ."^ 2
The organizational form
of the NWRO was simple.

The

organizers developed lists of
welfare recipients by any
means they
could and contacted
prospective constituents to
persuade them that
they could obtain increased
benefits through the NWRO.
The
organizers then staged a mass
meeting of recipients in a
local
church or hall, elected
pre-appointed officers by acclamation,
and took the meeting to
the local welfare office
to demand

supplementary benefits for items
such as furniture, winter
clothing,
and other special grants written
into welfare legislation but
poorly publicized.

Dues were one dollar per year,
used largely

as a token of members' contribution
and an expression of commitment
and to accommodate the standard
organizational rituals for the sake
of lobbying claims and inquiries
regarding funding sources . 43
Finally, although individual NWRO
chapters lasted less than a year,

during that time, organizers maintained
"intensive and continuing

personal contact" with the members 44
.

For the most part, the groups

were loose, short-lived, closely managed
by staff, and based largely
on personal relations between members
and staff.

Nationally, the NWRO could not sustain itself long
either.
The source of its incentives, the special
grants from the welfare

offices, dried up when state legislatures instituted flat
grant

systems of benefits.

Other strategies, such as advocacy and

grievances, were insufficient to maintain the organization since

recipients of such benefits from the NWRO no longer had reason to
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Stay in the organization
when their problem was
resolved.

The only

purposive incentive attempted
was to convey the belief
that "(t]he
reason welfare is so bad is
because welfare recipients
are not
organized. One by one they can't
get what they need because
they
have no power— and that's what
this country responds to,
power ." 45
Any ideological articulation
beyond that was eschewed: the
NWRO
organizers "put down attempts at
ideological justification for a

course of action as 'radical bullshit .'" 46

Nor, as their organizing

strategy dictated, did the NWRO
attempt to stimulate constituent
participation.

Rather, they made as few demands
as possible in

order to keep the benefit/cost ratio
as high as possible.
The NWRO was therefore incapable
of developing or maintaining

incentives adequate to the constituents
it sought to organize.
Material benefits had only a short-term
effectiveness, and the

organizers chose not to develop members' commitment
through participation or purposive incentives to inspire
constituent allegiance.
The combination of targeted constituency,
exchange relationship,
and organizational form was not effective
in the environment in

which it was attempted.
it

While a single case does not prove a rule,

is clear that this organizing strategy did not
operate within

the constraints outlined above with the predicted
consequences.

Another organizing strategy that has been widely attempted
is Saul

Alinsky's technique of community organizing.

NWRO, as Joan Lancourt has shown

,

Unlike the

Alinsky's groups lasted, in

some cases, for many years, rescuing several communities from
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urban blight and providing
services to community residents
on a
long-term basis.
The constituency targeted
by Alinsky organizers
was the leadership of local
community organizations within
low- and
moderate-income neighborhoods. These
included religious leaders,
block club officers, people in
business organizations, and
officers
of ethnic organizations.
Alinsky and his organizers tried
to
enroll these leaders and their
organizations as constituent groups
under umbrella organizations set
up by Alinsky.

The exchange relationship between
organizer and constituents
was more varied and intense than
the NWRO's.

It

is basic to

Alinsky groups to offer immediate,
tangible incentives to their
constituents, such as jobs, fair treatment
at the local supermarket,
and improved city services.

Longer-term goals of Alinsky groups

included establishing services such as
Community Development

Corporations and protecting neighborhoods
from urban redevelopment
and freeway construction.

The purposive incentives offered were

the ideals of democratic participation
in the political system for
the local leadership of the community.

The intended result of the

incentive system was to enable "each intermediate or
short-term

struggle to broaden the participants' consciousness,
propelling
them on to the next set of issues.

Without this clear, overall

perspective, which imbues individual victories with a larger
significance, the benefits of each advance, no matter how valuable...,

may dissipate, overwhelmed by the new problems arising from the
ever -changing reality."
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Hence, the incentive system is structured
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to expand the constituent

cogent

and understanding

iron,

the

immediate and concrete to
the more distant and
idealistic.
The demands Alinsky
groups made on the
constituents were
greater than the NWRO's.
The Alinsky confrontation
technics
required members to Picket,
picket rallv
rally, and protest at
times, and to
PP rt local institutions such
as the Community
Development

Corporations at others.

Lancourt points out that
the demands on

leaders was far greater than
it was on members of
the constituents’
49
groups.
Compared to the NWRO, however,
participants in Alinsky

groups were asked to provide
a great deal more of
the resources
necessary for organization-building
and achievement of community
goals.

The organizational form of
the Alinsky

above, is the federated umbrella
structure.

constituent groups

groups, as noted
The dues payers are

churches, ethnic organizations, and
block

clubs.

The boards of the Alinsky groups
consist of leaders of the
constituent groups who meet regularly
and make the important

decisions about group goals and
strategies.

The boards receive

a great deal of guidance from
the organizers early in the process

who then withdraw until they actually
leave the organization

completely to its own devices after a
pre-determined period of
time

—usually

four years.

The Alinsky groups generally stay within the
constraints

outlined above.

They exercise some important options regarding

constituency and organizational form as well as applying
conscious
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progression of incentives
designed to develop the
allegiance and
sophistication of its
constituents. They also
demand a fait
degree of participation
from constituents, as
Moe argues is
necessary. White that
increases the cost of a
henefit/cost ratio,
the relative success
of Alinsky groups and
the NWRO suggests
that
there may be utility in
that strategic choice.
There is then no consensus
as to the most effective
means
of organizing low- and
moderate-income people for
political action.
There are principles and
techniques that have been
developed and
rules guiding their use
given the constraints of
different
settings.
But there is no one right
wa*.
Understanding the

politics of low-income
organizations requires further
examination
of these groups, and that
of course is what the study
does.
It
looks specifically at the
organizing strategy of the Boston
ACORM
chapter to determine which choices
they have made to attract and
maintain members in their organization.
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THE ACORN ORGANIZING
STRATEGY
The plan that ACORN
uses as an organising
strategy for lowincome people lends itself
to analysis because
it is clearly
articulated and recorded in
a variety of places.
The founder of
ACORN, Wade Rathke, drafted
this plan, much as the
Boston Model of
the NWRO was drafted,
before he began his work.
Rathke designed
the ACORN organizing
strategy so that it could
be executed and
replicated throughout the
country. Moreover, he has
cited the
sources that inspired his
organizing plan.
For these reasons, it
is possible to apply
the foregoing analysis of
organizing strategy

to the ACORN organization.

When Rathke began the organization
he was working as an
organizer for the Massachusetts
Welfare Rights Organization (MWRO)
He developed a plan to organize
a majority constituency
using

techniques that would mobilize lower
class Americans.

He promoted

the idea with the MWRO and
received a grant to go to Little Rock,

Arkansas to create such an organization.

Rathke described his

goal

With the welfare issue, you're always
dealing with a
minority. We all knew that we had to
break out of
the single-issue campaign.
I wanted to build on a
majority constituency rather than on a minority,
where the next-door neighbors are in it
together,
not fighting each other.
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Hence, Rathke clearly
fits the Salisbury model
of an organizer/
entrepreneur with a strategy
for selling an
organization to a
group ln the political
system.
Moreover, he has discussed
his
Plan in a variety of sources,
including m«os, news
artlcles> and
commentaries on organizing
techniques.

Rathke also provides the
sources of ideas for his
organizing
strategy. The nature of the
sources and the manner in
which Rathke
blended them shows both what
his intentions were and
the kinds of
problems he thought were important.
All of the sources of ideas
were organizations attempting
to organize low-income
people.
The
Civil Rights Movement developed
the ideas of using confrontational
tactics, as did Saul Alinsky's
community organizing. Fred Ross
of
the United Farm Workers developed
the notion of house meetings
"to
build a sense of community among
potential organization members ..." 2
The membership dues system
started with the labor movement and
the

Non-Partisan League of North Dakota

3
.

The notion of training and

supporting professional organizers was
also a product of Non-Partisan

League organizing.

Finally, the idea of developing a clearly

articulated model and applying

it

in

neighborhoods across the

country was inspired by the Boston Model
created by Rhoda Linton
and Bill Pastreich.
The Boston Model was used as "the basis for
NWRO's ability
to send raw white organizers ... into Minnesota,
Ohio,

Illinois,

Rhode Island, and New York and, in a matter of months,
produce

organization.

4

Rathke, the former NWRO organizer, devised a
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similar organizing strategy
designed for a majority
constituency.
Because the plan is inspired
by previous attempts
to solve
specific organizing problems
of the past, it is
possible to
identify in the ACORN organizing
strategy what Rathke saw
as the
relevant problems and the most
suitable solutions, i.e., how
do
you create and sustain a
political organization of lowand

moderate-income citizens in American
politics?
The fact that the ACORN
organizing strategy is, like the

Boston Model, designed to be
implemented and replicated anywhere
in the country also reinforces
the notion that it is very much
like a marketing strategy consciously
designed to appeal to a
specific constituency within the
political system.

The fact that

the strategy has been applied for
over fifteen years in settings

both urban and rural and in
twenty-six states, plus the District
of Columbia, clearly indicates
that the strategy is capable of

dealing with many of the problems of
low-income organizing cited
in the previous chapter.

Finally, the goal that Rathke set for ACORN,
"Power to the
People,

makes clear the intention of its founder and provides
a

guide for evaluating its success.

In more formal terms, Rathke

describes the goal of the organization in the beginning of
his
detailed memo entitled "ACORN Community Organizing Model":
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To bulld a mass community
organization which has
as its prynary principle
the development of sufficient
t0 aChleVe lts ^dividual
members’
tatere^s^Us
h JecClves
and ln connection with
other groups,
groups its state
r
interests.
The oreanhshinn
must be permanent with
multi-issued concert achieved
through multi-tact iced [sic]
direct action, and m^ter
ip participating in policy,
financing, and achievement
group goals and community
improvements. 5
.

.

%

'

The model, when applied in
neighborhoods across the country,
aims
at building a national
organization made up of the local
chapters

which can "deal with the
manifestations of power in whatever
rm they take.

When the local groups coordinate
their efforts,

Rathke believes, they are capable
of redistributing power in the
American political system to the ACORN
constituency.

The Targeted Constituency

The targeted constituency in the ACORN
organizing strategy
is a majority of the American
people.

Writing in 1975 with Steven

Rest in the ACORN Organizing Handbook
#2, Rathke stated:
it is imperative that ACORN see as
its constituency
all the people in this country who are shut
out of...
Power.
As a rough working guide ACORN has
traditionally defined this constituency as consisting
of those of low to moderate income.
By any standards
you hit upon, that constituency contains within
it a
majority of the people in this country. It is that
majority that is going to have to be organized if
there is any hope for changing for reversing the
prevailing distribution of power
.

—

—

.

Hence, the constituency that Rathke targeted is defined by its

income and lack of power.

It

is clear from ACORN’s history that
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an

racial groups are
included, and that,
essentially, the
criterion of income has
remained consistent.
The selection of
members occurs by the
area in which people
live.
Since neighborhoods are
heterogeneous in their
economic
makeup it is possible
for members to be
relatively well off. The
choice of neighborhoods
that ACORN organises
is determined by a
,

variety of considerations:

This happens in one of
two ways:
Either ACORN
invited into a neighborhood
by some
m of itsS

reL

- S>

P ic ^/^or :arL^ st::tegJc
easons a neighborhood to
be organized.
The Board
might choose a neighborhood
because it is in a citv
C
d
h re AC ° RN 1Sn,t as
as it would
iRe to £eUke
be, or b
,
because the
racial or income character
Of the neighborhood will
help give the overall
organization its vital balan
Lt; or
c
important issue that might
affect the whole area
(a new highway, for
example) is making its first
appearance in that neighborhood. 8

“

Thus, the choice may be either
tactical or for the types of
people
residing in a neighborhood, but
historically, the basic determinant
has been income.
Cary Delgado's study of ACORN's
membership found
that, of 50,000 members, 70%
are "black and Latino, 70% female,

and almost all from the working
class....

The Exchange Relationship

"Deliverables."

The organizers of ACORN seek members
from

their low- and moderate-income constituency
who will contribute

time and resources.

In pursuit of those members,

they initially
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offer the "deliverables"
described in the previous
chapter.
Organizers are instructed
on how to develop
and pursue such issues
when the organizing
model is applied in
each neighborhood.
The
initial organizing drive
that creates the
individual neighborhood
groups virtually every
ACORN group is started
de novo by ACORN
organizers is where the
exchange process begins.
The Organizing Model
describes the process by
which

organizers should look for
issues that will interest
prospective
members to join:
“ alk

8

"g

throu 8 h ^ neighborhood
you can
‘*-ts, open ditches?
drainage
rainage, bad lighting,
:
condemned or dilapidated
housing, curbs, gutters,
sidewalks, litter domestic
C
m
al eyeS ° reS ’ ueeds and
overgrown lots,
lack of nartkS
recreatl °nal facilities, bus
routes
andV
n
nd a number
of other issues.
Depending on the
situations, all of these things
are potential
organizing issues. ®

o^In"

°e

bT!

f

"

While seeking issues that are
winnable and relatively easy to
achieve, the organizer must also
discuss what the residents perceive
as the most important issues
in the neighborhood.
At the beginning of an organizing
drive, there are two basic

means through which neighborhood
residents may identify issues,
the "Organizing Committee" and the
residents contacted in their
homes through the process of "doorknocking.

"

The Organizing

Committee is a small group of twelve to
twenty people who are the
core of the organization during the drive

They usually consist
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Of people who have
contacted ACORN requesting
that a group be
organized in their neighborhood,
friends of those contacts,
or

People known to the contacts
as interested in political
activity
They provide legitimacy
for the drive and become
leaders in the
organizing work and are often
the original officers
of the group.

“

"Doorknocking" is the process by
which the organizer and as
many
members of the Organizing
Committee as can be recruited
contact as
many of the people in the
neighborhood as possible before
the
"First Meeting,” or initial
neighborhood-wide meeting.

The interaction "on the doors" is critical
to the success of the drive
and
is where a great deal of

occurs.

the "salesmanship" for the
organization

The Model states:

There is no substitute for personal
contact in convincing
people to become active in the
organization. Doorknocking
oes it best.
It gives the doorknockers a
chance to
answer questions and create the
impressions of the organization.
It allows you to bring people in,
and define some
people out

In each relatively brief interaction
(fifteen minutes is recommended)

the doorknocker learns what the residents
think about the neighborhood
and what issues they consider important.

It

is an unusually direct

interaction between citizen and political organizer,
and occurs with

nearly a thousand residents in each neighborhood
organized.
Typically

,

the issues with which the organizers begin are

relatively easy to identify, such as clearing vacant lots,
obtaining
needed traffic control, open ditches, and so on.

In most cases, a
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visit to a city official
is all that is needed
to obtain satisfaction for the residents.
These "wins" are tangible,
quite
visible, and provide clear
proof of success for the
local organising
drive.
In organizational terms,
the deliverables can be
defined as
collective material benefits,
i.e., they are tangible
and all of
the residents of the
neighborhood benefit regardless
of whether
they pay dues or participate
in ACORN.
Thus, the incentive that
ORN organizers rely on to
launch each community group
and to bring
members into the organization
are material collective ones.
They
deal in any significant way
with the problems of free riders
or maintaining supplies of
accessible "deliverables."

^2IlZ£H££gsiv^Se ^ctive Incentives

.

There are three types

of non-ideological selective
incentives available:

camaraderie, and status.

material,

Surprisingly, in light of the political

organization literature, ACORN's organizing
strategy does not

mention the social incentives, and does
not treat selective material
incentives as critical to organization
building.

While

it

is

difficult to conceive of an organization
that does not offer any
social incentives in practice, ACORN does
not cultivate that type
of incentive

m

its model or its literature.

The Organizing Model

discusses the development of discounts from local
merchants that
only ACORN members can receive.

But it does not discuss discounts

as a means of attracting members for the value
of the discount,
but rather states that discounts make "it easier
to build legitimacy

with your community contacts

" 13

The types of selective material
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incentives offered by ACORN
groups around the country>
such
co-ops, are not intended
to be primary
motivations for members to
join or remain involved
in ACORN.
The main reliance,
however, is
on purposive incentives.
Organizers ground their
appeal on the
organization s goals.

^

^

*

Ideology, as it is generally
discussed
in

political views, includes
the Rinds of world views
epitomized by
liberals, conservatives, and
socialists.
In that realm, one might
expect low-income organizers
to espouse and apply
ideologies to the
left of the political
spectrum. However, this is
not always the
case. As Fainstein and
Fainstein discovered, urban
political
activists are sometimes forced
into a position of opposing
liberal
id ea 1 s

While the costs of attacking
"liberal" institutions may
be htgh, their salience to
the lives of ghetto inhabin s is great; Congress or
big business might be more
important causative factors in the
situation of the
poor but they are much less
visible and much less the
lmme late creators of the people's
misery than the
schools, hospitals, and welfare
offices.
The latter
therefore, become the foci of attack,
and the movements
evelop an ideology to counter the
Progressive ideology
which supports these institutions. 14

Moreover, the more extreme leftist
ideologies have been discredited
in American politics even among
low-income citizens.

Hence, there

is no clear option for low- income
organizing on the ideological left.

ACORN has dealt with this dilemma in several
ways in its
literature, public pronouncements and organizing
practice:

1)

it
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has adopted the term
"populist'’ to describe
the organisation;
2)
it has taken an
anti-corporate stance on a
consistent basis; and
3) it has eschewed ideology
and proved an
"action as ideology"

approach, especially in
its internal

_ications.

Ihe result
of these three
approaches in their public
statements and organizing

strategy creates confusion
and is somewhat muddled,
but may
provide some important
insights for the use of
ideology as an
incentive in low- income
organizing.

ACORN frequently refers to
itself, on fliers and in
the
press, as "populist".
The term, however, denotes
little and
connotes much.
It has been associated
with a wide variety of
political views and politicians,
as well as a major political
movement of the late Nineteenth
Century. Political scientists
have
rarely tried to use the term
with any precision, associating
it
negatively with racism and
anti-intellectualism 15 or positively
with the practice of initiative
and referendum and increased
political participation generally.16

Recent historlcal revislon

by Lawrence Goodwyn 17 has
altered the view of the Populist
Movement.

He argues that the Populists were
egalitarian anticapitalists, not

backward -loo king racist romantics
as many historians have depicted
them.

Similarly, George McKenna argues that
populism is a bona
fide ideology with a reasonable degree
of complexity and an historic

consistency that he attempts to document with
letters, speeches and
platforms from American political history.

McKenna distills six
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basic tenets of
populistic ideology
by-

n
)

.
af.p of
„ f class
lack
consciousness
,

the assumption of
consensus among "the
people"; 3) strong
patciotism; 4) the belief
ttat wealth should belong
to all and not
lust some Americans;
5) a fear of bigness,
corporate or governmental and 6) mistrust
of intellectual elites.
Despite a lack of
systematic effort by ACORN
staff or m^bership,
ACORN's rhetoric
and strategy bear striking
similarities to populism.
2)

;

ACORN's avowed aim is to
organize the lower seventy
per
cent on the income ladder.
ACORN rhetoric always refers
to "the
people", and avoids identifying
race, gender, class, region,
or
other divisions within the
American public.

As an organization,

therefore, ACORN operates on
the assumption ttat American
society
is divided between what
ACORN refers to consistently as
"low- and
moderate-income people," or "the
people," and those to whom they
refer to as the "fatcats" or
"the few." ACORN does not,
however,
expound theories of class struggle,
keeping the analysis at the
level of "the people" struggling
to be heard or the "majority"

trying to

take control of the government."

Like the Populists,

they maintain that the struggle
is between "the many" and "the
few"

where

the many

struggle for their rights as American
citizens.

ACORN operates on the premise that there
is a consensus
among "the people" regarding what
McKenna calls "what is right and
wrong, fair and foul, legitimate and
crooked.

ACORN organizers

argue that as long as ACORN deals with
economic issues or the
building of political power, low- and moderate-income
people will
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hold together 20
.

ACORN’s People's
S Platfnr
Fiatf °rm,
m
f
P
for
example, clearly

argues, "[Hike many
populist organizations
ACORN. .opted to
preserve class unity by
developing an anti-corporate
political
.

program that did not directly
address salient issues of
race and
This has been an integral
part of ACORN’s organizing
strategy from its inception:
to organize people
around economic
Issues using government and
corporations as its target and
avoiding
divisive social issues.

Patriotism has not been a salient
issue in ACORN's history.
The only issues that relate
to patriotism in any manner
are ACORN
protests of President Reagan’s
increased military spending, and
in
some instances, the nuclear
freeze.

However, there have been no

Vietnams to divide people who might
otherwise unite, or to raise
doubts about the patriotism of
ACORN as an organization.
ACORN's ideological approach to private
property is similar
to McKenna's depiction of
populism.

The idea that "the land and

commodities of America belong not to some
but to all of the American
people" is expressed by ACORN in both
word and deed.

The ACORN

People's Platform provides clear evidence
of this belief in the

preamble when it demands "the best of our
energy, land, and natural
resources for all people."

The clearest expression of this belief

came from ACORN's "squatting" campaign.

ACORN saw a contradiction

between a housing shortage, on the one hand, and the
existence of
thousands of vacant houses in ACORN neighborhoods, on the
other.
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These houses had been
abandoned by their o»ers
and frequently
assumed by city and federal
governments for unpaid
taxes, HUD
mortgage foreclosures, or
other reasons, and they
became the target
for ACORN squatters.
ACORN organized public
rallies to break into
and claim the houses
for low-income families
in need of housing.
Claiming no legal grounds
for their actions,
ACORN instead
justified and publicized
squatting on the moral
grounds that
people were "Taking What's
Ours!" Many squatters
were evicted
and arrested for trespassing,
but in Congressional
hearings ACORN
members expressed determination
to continue squatting
despite
22
police and official action
Hence, unused resources, in
this
.

case, abandoned houses, have
been claimed by ACORN to
promote

views on human rights versus
property rights.

McKenna’s claim regarding populist
fears of bigness is somewhat muddled in ACORN. Delgado
argues,
for example, that the

People’s Platform expresses
"ambivalence between anti-corporate

populism and the social-democratic
state ." 23

While a great deal

the platform is directed at
control of corporations and their

abuses, and the difficulty in controlling
big government, some of
the proposals would require massive
bureaucracies and tremendous

budget outlays that have historically
led to unresponsiveness to
and abuse of low-income citizens.

The demand for federal programs

capable of building a million units of housing
per year seems

contradictory in the face of ACORN’s organizing strategy
which
dictates extreme localism and a scale responsive to
individual
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inputs, and the association
bylaws which include an
explicit goal
of maintaining
organizational democracy.
Thus, ACORN appears

ambivalent about the most
desirable size of institutions;
it
struggles against large
corporations and g overm,ent
bureaucracies,
is attracted, at times,
to large government
programs.
ACORN has had little to say
about intellectual elites,
the
last tenet of populism
that McKenna cites.

ACORN chapters have

frequently been involved in
public education affairs,
including
tunning and supporting
candidates to school boards and
promoting
legislation for free textbooks
in Arkansas.
However, there have
issues or statement akin to
William Jennings Bryant's

behavior at the Scopes Trial or
George Wallace's attacks on

"intellectual snobs.

Anti-Ideology in ACORN.

ACORN’s internal approach to

ideology and action is quite
unusual for an apparently leftist

organization.
are

1)

ACORN's avowed reasons for being
anti-ideological

the goal of redistributing power is
adequate inspiration

and direction, 2) understanding of
politics is best gained by

experience rather than study, and

3)

it

is not

possible to predict,

given the complexity of society, what will
be the best means of

redistributing power in every policy area.
Rest and Rathke argue that specific issues
and policy stands

are not the essence of ACORN's activities.
that

" [b]

Rather, they contend,

ehind the organization's concern with these issues
is a

basic understanding that all these issues are mere
manifestations
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of a much more fundamental
issue*

—the
—

Hict-

-u

in the
Hence, the single concern
n that the organizers
of ACORN
address is the distribution
of power in American
politics.
ACORN also claims that a
well-developed ideology is
not
useful for community
organising hecause it is
not possible to impart
political knowledge without
a solid base of
participatory involve.
Indeed, one of the most
important reasons for
designing ACORN
activities to involve as many
members as possible is to
provide
them with the experience
necessary to develop a good
understanding
of the political system
and the alleged maldistribution
of power.
is the aim of ACORN
activism to put low- and
moderate-income
people in situations where they
are making what they consider

country."^

U

reasonable demands and to have
those demands resisted or
rejected.
In this way, they will
learn what to expect from
politicians and

corporate representatives.

Fainstein and Fainstein observed
this

same process at work in several
urban political movements they
studied. 2 6

Having experienced first-hand the
maldistribution of

power, ACORN participants are then
likely to see that the

connections between that issue and other
issues revolve around the

distribution of power.
Finally, the ACORN approach is predicated
on the claim that,

m

order to make policy stances attractive
to constituents,

necessary to be actively involved in those areas.

it

is

In addition to

being a corollary of the preceding claim,
ACORN strategists argue
that it is unwise to make claims regarding a
policy area in which
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one had not taken sides
on some matter directly
affecting the
members of the organisation.
Further, it makes no
sense to take
a posit ion unless
one is willing and able
to act on it.
Thus,

until one is in a position
of some power and
until one tas organized
constituents around an issue,
there is no benefit and
possibly some
danger in taking a position
on it.
Rathke claims that "fa]n
organization like ACORN doesn't
develop an ideology until
it finishes growing,
until it has some
exercise
I m confident that
that process produces
the
best of all philosophies
27
"
and ideologies
eulogies.
Who
When t-h
the organization's
precepts are kept simple,
educational functions are
provided by
action, and issue stances are
only taken in areas in which
the
group is engaged. This
assures the organization's needs
can be
met, and also that it will
not be encumbered with
ideological

baggage that can lead to the
kinds of goal displacement that
Moe
describes.
Thus, ACORN's anti-ideological
approach stems from several

concerns that are ultimately based
on three considerations pertaining
to the low- and moderate-income
constituency: 1) power in American
life is maldistributed
is

;

2)

knowledge comes from power; and 3) action

the most effective means of learning
and expressing political

values.

This level of abstraction and analysis
appears to provide

sufficient direction to ACORN organizers and
members without

painting them into the corner that Moe
describes of goal displacement
and organizer dominance.

The combination of the vagueness of the
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popular understanding of
populist, and the fear
of the organizers'
abuse of ideology warrants
the use of the term
"anti-ideological"
to describe ACORN.

~

Anti-co rporatism

in

ACORN

The
ihe t-h-ir-a
third adimension of ACORN's

Purposive incentives is a
crude anti-corporati OT

Kest and Rathke

.

argue that the most
important thing about high
utility rates

is

"the fact that. ..in reality
rather than rhetoric a
bunch of

corporate directors and New
York bankers have the
power to
unilaterally make decisions that
affect the lives of ACORN
members 28
This claim that economic
power is undemocratic and
should be redressed
by political action
permeates all of ACORN's
activism and rhetoric.
.

ACORN chapters have fought
corporations over toxic wastes
disposal,
ility rates, plant sitings,
tax structures and abatements,
banking
and investment practices,
and many other issues.
The preamble to

ACORN People

s

Platform specifies a subordinate
rather than

dominant role for corporations in
American society:
shall have their role:

taxes

.

No more

.

"Corporations

producing jobs, providing products,
paying

No less
J-ess.

Thpy
cinnii obey our
they shall
wishes, respond to
,

our needs, serve our communities."
In sum, ACORN's approach to ideology
is a form of praxis

where action informs thought.

,

This is augmented by the vague yet

appealing principles of populism, the "perennial"
ideology of
protest in American politics, and a crude
form of anti-corporatism.
The history of ACORN, its literature and
the comments of observers

substantiate the nature of ACORN's ideology and suggest
that it is
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effective in overcoming
some of the diff-ir-,
if
difficulties
in using ideology
as a purposive incentive
ve tor
for lowlmr and mo
derate- income Americans.

Ifejl gnbers' Contri hntinn
acorn organizers make

it

clear to prospective
members that

hey must contribute
substantially to the
organization ior it to
succeed.
One of the major goals
of the uigdnizers
organizers in the organizing
t

•

•

drive is to collect dues
before the first meeting.
This fact alone
makes the exchange relationship
clear: members must
provide the
means by which the organization
survives. The principle
that
ACORN uses is the Membership
organization." Members and
prospective
thus initiated into the
organization with a clear message
that their role in the
organization is contributory and
not passive.

One of the clearest assertions
of members' financial role
in
ACORN stems from the organizational
goal of financial self-sufficiency.
The "ACORN Members' Handbook"
states

ACORN has always been committed
to the principle of
mancial self-sufficiency and we've
made great strides
toward that goal.
The principle is important
because
only an organization that raises
and controls its own
un s can be truly independent.
Because ACORN members
pay the organization's way, we call
the shots 29
.

Hence, despite the fact that ACORN's
constituency is on the lower end
of the income scale, the organization
requires its members to contri-

bute dues regularly and with great emphasis.

ACORN organizers are also advised to persuade
members to
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contribute as much time as
possible to the organization
as well
This begins with the
exhortation to assist
in the large task of
doorknocking the entire
neighborhood in the organizing
drive. The
Organizing Model is nite
blunt about this matter
q
when it describes
the agenda for Organizing
Committee testings: "
Doorknockiny
Get
agreetents on when, not if. "30
The organlzers
•

^^

^

delegate as much of the other
duties of the group as
possible,
including phoning, taking
parts of the meeting agendas,
distributing
fliers and fundraising.
Moreover, one of the basic
principles of
designing ACORN actions is to
involve as many people as
possible.
Thus, the level of expectations
on the membership is quite
high and
frequently involves a great
deal of time and commitment.
The

Organizing Model is quite explicit
about the nature of the exchange
relationship

Cl ar

[W]

^

they Can ex ect

from ACORN
P
fs
ervipP Q research,
^
(services,
assistance, contacts, political
power,
itertures [sic], etc.), and what
ACORN expects
e 3^r° u p (dues, affiliation,
news distribution,
GLC

«

y

•

Organizational Structure

ACORN’s organizational structure can be
described by its

organizational groupings, the three roles that
participants play
in the organization,

and the committee and governing structures

above the local level.

All of these features of ACORN were designed

to contribute to the success of the
organization and to fill the
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needs of the constituents
and express the values
of the organization.
The basic covenant of
the organization is
the neighborhood
organization. One cannot be
a member of ACORN
unless one lives in
an area that has been
organized by ACORN and
contributes dues and
participates in the group. The
neighborhood structure is
intended
to provide a physical
association for the membership,

i.e., the

organization represents a
geographical entity with clearly
defined
boundaries. Besides providing
members with territorial
allegiances,
geographical basing
vines a sense
s provides
seriQP of permanence,
P
according to Kest
and Rathke:

its members, the organization,
rather than just
hatever issue is being worked on
at that time
is
of number one importance.
The point is that in
order to address the fundamental
questions of power
low- and moderate-income citizens
must be organizedS
be COmmitted to a Permanent
organization
’-|
thaT
hat, over
over°ih
the long run, will attack the
maldistribution
of power in every way it can. 32

This sense of permanence provides
the necessarily long-term mission

with a concrete representation.
The local nature of the organization
also makes the experience
of membership personal and tangible.

Upper-income Americans fre-

quently participate in politics by writing
checks to distant post
office boxes and following the organization
in the papers and

monthly newsletters.
to visible,
to meet

Lower income citizens, however, respond better

tangible, and local organizations.

The members are able

face-to-face with leaders and can personalize the organization
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rather than experience it
only in an abstract
way.
The local groups meet
monthly and constantly
work on issues
within the neighborhood, as
well as in the larger
community, along
With other local groups.
This is part of the
strategy to keep the
organization constantly in view
and maintain a degree
of momentum
that organizers feel is
necessary to keep members
motivated.
Historically, lower-income people
have seen organizations
come and
go and the resulting
mistrust of organizational
solutions to their

problems creates the need to
overcome constituents' skepticism.
This is done by keeping the local
groups close to the members,
both geographically and temporally.
The local groups consist of
approximately 100-200 members

who hold membership cards and pay
dues.

They are, for the most

part, the people in the neighborhood
who joined during the organizing

drive or at the first meeting.
than the entire membership.

Active participants number far fewer

Active members are generally the

officers and a loyal cadre, usually
around a dozen people in all.
They attend meetings regularly, respond
to requests to assist in

distributing fliers and making calls, and
participate in actions.
Moreover, they serve on larger committees at the
community-wide
level, such as the ACORN Political Action
Committees.

The disparity

between active and inactive members is calculated
into the organizing
strategy, as expressed in the Organizing Model:
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Attendance
The majority of firatC
ln § s are the
biggest meetings that prouncs
W
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on the quality of the
issues
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Thus, the reality-a

-.11 core

of activists-is
accounted for in

the organizing st rategy,
yet an ideal is established
that prods
the activists to greater
efforts to expand their
numbers.
The
activities of this cadre, meanwhile,
represent the tangible
organizational solution to
neighborhood political problems.
Participant Roles
The three roles in ACORN
are member, leader, and organ:
nzer

They are clearly defined
in the organizing strategy
and are essential
to understanding the nature
of the organization.
Briefly, members
pay dues and participate in
the organization. Leaders are
formally
elected or appointed to interim
posts.
Organizers are paid,

professional participants who are not
indigenous to the neighborhood,
and rarely come from the constituency.

Members are formally designated by being
current on their
dues and possessing membership cards.

As stated above, one must

be a resident of an ACORN neighborhood
in order to join a group and

become a member of the larger organization.

They receive ACORN

publications and have access to the ACORN organizers
and the
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services they provide
upon request.

Leaders co me fro m the
membership,

i. e .,

they are residents
neighborhood who have
agreed to serve in
positions in the
local group.
Oceasionall y> interin,
officers are appointed
when
circumstances require it,
such as the sudden
departure of a current
officer.
Leaders are required to
operate the group, chairing
meetings, leading actions,
and conferring with
organisers on the
operations of the organization
ganization.
nff
Offices in a typical
neighborhood
e chair, co-chair,
secretary and treasurer.
While the roles are
not tightly defined, they
generally are for the chair
and the cochair to be the executive
leadership of the group, the
secretary
fulfills communications
functions, and the treasurer
maintains
dues records and keeps the
books.

Organizers, as in any voluntary
organization, are the only
paid participants in ACORN.
They are quite different
from the
members and leaders in their
demographical characteristics and
serve at the pleasure of the
Head Organizer.

Organizers are almost

all well-educated, white,
middle- and upper-income young
people.
ACORN recruits them most frequently
from Eastern colleges and

universities from which they are then
assigned to posts anywhere

m

the twenty-six ACORN states or
the District of Columbia.

Thus,

there is some built-in distance
between the members and the leaders
and the organizers-social
and frequently racial.

,

economic, geographical, educational,

In addition,

the organizers' allegiance is

to the organization at large
while the members tend to perceive the
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organization mostly within
th eit nei ghborhoods

.

FlnaUy>

^

organizers' perspective
is that of professional
t essionals
P
applying skills
and ethical standards,
while the constituents'
main concern
co
is
with issues and power.
lie the organizers
are trained and
encouraged to delegate
as many of their
functions as possible, they
have a tendency to
do
as much of the work as
they can.
The ACORN model is
built on
member control and
participation which, it is
expected, will lead
to commitment to the
organization and its goals,
but the nature of
the organizers tends to
mitigate against this
approach. The

organizers, many of them
high achievers, feel the
responsibility
of their jobs rather
heavily and become uncomfortable
when others
are doing the job for them.

Structurally, the role of the
organizer

counterposed against the
constituency is a source of
conflict within
the ACORN organizing strategy.

Regional Structure
The two main regional
structures are the Executive Board

and the ACORN Political Action
Committee (APAC)

.

They manage the

citywide (or, in the case of rural
areas, countywide) executive
and electoral activities of ACORN,
respectively.

The Executive

Committee consists of the Chairs of the
neighborhood groups and

meets monthly to make the broader
decisions of the regional
organization.

The Head Organizer of the area reports
to the

Executive Committee and confers with them
on issues, strategies,
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and financial affairs.

The APAC conducts
the electoral

^

of the regional group
by analyzlng
campalgns>

dates, if any, to
support, and co-ordinating
the electoral efforts
Of the regional AC
ORN group. Both of
these bodies
and leaders opportunities
to contrihute.
control, and participate
the larger workings of
AC0RN
Llke any boar<J Qf
directors
political action group,
they exercise as much
control as they see
fit and oversee staff
(organisers) as much as they
feel is necessary.
There is nothing absolute
about their functioning,
which is in keeping
with standard practices
in voluntary organizations
of any kind.
This chapter has described
the organizing strategy
of the
ACORN model. Throughout,
it is
8 clear that„
that th
the strategy
i s adapted
to the constituency
and the goals of the
organization. Moreover, it
Is clear that the decisions
that go into it are conscious
and goaldirected. Thus, the concept
of the organizing strategy
is q uite
capable of providing insights
into the model ACORN applies
in

^^

“

^

.

’

organizing its constituency for
political power.

The chapters that

follow will examine the
experiences and insights of A CORN
participants
in the city of Boston through
interviews in order to determine the
impact of the organizing strategy
on its participants.

Consistent with the notion of the
organizer/entrepreneur as
the rational (and, historically
speaking, actual) progenitor of the

political organization, this study will
look first at the perceptions
of the professional organizers.

The interviews in Chapter

5

will

attempt to establish the intentions of the
organizers and determine

6£feCtS thSy " 1Sh *»

™
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interactions with the
targeted constituents
of the organising
strategy.
Once it ls
estahiished what the
technics the organisers
use are designed to
achieve, the interviews
with the mem hers and
leaders (the
constituents) will provide
insights into their
effectiveness and
thexr perceptions of the
organisation and the
organising strategy.
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CHAPTER

I

V

THE ORGANIZERS

Interviews with the organizers
were designed to ascertain
their perceptions of their
roles in ACORN and the
impact of their

activities on ACORN,

clearly, their role in
ACORN as the profes-

sional staff and entrepreneurs
of the organizing strategy
is
critical to an understanding
of ACORN, for they are
the ones who
sell membership and
participation in ACORN in return
for the
benefits they claim they can
supply.
The responses of the organizers will be discussed under
four broad headings:
1) their

impressions of the nature of ACORN
organizing;

2)

their impressions

of the benefits members derive
from ACORN; 3) their perceptions
of
the decisionmaking process;
and 4) problems they encounter
in

their work.
The questions that the researcher
used to explore the

organizers’ experiences approached
their work as one would any
other occupation.
sionals,

i.e.,

ACORN organizers consider themselves profes-

political activists who possess practical and

ethical standards of performance.

Organizers

*

Incentives

The organizers’ perception of the experience of
ACORN
70
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organizing derive from
their reasons
asons fnr
for k
becoming ACORN organizers,
the satisfactions they
receive from their work
worK as an organizer,
and
their experience with
ACORN organizing. The
impetus for the
organizers to "hire on" with
ACORN appears to he
either iheoiogioai
or social.
The ideological attraction
of ACORN starts from
its
commitment to social change
and social Justice for
low- and moderateincome people.
The organizers themselves
were all oriented to
leftg political activities prior to
becoming ACORN organizers.
I was a radical
in college and involved
in a student
group there.
I d planned to
work for social change
1 ® 0t ° Ut ° f SCh °
o1
1 Kanted to
8°
into
nto the ttrade union movement
but I... didn’t know
ow to do that... I found
out about ACORN... and sent
an application.

r

-

m

I’d always been interested
in progressive stuff....
d done a fair amount of
work for a couple of years
ut of college with some
peace and social justice

I

organizations, working on international
and foreign
relations things like that, so,
I’d gotten fairly
frustrated with, number one, there
were never any
concrete results, and number two,
it really did seem
we were talking to the same
people.
So ACORN is a
real change of pace.

I had been involved
in other things, like peace
stuff,
and that just didn’t seem to be
valid and it seemed
o be a shell game.
I became convinced very
quickly
that the only way to do something
about the arms race
was to radically restructure the
society that implied
e arms race.
And any of the peace organizations
that are around now aren't in the
least bit interested
in changing anything.
That was the conclusion that I
arrived at and ACORN seemed to be the
organization
that was interested in changing some
very basic things
in American society, trying to
change the way people
think about themselves and their environment.
So
that's why I began working for ACORN.
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is notable,

too, that this group,
while not a valid sample
of

ACORN organizers nationall
y , emphasized foreign
policy issues as
the focus of their
pre-ACORN activism.
The other major factor
in their decision
to become ACORN
organizers was the opportunity
to explore a part
of American
society that they had
little experience with in
their lives up to
that point. As a
grassroots organization that
works directly in
the neighborhoods, ACORN
puts its organizers in
frequent direct
contact with low-income minority
people within their communities.
Hence, one organizer responded
that he was to a great
extent
motivated to become an ACORN
organizer by his desire to learn
about the ACORN constituency
because of a curiosity first
peaked
by his study of social
anthropology in college. For
the ideologue,
the opportunity to work directly
with low- and moderate-income

people also provides a test of
ideological assumptions.
lor the most part, the
organizers' experiences either met
or exceeded their expectations:

.t// down-to-earth, seriously organized group.
I
didn t expect it to be so tight
and well run.
In
terms of other organizations I've
been involved in
oeing able to lay out a plan and
go through with it
being able to make plans for a
year or more and
icing able to respond in a real
way to things that
are happening in the community and
the country.
Very much so and very much better.
I couldn't
imagine myself, after working on disarmament,
getting
terribly excited about vacant lots and
stop signs and
all.
But it obviously turned out to be a lot
more
exciting than I expected it to be.
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necessary Pc organise
an ACORN gronp on
the streets, in
peoples'
homes, and in meetings
at neighborhood
churches and halls.
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-ganizers-usually,

college-educated,
white, middle-class
people like th«selves-the
organisers voice
the same themes.
They try simultaneously
to make the experience
°£ AC0RN organizing
attractive and to interpret
the e
experience for
someone relatively
unfamiliar with
it.
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good deal of time trying to
differen AC0R ” and ° ther grOUps
1
when
I wa's i„
ege
t0 me ’ 1 had heard about
ACORN
and
ACnPN was like
i -l
L
ACORN
the
Mobilization for Survival, like
eft ~ Center P° litlcal groups.
a

rn
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I didn't
?eaU understand what made
realiy
ACORN different.

mk

the contact with people in the
neighborhood
is a major factor in new
organizers. Basically, try
to make people feel comfortable
on the job.
You can
get people to give you the
political rap

about anything, but they won't be willing
to do the work.

These themes

— social

justice, organizational effectiveness,

and social contact with the constituents

prevail in the discussion
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of the experience
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of satisfactions
organlzers tave

acorn’s national goals
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u ow

^

successful they feel
ACORN

has been in achieving
its goals.

The pursuit of social
justice retains a primary
motivation
of organizers after
their decision to
join and after they
have
been on the staff long
enough for the novelty
to wear off:

movement^ that]
people,
that is

toV^
PO
U° r n
’to overcote ?he ;;st«.
BeLe
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what
want to be
.

in

Jhe'end^m
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right now and wtat

6 Cl arly What the
y
P eo P le can do, how P
people
crpt- a
Pl ®
get
sense ofJ their power as a
gro^T

What keeps the job satisfying,
according to the organizers,
is the
experience and assurance of
success in pursuit of social
justice.
This point is particularly
critical when the organizers
consider

ACORN relative to other groups
with the same goals but without
ACORN s successes and when they
consider the relatively powerless
status of their constituency:

mg the 7 0s and 80s, no other left-wing organization
has really survived and prospered
in any real sense
ike ACORN has... and they’ve been
around for fourteen
LsicJ years.
As far as an independent, self-financing
organization, I don't know any other
organization in
t e country that does
that... apart from unions or
somebody that gets serious money from
foundations....
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P ° litlcal
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our participation in a
hf StSs was pretty
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lo J^ognize^te skills
skSfs^d"
and
power that we do have.
Locallv mJi1 ^ inS We
busted
our butts for him last
sll, and
Zh
fall
many ways it s
nai j .re; c
He 8 SOln t0 raise ?50
° *or APAC
,

s

r

’

m

*

?h

^

n^r

1

?

ACORK helped me in my campaign,
you sill
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the p8 ° ple in his c
a«
o other lefties around
town, and things like
that..
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In the last year and a
half...x' ve almost had to
define
S
85 SUrVlva1 ' We »ent through
a couple of
? d

r«U?

yea 8 really hard years
40(1 wa tame
thrllhlt
?
through them okay,
with a strong organization
and
having won some victories along
the way.
It speaks to
some internal strength that
we did survive the list
couple of years. A lot of
organizations didn't. A lot
of people went under or
stopped organizing or because
some ing else. And we’re
moving in broader directions
In most cities that I know
close up, it isn’t at the
xpense of the neighborhood base.
We can still call ourselves, and mean it, "grassroots."
’

Clearly, the organizers feel that
the fact that ACORN works for

social justice and general left-wing
causes is not sufficient to
keep them involved.

It

is necessary that their efforts
in ACORN

be rewarded by success, something
they perceive as being rather

rare among such organizations.
Finally, as a motivation for staying on the
job as a

political organizer with ACORN, social interactions
are quite
effective.

operate:

The following show several ways in which these
incentives
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The social satisfaction
the organisers reported
included getting to
know a segment of the
population they had never had the
opportunity
to meet, individuals among
that segment, and their
fellow staff
within ACORN. Those incentives,
coupled with the ideological

goals, compose the bulk of the
reasons organisers work with
ACORN.
None cited any other commonly
used incentives such as income,

flexible work hours, working
conditions, fringe benefits, and so
on.
The Organizer Role

Another theme that the interviewees
centered on was the

relationships they developed in the course
of the organizing work.
While some of their experiences provide
insight into the organizer’s
role
work.

m

ACORN, others of them are reflections on
the nature of the
It

responses.

is important to recognize the context
of the organizer's

Their work for ACORN is usually the first full-time
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employment they have had
after graduation from
college, so they
have limited experience
with which to compare
it.
Nevertheless,
all have some experience
as political activists
in other organizations
and, clearly, the venture
from their middle-class
backgrounds into lowand moderate-income
neighborhoods lends itself to
a profoundly
different experience. Moreover,
the organizing profession
is, in
many ways, different from
other occupations. The two
themes that
the organizers developed
most clearly were (1) that
they "inject"
themselves into peoples' lives,
neighhorhoods, and political
relationships, and (2) that they
must create changes in peoples'
lives in order to succeed.

The result, according to the
organizers,

is that they occupy a
somewhat unusual position in
society.

One or the essential roles
of the organizer in ACORN is
to
knock on peoples' doors and
promote membership in ACORN:
Part of the reason we have the
ability to go doorto door to recruit people that
other organizations
don t is because we have full-time
professional
organizers. A group can maintain itself
at some
level without an organizing staff,
but there’s
always some amount of attrition, and
unless there's
some constant recruitment of new members,
it's just
a matter of time before the group
kind of dies or
doesn't move forward.

At the same time,

the experience is one that is somewhat alien
to

the organizers in the beginning.

The organizing part of it is strange.
Knocking for
three hours at strange doors, asking to come in
the
door, we talk with them and for me it's something
I've never done before.
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Just by going door—
knocking everv dav
challenging peoples' interests
o?
property, and that varies
from person to person
n ‘*'*
P
That may seem very
trivial but ir
3
Pl “ atl0ns
for much larger schemes
"f’tSnWng
*

”
•

i

.

On the other side of
the relationship, that
of the "intruder,"
one of the organizers
reported that the same
sense of privacy

appeared to constrain some
organizers’ behavior:
Not long ago, one of
our newer staff members
S
m heSlt ion about d °ing
second and
th?rd
third visits tto people on a
drive because he felt
W° Uld
° f " houndin g" the
members,
Mv
t* always been
penence has
y exner
just the reverse
e always hear that the
members don’t hear from
us enough; I ve seen that
happen.

f

^

To succeed as an ACORN
organizer,

it

is necessary to

intrude on

people's privacy beyond what is
generally considered acceptable

m

order to reach the constituents,
and not all organizers are
entirely comfortable with this.

Once the organizers have entered
their constituents’ lives,
the goal is to change their ideas
about their neighborhoods and

political relationships.
it is not

lecturing.

According to ACORN organizers, however,

possible to change members’ thinking by
persuasion or
One organizer, for example, reported that
"what makes

ACORN sometimes so frustrating is that its
structural ideas are so

radically different from the mainstream structure
of ideas in the
world today."

ACORN organizers believe the only effective means

of imparting ACORN’s "structural ideas" on
authority, social
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justice, the rights of
low-income people, and
other fundamental
political concepts is
through experience,
The researcher asked
one organizer if ACORN
is able to educate
its members in
political
matters

bLtr—^ct functions;
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From the organizer’s viewpoint,
then, "education" involves

more than information imparted
to members.

It requires members

to change their attitudes
towards authority and their way
of

dealing with it.

Indeed the organizing process
itself requires

many of the same skills that ACORN's
opponents use to maintain
their positions against change,
first, to motivate members'

activism and, then, to overcome resistance:

worrforlcOR/don’rtMnk very“iff 6
people who
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fims^^h
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think very differentlv fm™ m law
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1S ° n Avenue adve
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hand, if that’s the
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way the American
W° rkS ’
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trench
filled in. All it tool
6
S °me° n£i
called and said they
wer^fro^ACORN
action now or weM take
sane
nd lt: was d °ne
a“d
that morning.
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in order to carry out
their mission as organizers,

therefore, th<
interviewees reported that they
have to invade peoples’
privacy,
pressure them to attend ACORN
activities, and then apply strong
pressure to achieve goals that
are not widely shared, or
even

understood by the majority of
people in American society.
Membership Incentives
One of the foci of ACORN organizing
is the incentives used
to persuade its constituents
to join and participate in
the

organization.

Critical to an understanding of
these incentives is

the perception that the organizers
have of what they are and how

they work to build and maintain
the organization.

The organizers see three factors as
playing a role in the

members’ decision to join ACORN:

self-interest, anger, and the

nature of ACORN as an organization, but
self-interest is the
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organizers' bread-and-butter
when they are appealing
for new
members

People join around verv snen’f
~
and in their neighborhoods.
Something ^hey^eel
immediately.
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The majority of our members
join thin
ter an organizer has
knocked on their door iml
conversation is about the vacant
lots on their bio V
* ** *'
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doors
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ed about th ‘“
the neighborhood,
baIic
sicaiiy
anv the common „denominator, things
that almost
anybody in the neighborhood,
if they have any kind of
1 Pr ° Ve the Situatio
". will be upset about!,
1th
l
h
pc tholes
abandoned
houses... or if I work in a
tenants'
group, t e conditions of the
apartments. .that's what
r

“

.

people really relate to

The obvious is t he feeling that
community improvements
can be achieved, Whether they
be small, whether they
be big
I guess that's the most
important one....
.

The way self-interest operates in
neighborhood organizing, however

seems to create a dynamic that expands
the benefits beyond the

individual and into the larger community
in some cases:
Some people, a person in my group is working
really hard
for a park which she would never use
because she lives so
far away from it.
But she spends so much energy on it,
it|s crazy.
I feel really strange about it.
I think
it s great.
She tells me she wants to see something
done.
I
think it's a commitment towards the community
which she really likes... and it
a commitment towards
other members of the group that she enjoys that live
close to her.
'
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Self-interest then is the mainstay
of the incentives used
to
persuade people to join, but
since ACORN organizes
specific

geographical areas, self-interest
can, a t times, expand
to
include issues that are somewhat
removed from the specific
individual.
One organizer took the notion
of self-interest and

identification with one's neighborhood
a step further and
suggested that some members join
out of a desire to support
an organization to represent
the community:

Another reason would be just to
participate in being
part of some organization within
the community, the
notion that the community has to be
more unified and
to participate in it.
Some are really oriented
toward the goals and some like the
idea that there’s
a community group to belong
to.

Hence, the notion of there being an
organization to support is a way
to persuade some prospective
members to join.

In a similar vein

but with greater emphasis on the goals
and the creation of the

means of achieving them, another organizer
stressed the value of
using the strength of numbers to persuade
people to join ACORN:
Sometimes, depending on where somebody is politically,
I will talk about the general notion
of having an
effective organization, touch on a wide range of issues
but usually just a real specific pitch emphasizing
the
idea that you and I can't do it.
If you and I go down
and complain 'bout getting a bus shelter, they’re not
going to listen to us.
But I talked to six other
people today, and they’re concerned about it too....
We’ve got two hundred members in this group, don’t you
think even if half that many went downtown they’d get
something done?

Not unlike the role
that effectiveness
plays for the organizers,
that same role Is
important In the decision
that

constituents

make to join ACORN.
Finally, a„ g er is important
in the organizers'
calculate,
tor appealing to
prospective members. The
organizers claim that
many of their constituents
are people who have
been frustrated
because their needs have
been ignored for so
long:

People are attracted to
ACORN because... we do a
lot
of actions, we make a lot
of noise, we get
some stuff
6
8 ° f gettin
S “Provemkts In the neigh
^ orhood,
a" different
a
8
aspects of peoples' lives
that
before they didn't know they
had any control
People who are fed up with
it and feel that if
they
band together they can get
something done join ACORN
because they see that it helps.

™
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In addition to awakening
peoples’ anger over long-neglected

problems, one organizer noted
that the severity of some of
the
problems they find in neighborhoods
is as effective in promoting

anger as a stimulant to join:

.ask very, very general questions
and I use words
like change,
neighborhood," "What do you want?"
What do. you think?" and sometimes
people can’t think
°
an Ything off the top of their head,
so you toss
o
a couple of specifics.
That can get people oiled
up.
They don’t like the fact that there’s
a playground around the corner from them that's
filled with
drunks. You can get them steamed up
about that.
The ACORN model depends on playing on
peoples' anger
to get them to join, to get them
to say what they
already know. .and capitalizing on that to
get them
into the organization.
.
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Part of the organizer's
tool hit for recruiting
new m^bers, therefore, is the anger their
constituents experience
when they are confronted with the condition
of their neighborhood
or the lack of
services they receive from
the government.

ACORN members are thought
by the organizers
to stay in the
organization for somewhat
different rMcnmo
reasons than they

join.
These
reasons include commitment
to the oreanizatinn
rganization anda some intangible
incentives that they receive
from their participation
in ACORN.
In addition,

they also argue that some
members stay involved with

ACORN for the continued supply
of tangible rewards,

clearly, how-

ever, the tangible incentives
are not sufficient to maintain
the

organization

pl
!\° f en Joln for one ve ry, very narrow reason,
J
treetlights
on their block, and then after
they get
them in the organization, they
do work on other
things
They see other reasons for having
an organi8
zation like that.
.

t ink people stay involved
over time because. .. they
develop... a sense of what can be
achieved through
organizing. And then there's definitely
a core of
people..., especially some of the leaders,
who stay
active out of a commitment to the notion
of organizing.
It definitely goes beyond the
issues.

Eventually, people go beyond an understanding
of the
group as just a neighborhood group but also
a political
force in the country.
I think people get a sense of
that after they've been involved in the
organization
for a while.

The organizers claim that the organization
itself becomes the focus
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of the members’ energies
and the force that
keeps them involved.
The organizers offered
several explanations
of why people

become so committed to
ACORN and its maintenance
as an organization
The sum of these explanations
seems to he a combination
of q ualities
that ACORN organizations
possess and the qua lities
that committed
members possess:

think that the general
excitement of the Pr n,m r
ed
like actions, they
° ^H-rnn meet ings ... that do follow an agenda
and get things accomplished.
I’d say those two hv>
8S ’
more than anything else. And
a lot of our m^Tbers
they just like the notion
of fighting City Hall.
I
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My experience has been
that people who come to three
or more meetings or actions
... that s the one objective
determining actor. The experience
is somewhat' add J!
y that pe° ple Wh ° are willin
§ to work,
also* that s a determining
also
factor... who aren’t incrediUS
r “1
Again, people who get out there
y
! H 00r
C
bl ° Ck With an ^ganizer, Who
make
nhnnp
^i*° f
ne calls
for meetings and all that
p
kind of stuff
I
ink it sets up a sort of dynamic
in their head where
S ver y
ifficult for them to live with the
inconsistency of investing all this time
and energy and then
not coming out for the meetings
or actions themselves...
People who s t a y involved are people
who have a little
bit of time on their hands, are
genuinely concerned
about their neighborhoods and neighborhood
issues, and
we ve gotten to come out two or three
times.
’
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I think that what enhances
peoples’ commitment is just
that they do something that changes their
way of thinking , they participate in some kind of
action where the
action gets something accomplished or at least
they
scare a person that they see has been pushing them
around for a long time or ignoring them.
Or if you
have a big meeting and you have a new person who
chairs
it or takes a big part of the agenda.
That's the sort
of thing that enhances their commitment or it
sort of
d iv ides ... -some people will do that and feel
really
good about it... other people won’t be able to handle it.
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In essence,

the organizers believe
Detieve that
that- when
u
the right kind of
people are exposed to
ACORN
okin tney
thev w
i
W1-m
li a
develop
commitment to the
organization. Note the
featuresS of ACORN
ACORm activism
that they claim
Will create this effect
for the
b HS;
excitement, effectiveness
in fighting City Hall,
addiction, consistency
of action and thought,
vented anger, and the
opportunity to assume
responsibility.
Because of this belief in
the effectiveness of the
ACORN experience in creating the desire
for more, the organisers
believe
strongly that persistence is
the key to ACORN's success:
•
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tO be AC0RN,S ° r anlza
t:ional persis§
i
ey don ^t let
go
of
people.
People who
b_
ieVe *
° f theirS and don,t
come out
mee?
r
to meetings
for a while but they’re on
your
list
and you call them anyway.
And then, once in a
while something comes up and
they do come out.
I
in
w at keeps people in is that
once ACORN has
its grip on someone, they
don’t let go.
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Finally, one of the organizers
expressed the belief that

ACORN taps an understanding that
low-income people have that they
should belong to organizations like
ACORN:

Just the fact that they're joining
an organization
shows some kind of knowledge that poor
people,
wherever they are, have to get together
to get
organized. There’s already that germ of
consciousness about how poor people have the same
problems
everywhere and got to get together. I think
getting involved in the organization deepens
their
understanding of that.

Once the understanding is realized by joining, he
claims that it

becomes the source of continuing commitment to the
organization.
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In addition to the
commitment that organizers
claim the

members develop toward the
organization, several
suggested the
purposive incentives operate
to promote members'
participation in
ACORN. One organizer
suggested that that was
the only way the
organization could survive:

What gets them in is a more
narrow view, what keeps
them in is a broader view.
Because I've always
hought about in some way the
idea of keeping members
involved is so difficult because
if you look at^t
we either fight that specific
issue that they're
C
they
80 home and
come
out again.
again
•'T’ on an issue and
If „*1
e fight
lose ...
probabl y have even more reason
not to stay
the
r “ e d ° n,t tackle tba
?f°T
»L
lf that ? s wh
y y° u joined, they won't
f to stay
be inclined
involved, so the pressures or
S
keeP pe ° ple from sta ying involved
are
nr^t high.
pretty
’

U
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By this logic, for ACORN to
persist, it must recruit

members who respond to incentives
that are not purely selfinterested.
several ways.

The organizers suggested that that
was possible in
First, one organizer argued that the
members

...are sophisticated enough. You have to
give them
credit.
Just because they aren't saying it
doesn't
mean they aren't thinking it. You just
haven't
asked them the right question, you haven't
spoken
to them at the right time

Another organizer argued that purposive incentives
can be experienced

m

such a way that the individual can feel rewarded
personally

for making a contribution toward a public good:

Probably the greatest
selective inn Ptl H vo
s tke tatangibl. one:
people
part of an organization
that Is fighting for
a lot
of important things.
That's why pLss Coverage
°s
so important
so that our members
,
that don't Iver
m
U
1
a
S
AC ° RN °"
fightin S
to ge? a t?a«lc Ught
at'a dan
It makes them feel really
a real selective benefit, proud^Trtink^S?'^s°"'
because other thlS^ir
church, there aren't that
many organizations our
members can feel like are good,
positive helpful
organizations that they belong
to.
Ther^ are
service organizations like
Eastern Star,... but 1
hink it s a different feeling
for most of our
members.
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e defln ms that sense of
"l' m involved in
“?J unportant
something
". .as the major selective
certainl y People who feel that
more
emphatically people who have been
defining themselves all their lives as being
fighters, they
definitely participate. That
woman,... all of her
ife, she s defined herself
as somebody who stands
up for the little guy and fights
to change stuff
doesn t take "no" for an answer.
And for that
r eason
she s out to everything
,

.
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Thus, members apparently derive
benefits from contributing
to what they perceive as the
public good.

Paradoxically, however

the same organizer who argued for
the effectiveness of selective

purposive incentives also argued that ACORN
organizations must

provide tangible benefits in order to succeed:

Members say you gotta crawl before you can walk.
So
we do that in organizing. By working on
tangible,
winnable, immediate, specific kinds of issues. We
d°n t knock on somebody's door and talk to them
about...
socialized medicine. We deal with those issues that
we know we can win and we can look at and point to.
And when one of their neighbors say, "That guy who
was
at your house— is he from ACORN? Did you join that
group? Do they get anything done?" They can point to
something
'
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Most people like to see
something visible

•

a

”0

struggll^i^about "and
1
Without actually winning
something'^’conc^/ln
particular neighborhood, she
won't
disappointed. But she's obviously necessarily 'bo
the Lceptlon
People who respond most to
that sort of approach'
are people who have tried
on their own..
Sc
hav
P
for “ample, called
the ambulance
f’
and had
tad“th
the ambulance not show up
for fnri v-n„ n
minutes and then they read that
the...citv
/
to triple the ambulance
fee.
They respond much°better
!

‘

i

His argument makes two basic
points:

1)

i

you must keep working on

tangible benefits in order to
keep recruits; and 2) those
who
respond primarily to selective
purposive incentives are really
quite rare and cannot be counted
to constitute the entire
organ!zat ion

The organizers, therefore,
offered a wide variety of

comments on the kinds of incentives
that they are capable of
offering to their constituents in
return for joining and participating in an ACORN group.

The incentive that plays the
biggest

role, both in recruitment and
maintenance,

is the specific

tangible benefit that satisfies the
self-interests of the
constituents.

The organizers claimed that it is a
necessary

component of the recruitment process, in
particular, but was

actually quite significant in the maintenance of
an ACORN group
as well.

The other three incentives that they felt were
important

in their efforts to create and maintain
ACORN groups were anger,

the organization itself, and purposive incentives.

By their

account, they are able to use all of those resources to
persuade
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their constituents to part
icipate in ACORN.

Organizational Goal:
The interview also elicited
organizer responses on the
kinds of goals ACORN could
pursue, given the nature
of their

constituency.

As professional organizers,
they responded in a

way that reflects their
relationship to the ACORN
members and
their use of issues as
organizing tools. This
discussion will
deal with the organizers'
perceptions of:
(1) how broad ACORN's
goals can be; (2) what limits
exist and why; and (3) how
flexible
the members are.
The two most experienced
organizers had a great deal to

say about the value of expanding
the issue agenda at the same
time

recognizing that is a difficult task:

It should be broader... in that—
we'll probably always
be able to say this, or I'll be able
to say this—
again, because of the intense day-to-day
demands,...

when doing direct neighborhood organizing,
I didn't
spend nearly enough time talking with
the leaders and
members about the broader issues involved.
I would
talk to them about why it's important to work
on this
campaign or that campaign, and
in a campaign against
a landlord, I'd talk about a particular
landlord and
the injustices that we've got to fight to
change, but
not often enough did I spend time talking about
the
larger housing issue why landlords get by with this
sort of thing.
I sort of did with leaders but not
enough with members. Part of our whole philosophy or
outlook is that people don't learn those kinds of
things from conversation, they learn them from actions.
.

.

.

—

Issue generation, or the process by which ACORN organizers raise
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and articulat e issues
that are both concrete
and important to the
constituents, pose the difficulty
of translating what
organizers
see as worthwhile goals
into campaigns the
constituents will support
t:
es ’ 1 think we have to
work harder to get
non ? 63
:mt<“ rest
or make People understand
why
this particular issue is very
important even though
8
aren t kn ° Cking ° n
doors
saying"?'
H
b
y
8’
y ’ why aren c y° u guys out there
doing
voter registration?” So I
think we have to work
with some of those issues a
little bit harder and
we have to dig deeper into
our membership and find
the people who are motivated
by those things

T

’

'

.

His solution to this dilemma
is the fact that ACORN
pursues many
goals at the same time:

That’s one of the benefits of being
a multi-issue
organization; people who are going to
be coming to
tonight s APAC meeting .. .may not
have come to
neighborhood actions for four or five
months.
They're just not that concerned with
potholes or
whatever, but they do understand the
importance of
electoral politics.

The goal of their organizing efforts,
as the organizers
see it,

is to

impart their understanding of political
issues to

the members through political action on
those issues.

The

potential for such a broadened understanding is
equal to the

members

potential for learning from experience, either in ACORN

or, as the following statement indicates,

from daily life.
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There’s
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and where
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day!
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One goal of ACORN organizing,
therefore, is to reconcile
the organizers' political
views with the daily lives
of their

constituents by changing the batters'
lives to include political
activism

The way a lot of these things
can become reality is
by doing the kind of work that
we do
I think
that the tilitary buildup is not
going to he stopped
by.
those who oppose military
increases now.
They’re
just a small, small percentage of
the population.
While a lot of peace groups will
talk about getting
more rank-and-file blue collar
worker people involved...
by doing our work, we’re making
their job easier
because people begin to see the links.
I always
describe our work to people as enlarging
the whole
arena of political actors. We’re
getting people who...
have never defined themselves as being
politically
inclined whatever ,... so we’re enlarging
the progressive
end of the political spectrum.
.

The limits on issues that Boston ACORN can
address stem from
several factors.

concreteness

First, there is the above-mentioned problem of
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The organizer quoted above
also expressed the ideal
of reconciling
broad issues with the daily
n f members
y concerns of
under specific

circumstances

^

mem bership side that
ther e s a difference
there
ff
between peoples' intellectual
responses to things like that
and peoples'
responses after some amount of
discussion or
context put to the questions.
Our board voted to
endorse the Central American
Referendum that was
on the ballot in Boston last
fall after a fair
amount of discussion on it.
Because it was tied
to domestic spending and...
social programs, and
hen people make those connections
there tends to
be more of a consensus on
where that issue should
go than when it's talked about
in a vacuum.
The second limit cited by the
organizers is the problem of

natural divisions among their constituents:
ethnicity.

race, gender, and

One of the organizers voiced an acute
awareness of the

limits Imposed by the differences within
ACORN’s class-based

constituency
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number of our White members
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the issue of polSe
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by
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ACORN,
tM was raised
h by some other
organization
W° Uld aPPen
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One" offth
One
the reasons that ACORN has
really
failed to see that it’s not
just a class issue, there
issues of race, that generate
—r~
excitement among the
minorities, and you have to address
those issues^too
,
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The other limit that the
organizers discussed is created by
the necessities of ACORN’s
organizing style

•

Since the constituency

responds to short-term, concrete
issues and campaigns, the organizing
style itself places limits on the
kinds of issues the organization
works on

[Many issues] just don’t fit into the
base. When I
go out on the doors with people and ask
what they’d
like to see better,... I never hear anybody
say,
Stop killer cops." I’ve never heard
anybody say
that.
But what we ask doesn’t lead to statements
like that. We ask what they want to see improved
on their block, around their neighborhood.
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ign °y in § th ings we
should look at
ve ever done about

!
what

so ho sp it al sterna in

open^n lo^i^c

^

healthcare
hearingS

^

like that. But so mu^h
short-term. We don’t have
the time, or the staff
the leisure to really
approach basic problems.]..

Nevertheless, within the issue
agenda the organization
pursues, the organizers claim
there is significant
flexibility
on which ones should be
dealt with at any given
time:
Part, 1 depends on what
prompted the change [in
-L agenda].
a ?
the
In one of our local
groups recently
Ut
h ° ld
Campalgn ° n as bestos in the
schools
schools.
To a degree, k
because the organizer was
reaily frustrated about the
campaign.
But we also
put it on hold because there
was a twenty-story,
168-unit elderly high-rise run by
the Boston Housing
Authority that had two elevators
that were always
broken down. We actually cancelled
a meeting on the
asbestos issue. We called people
back and said.,
we ve cancelled this meeting,
this action is going
on the day after tomorrow, we
need your help in it
I don t think anybody
got terribly upset.
One thing’
you have to remember is that most
of the issues that
our members are concerned about
have been hitting
them in the face for a long, long
time.
If they
don t see progress over some long
term, then it does
become a problem.
1

T

Most of the primary and secondary leadership
see the
main goals of the organization, not so much
the
neighborhood issues.
So, if we drop everything and
work on the Dallas trip [to the ACORN 1984
National
Convention]
the members will get behind the idea
that we have to spend more time on Dallas and
less
time on vacant lots.
,

This flexibility, they claim, stems from the long-standing
nature
of unresolved grievances in their lives and
organizational commitment
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a nd a broader

view of issuer

The organizers

•

just narrow concrete
concerns.

statements regarding
issues they use in
their organizing and
their constituent*’ r-oo
responses to them center
on a recurring theme:
the desire to generate
left
g nerate left-wing
progressive
political issues limited by
the narrower, more
concrete political
vision of their constituents.
The organizers claim
that these
limits can be expanded by
creative organizing and
by the members'
commitment to the organization
organization. The expansion
of their constituents'
limits, in fact, seems to be
t-v 10 moone oi
of the
major goals of ACORN
organizers.
'

•

i

Views on Tactics

Several of the questions in the
interview asked the ACORN
organizers to discuss the kinds of
tactics they thought were the

most desirable for attaining the
goals they seek.

emphasizes that

it

is a

ACORN literature

"direct action" organization; hence,
the

questions asked why confrontational
tactics are important, what
effect they have on members, what
tactics members prefer, and if

organizers have philosophical commitments
to confrontational tactics,
Once again, the critical question becomes:

What technique is the

most effective for promoting low- and
moderate- income membership
and participation in a political
organization?

Clearly, the

tactics the organization adopts to achieve its
goals comprise a

major portion of the experience the constituents
have as members
and therefore assume a critical role in the success of
the
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organization.
The organizers expressed
a preference for
confrontational

tactics in their organizing
for a variety of reasons:
their
educational effects on the
members, the excitement
they generate,
their salutory effects on
the organization, and
the impact they
have on everyone involved.
The organizers noted,
however, that
they must be strategic in
the choice of tactics;
that is, they

must apply the style of tactic
that will be the most
effective at
any given moment in the
campaign they are conducting.
Moreover,
the organizers noted that
there are costs for confrontational

tactics, even when applied at
the appropriate times.
The campaigns for which the
organizers develop strategies

follow a kind of natural
progression that begins with requests
for action on an issue, as
for example asking that a city
agency

have vacant lots cleared in an
ACORN neighborhood.

If the members

are not satisfied with the response
they receive, they become more
direct and forceful:

You just have to think organizationally,
what's gonna
be best for us.
If bargaining or building a coalition
xs going to advance your cause, fine,
but if that
fails, then you have to confront people.
That's one
of the reasons that ACORN is here— to
confront people
with received opinions, to confront their... very
comf ortability
.

.

.

While the organizers prefer the more direct tactics, they
recognize
that the members do not want to be confrontational
until the target
has had an opportunity to respond to their non— confrontational

requests first:
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Despite the organizers'
preference for confrontational
tactics, one cited a case in
his experience in which non-

confrontational tactics were preferable:
You build the organization more
in the sense by
confrontational tactics, though, at the
same
time, cooperative tactics can
be good, I mean it
depends on what you're trying to
achieve.
Cooperative tact ics ... can be very
effective.
1 ve been dealing with
vacant lots [since starting
with ACORN] and we're trying to get
some funding
from the federal government or the
city for a landscaping project. And that's definitely
cooperative
tactics.
It's gonna be the members doing most
of
the work, planting the seeds and all
that.
Rather
than getting the city to do it.
In that sense, we're
getting money from the federal structure
of the
group to get money from the city... so the
group is
useful for that. Some people take leadership
in
that project and are definitely developing
their
leadership there....

Clearly, organizers apply tactics as they fit
strategies, but for

reasons noted below, confrontational tactics are the
most desirable.
The organizers cited four basic reasons why
confrontational

tactics are the most effective for the long term:

educational

99

effects, excitement,
organization-building, and impact.
Clearly,
if ACORN organizers
are trying to broaden
their constituents'
view of politics, the
educational eff ects of a
tactic would be an
important consideration:
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Two organizers noted that
confrontational tactics are
particularly

useful for educating members
about the organizers

perceptions of

the nature of authorities:

They re more polarizing.
If you get somebody at a
neighborhood ACORN meeting and you're
giving him or
er a teal^hard time, either
they're going to cave
or the y re gomg to become more
defensive and
sort of lash out and that's really
important because
it shows our members [that]
in the heat of confrontation people say things they really
don't intend to
say and it shows our members their
true colors sometimes.
They'll make some terrible slur about
poor
people or something .. .and the members will
learn that
when push comes to shove, everybody
else is going to
stand up for his own self-interest and
therefore you
can t believe him when he says, "Gee,
I’d really like
to help you guys
"
So that's a tremendous benefit.

m
.

We went to the BRA [Boston Redevelopment
Authority]
and the BRA director was furious and it
was good to
see him get that angry.
Because his notions of
order had been drastically rearranged. And it
was
good for us because he was arrogant, rude, and
condescending and that helps us all the time.
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Thus, by stimulating
conflict and forcing a
situation in which
officers feel threatened and
become less diplomatic,
organizers
feel that members will
have an opportunity to
see what powerholders
truly think about ACORN
members and their grievances.

The organizers also claim
that the

excitant of confrontational tactics generated
also makes them more
desirable.
They
described the experience in
terms of the fo
feeling ofr power that it
creates for both members and
organizers:
i

•

I'm sure people remember
confrontational longer
arga 1I lng ° r ne 8°tiating.
I

taMon
that

l
I

think confronm° r " f“ n
That s °ne of the reasons
like this job, for the fun,
sometimes.

^
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Confrontational tactics also help
keep the staff
going. You can literally see
targets sweat, soraetimes.
And feel pressure you know
they never, ever

The one street-blocking that I did,
the people.,
thought it was fun.
One man, who I just assumed
wouldn t come, came, and [while] everyone
else was
sort of milling around he was the
one who got the
ball rolling saying, 'Veil, I can
give them some
garbage, " and then he began throwing
things out on
the street.
He had such a good time doing that!
it felt like you were nine years
old.
Everyone
had fun.
The house visits were f un
they 're a
little afraid to do those, but once things
got
moving and once a couple of people took charge,
people after the fact... tend to think they were
more
fun than when they were doing it.
.

.

.

One organizer cited what he believes are
organizational

benefits from confrontational tactics:
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front porch and rant and
rave abont th
u
down_at City Hail and when
they get do^the?^
they re quiet and meek
as a mouse.
Avain
you have a 58-year-old
woman standing two
’feet"
rom the mayor shaking her
finger atViTand all
IS stuff and two days
later the vacant 1nt-o
cut, everybody in the
room knows that
tasn'f
coincidence.
So that's yet another
benefu
,
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In other words,

besides providing clear and
tangible benefits for

time and energy involved
in ACORN activism, direct
action helps to
separate the sheep from the
goats, helping to determine
the degree
of commitment members
possess.
The organizers

'

discussions of the impact of
confrontational

tactics on members and targets
identified two valuable results:
targets are moved and members
feel satisfaction.
The effectiveness
of confrontational tactics
were critical to the organizers:

The ones that are the most militant
are the best
You ve always got the... sort of...
"bad guys," the
people [targets] that are extreme,
but then’you've
got people who are sort of trying
to do something.
s far as tactics for the
"bad guys," militant
tactics are the best because that’s the
only way
you re ever gonna get them to listen
to you, that’s
the only way you’ll get them to do
something.
^

The more militant the better.
It’s just so hard to
move people toward those things in a lot of
ways.
And yet, when we do, we almost inevitably
win.
If
we hadn t squatted, we would be nowhere on
the homesteading
.

While effectiveness and satisfaction are not entirely
distinct
categories

there is a lot of satisfaction in winning

— at

least
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some of the satisfaction
the organizers described
was aprt from or
in addition to success

I think the more
militant, the more nooubr
i
6
really feel like. .they 're
much more satisfied with
7 glV ng hel1 to some official than
being nice
^ not getting
to them and
anything out of it. We
went
down to the HUD office and
really got into a
t
match with HUD, the head of the
8
Northeast Region
catling hnn a liar and a bastard,
people wer! sw^Hng
an
everythln 8> and maybe we went
a
little
ittie too far, t
but people came out feeling
much
better about that than if they
had gone down and been
y nice to him and still not accomplished
anything.
t-

f

The organizers' evaluations of
confrontational tactics are
not all positive.

Given peoples' preference for
dignity and

decorum, confrontational tactics
have cost ACORN manbers at times:
A small down is that once in a
while we lost some
of our more mild-mannered
members who feel we've been
too tough on a target, particularly
if they come in
on the fourth action of a campaign
and this is their
first action.
They tend to think, "Gosh, why are
people being so rowdy?" And they .weren
paying
attention during the prep session or they t
didn't
really believe earlier when they said he
wouldn't
return our phone calls... and that's why we're
taking
this step.
.

.

'

People tend to just eliminate themselves without
a lot
Going to someone's house or doing a
street-blocking, you always lose people. We did a
street— blocking and a woman who was very active and
attended a lot of meetings just won't have anything to
do with us anymore.
She hasn't come out and said it,
but she hasn't been to a single meeting since.
And
she's very cool and noncommital on the phone now....
And so you just can't please everyone and change
things.
You have to offend somebody.
of conflict.
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This same preference for
dignified behavior seems
to be operating,
the organizers said, when
outsiders observe ACORN's
confrontational
behavior

6 gettln § lnto situations
where anybody got
arrested or anything like
that.
That would be a
isadvantage.
Legal fees... and depending
on how
6
l00k ’'^ 0U
s”
"troublemaker
but evL'irvo
7
§ f arrested, it can make them
look
bad.

*

.

.
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And there

s the larger picture
in which the public
perception of ACORN is we're a
bunch of crazies
the 8
ral PUkUc regards as some
outTand?sh^ndish things. But that's not
a particularly
compelling argument against doing
militant tactics..
° Ur membershi
P rather than
some
som^amor
h°
amorphous
group of people that haven’t
done
anything but read a newspaper.

T

^

Finally, the organizers noted that,
since confrontational

tactics require greater commitment,
better preparation, and widespread agreement on the goal and the
tactics, their use makes

cooperative ventures with other organizations
much more difficult

ACORN tends to "Lone Ranger” it a lot.
And
I think,
for really good reasons. What ACORN
does best is
direct action, and a lot of groups simply
don’t
,

to do that.

And if you get involved
and if you need a consensus for what
do, other groups are pointless.
And
wrapped up in coalitions, you dilute
you have.

like
with coalitions
you're going to

if you get
whatever strength

Thus, despite the drawbacks the organizers cited,
they prefer

confrontational tactics for the benefits they provide the members,
the organizers, and the organization.

While they do not and cannot

104

use confrontation indiscrim
inantly
to shake things up

,

,

its effectiveness

>

its ability

and its educational
value make it a desirable

choice of tactics.

The Decisionmaking

Prop. ess

The organizers recognize
the importance of the
decisionmaking process to the ualit
q
y of their work.
The organizers convey
a professional concern
for the manner in which
important decisions
are made, first, because they
are sensitive to past
criticisms that
they control the organization
and, second, because they
feel that,
if they are going to
organize a group of low- and
moderate- income
people to educate them in political
activism, the place to start
is

within their own organization.

Consequently, responses to the

questions regarding the decisionmaking
process stressed, in most
cases, the complexity of the
process and the need to strive for
the ideal of member control.

Responses of organizers to the question,
"Who makes the

decisions in Boston ACORN?" were quite
consistent:
Different kinds of staff and different
kinds of memberthe rank-and-file organizer,
the leadership of the members, and the
rank-and-file of
the ^members.
In terms of who makes the decisions,
you
can t pinpoint one of those four elements as
making a
decision.
It’s hard to say, because I don’t want to say
the members make all the decisions because it
simply is
not true.

ship— the head organizer,

105

Understand th^l” ’d^ deClsions are ™*de by the
f'
th ®
organization and also^h/staf
^hel^l ^

but always in consultation
with
the group. And those
decisions
the context of what the
feeling
§
ship is, or perceived to

tuVea^r^^r
of
ni

thp^

in

be.

8

£

’

Ln

member ~

m ° re P ° Wer than i,: should
bably bee
Probablv
because it s more expedient
to think of
something yourself and raise
it with the membership
they
thl "k lt s a Sood
o" even if you have a
couple of choices, they’re
the choices the staff picks,
sometimes.
*

^

u'V

?0

’

U

'

id^

eXeCU tlVe b ° ard does whlch
°nce
,
realit
y> organizers have a tremendous
amnun,
f
r J
thln 6= that ” e S^invoWld
witl,
with arise strictly
r
r^’ out of membership,
things the best
organizers would never have even
thought of.

mon^

a

r

y
’

’h°t

’

t

"

^

he structure of the organization
is such where
ev en if staff i s pushing for
certain
•

.

.

f

I

]

decisions
going to get carried out that
the members
ciren t into
There's no question the final say
comes
out of the board and the leadership
and that the
members perceive the staff as working
for them, for
the organization.

nothing

s

These responses indicate that organizers
clearly have a lot of
power within the organization but that
there are important checks
on their power.

One of the most important checks is the
desire expressed by
the organizers to develop the members'
skills and commitment by

making sure they are the ones making important
decisions.

There

is a recurring theme throughout all the interviews
that the most

effective organizers are the ones who delegate as much as possible
and confer with the members as much as possible, thereby diluting

their control over the
decisionmaking process.

Delegating power
and responsibility is a
major topic and ideal
expressed by the

organizers

[T]he times that I've grown
most as an organizer and
developed r S when I've tried
to juggle t
orThree
local group campaigns at one
time. By takins on that
additional load, it's forced me
to prod
push
’
beIS lnt ° d ° ing m ° re
that's
what"!?; a°n
11
bout
I think.
If we take fewer
r.
f
[issues] we take
more of the load as organizers
and
r
e d °" ^ empOWer pe
°P le as much as we should.
There s always
Th«e's
al”
a temptation to do more of
the iob ourselves than we really need to
be doing.

»

a

T

“U

-

>

Allowing them to take part of
the organization
allowing them to take a part of
the agenda, allowing
them to speak at a public hearing,
chair a meeting
just many of the million different
ways of things
you need to do to get an organization
going. By
letting the members participate as
fully as possible
by delegating a lot of the stuff
the organizer has to
do to all the members.
That really builds peoples’
sense of ownership of the organization.

It’s very interesting to me... the
degree to which
we push membership ownership of the
organization.
And getting leaders involved in a real
serious way.
Something we could certainly do more of, and
every
time we do more of it, it’s wonderful for
both the
leaders and the members.
I think that ma^ be one
of our shortcomings.
We do need to make a concerted
effort, just constantly, to get members to
be doing
things that they certainly are capable of doing
and
that we certainly don’t need to be doing.
I wouldn't
recommend that everybody be stuck in an office for
six months by themselves, but the benefits of
that
were just tremendous.
It made me feel somewhat
foolish for not having part of the members do more.

The process of conferring with members and leaders is
cr it ical to the proper practice of professional organizing,
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according to the organizers
int srv iewed

a good idea to go ahead
and move a campaign
about
something . . .and said, "Let’s
do it,

we golL do
There’s all these people o U
? there
that want something to happen."
And we didn’t
really involve the leader in
the discussion.
And
we went ahead and did it
and she got all u^et
a out it and how we
bypassed her, even though it
was a good thing and she came,
she thought it was
a bad way to do it.

^ihin^.

I thinh conflict comes
out of a lack of communication
when organizers stop listening
to the members .. .and
make assumptions. It’s a fine
line the organizers
are walking sometimes, and that
part of what happens...
is that organizers. .expect.
.members to pull the
reins
It shouldn't work like that.
The organizers
th emselves
should be from the get-go just
asking the
questions and making sure that they're
structuring
things so it is the members making
the decisions,
ometimes it happens almost out of
convenience
an organizer knows this is what
the group needs’or we
want to build the group in this way,
so it’ll be
quicker if I just make these things
happen.
’

.

.

,

Thus, the potential for organizer
control of decisionmaking exists,
but at the same time, the organizers are
sensitive to criticism and

express professional ethics that counter that
tendency to some extent
The organizers’ descriptions of the process
by which important

decisions are made seem to agree that the process
requires member
involvement for them to be effective.

1

Ibourtrcamplian!
ten

or't^rjSi;

^

^

members and Baders

^fa^Tur^^

C°

0"
issues than even our best
leader does
So STth
^something that's happening,
... an organizer] wUl
SOmetlmes <»*>« the
neighborhood
leaders
'

[

*nT “

In one of the groups I
have, they hav P
1S P i
'
11
1 " “ taOS ’
S ^ USt ac™ss t h
from
fr» a'a liquor
li
store.
I didn't all of a
sudden decide
to work on that like no
one else had thought to
do it
efore
People for years have been
trying to do something about that. And if you
say that to someone and
the group will say, "Yeah,
that's a good idea " Then
eVer y° ne else . VO" have
a campaign
going
7 ttat 1 ” ade a de oi=i°n to do
?"
ftet
1
If people had
said it's a bad idea, we
just
f] ,
V
d
e
Certalnl y there's power
In“the
the fact that
rh
you re a catalyst, that you're
ln 7 th
nS that ' s br iuging people
together.
Thar s powerful.
f ?
That
But on the other hand, people
won't
together for a reason they don't
think
is
vend
I
good.
So you re always held in

U

^ I

V°

f

r

check.

[Y]ou have a planning meeting before
we have a big
meeting or an action or anything like
that, and for
the planning meeting, in theory,
the organizer who’s
pulling it together is supposed to consult
with all
the different leaders, five or six
leaders, and find
out what the key issues are, work on
getting the
agenda together, finding out what people
think we
should do... and at the planning meeting
pretty much
make a decision on what we’re gonna do, or
else, or
at least the rough guidelines of what
we're gonna do.
Then we have a big neighborhood meeting where
people
from the whole community meet to ratify the
ideas of
the planning meeting.
It’s a process between the
leader s .. .and the mass of the membership.
The final
outcome is dependent on how it is accepted or how
people react to it.
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In terms of the issues to
work on, I believe it's
e
berS P th3t dSCldeS the
lssues to
worK on
on.
The
Thr way that
|’i
can

hannen
can talk about some issue
and others
about those issues at mccLiugs,
meetings
-i

nf

.

r

»

“

P

The
lhe organizers

,

“P

re exclte<!^

,

snr-t-

people involved in the issues
that „e work on!
Thus, the consensus is that
for the organizers to do
a good job of
promoting a decisionmaking process
which generates popular
decisions
that build excitement and enthusiasm
for the organization,
they must
consult with the members and leaders
in a variety of ways, on
the
doors, while planning meetings,
and in the meetings. While
all of

the organizers recognized that
they and other organizers in
Boston

ACORN possessed and exercised power,
they also recognized that
ideally they should do so as sparingly
as possible, for both

ethical and practical reasons.

Summary

The organizers interviewed considered
themselves professionals
in a field that requires both expertise
and responsiveness to their

constituents.

The responses of the organizers to the
questions that

sought to discover their motives for pursuing this
profession

combined goals that they have for American politics,
the progressive
political agenda, for example, and the opportunity to empower
lowand moderate-income people.

The combination of these goals seems to

contain a contradiction that the organization attempts to reconcile
in the way it provides incentives to the members,

pursues its goals.
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and makes its important
decisions.

By the organizers'
admission,

the process is imperfect,
yet the organizers claim
to hold

professional standards of practice
and ethics that they feel
will
promote the issues they, as
left-wing political activists,
believe
in,

yet preserve the democratic
control of the organization
for

the membership.

The interviews with the members
and insights by

the researcher and writers on the
topic of community organizing
will examine their claim in chapters
to come.

CHAPTER

V

THE MEMBERS

This chapter will discuss
the results of interviews
with
ACORN members and compare them
with the goals of the
ACORN organizing strategy.
The topics explored by the
interviews include the
characteristics of the members,
their views on why they and
others
join and participate in ACORN,
their perceptions of the
decisionmaking process in ACORN, their
views on American politics
and
political issues, their sense of
how the purposes of ACORN
activate
members to contribute, and their
perceptions of the tactics that

ACORN uses to attain its goals.

The responses of the members

allow one to evaluate the impact of
ACORN organizing on the
constituency.

The members' responses also provide
insights into

the questions raised by the literature
and the problems faced by
the political organizers/'

It should be noted that the text of
the interview responses will
include grammatical errors and underlining to
express emphasis
where the interviewee was clearly intending to
emphasize a word
or phrase.
The researcher has sought to reproduce the language
used by the interviewee as closely as possible and
has used this
language in the text.

Ill
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.Thg_Character istics of the
Int erviewees

The nineteen members
interviewed are but a
small part of
the 2,500 total Boston
ACORN members. They
do, however, represent
a fairly large portion
of the more active
m«bers and officers of
the organization. Among
the interviewees were
ten officeholders,
the representative to the
ACORN National Board from
Massachusetts,
and eight members who have
attended national ACORN
conventions.
The demographic characteristics
of the interviewees
are quite

different from the average political
activist, however.
of the members are black,
one white.

Eighteen

Seventeen are women.

The

age and education legels of the
members is given in Table 5-1:

TABLE

5-1

AGE AND EDUCATION OF INTERVIEWEES

Age

18-25
26-31

32-39

40-49
50-59
Over 61

Number

1

Education Level

Number

Grade school

1

2

Some high school

3

4

High school diploma

7

3

Some college

3

2

College degree

3

7

Graduate or professional
train ing

2
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Six of the interviewees
are retired
retlred
and eleven are employed
full-time.
y all have children.

tw„
° are on welfare or
disability,
«- t

-

Only
th
v
y four of
f them
have
spouses and

Thus, the group is
predominantly black,

female, older, high school
educated, employed or
retired, and single.
This is in marked contrast
to the Boston
ACORN organisers who are
all
white, single, childless,
and college-educated.
Moreover, they are
considerably younger, between
twenty-one and thirty-two,
and only one
was a woman. Hence, the
demographic data is important
not only in
terns of how similar individuals
tend to behave politically,
but also
in terms of the differences
between them and the organizers.
The participation rates of
most of the interviewees
is quite
high, though there was some
mix of relative newcomers or
people who
have remained somewhat on the
fringes of the organization. The

activities members reported break

do™

into four categories, from

those most frequently engaged in to
those that are not often engaged
in.

Table 5-2 gives the data on participation
rates

activities.

in

these

The average number of activities
the interviewees parti

cipated in was 9.47 and the range was from
one to all eighteen
activities.

Nine of the interviewees are very active,
six active,

and four not active.

Nine of them are what might be called "charter

members" of Boston ACORN, joining during the
first round of ACORN
organizing in 1980.

Thus, the group interviewed comes primarily

from the most active, most knowledgeable and most
committed segment
of the organization, and the responses generally
reflect the

experiences and insights of long-time members who have participated
frequently and in a wide variety of activities.
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TABLE 5-2

ACTIVITIES IN WHICH INTERVIEWEES
ENGAGED

Frequency

Most frequent

Activity

No. who engaged

Fundraised
17

Phoned
17

Marched in action

Very frequent

Flyered

Recruited members

Less frequent

Least frequent

16
14
13

Campaigned in election

12

Served on APAC

12

Held office

10

Chaired meeting

10

Recruited in public

9

Attended national convention

8

Doorknocked

8

Led action

7

Hosted meeting in home

7

Attended national action

7

Attended public hearing

6

Signed support letter

6
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Ihg__Membership Der1fi1 nn
-

^

Responses to the question,
"Why did you join AC0RN?
„_
into four ma i or categories:
service to community,
serving others,
specific issues, and
self-development. Pew
interviewees restricted
their answer to one reason,
and some of those cited
other reasons
in response to other
questions in the interview.
Hence, few of
the ACORN members

™de

the membership decision
for only one reason.

Rather, they were attracted
to the organization for
a variety of
things.
It is also noteworthy
that few of the interviewees
joined
for clearly self-interested
reasons, referring instead to
broader

concerns.
The respondents that cited
community or neighborhood improve-

ment, for example, discussed
issues such as beautification,
safety,
and crime.
Beautification included cleaning up
weeds and trash in

vacant lots, removing abandoned cars,
and development of park areas.
Safety issues involved traffic controls
at dangerous intersections,

WALK signals for pedestrians, and
abandoned buildings that threaten

children's safety and present fire hazards.

They addressed crime

issues by their desire to rid the area of
buildings that are used

as drug hangouts, or that offer opportunities
for rapists to hide
and commit crimes.

They were also concerned with street corners or

parking lots in which people regularly gather to drink
and dark
streets in need of lighting.

In the typical ACORN neighborhood,

there is always an abundance of potential issues of this kind
due
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to poor city services
in lower-income, and
especially black, areas

The ACORN technique of
doorknocking virtually
always uncovers
issues that organizers can
use to recruit members.
Eleven of
the interviewees cited
reasons of community
improvement for

originally joining ACORN.
Two members stated that they
joined ACORN in order to
help
others. They welcomed the
opportunity to get involved
in a program
to do "something to help
the poor." Several described
ACORN as a

service organization like the
Eastern Star (and were, in
fact,

members of that organization also)
in which they could help
those
less fortunate than themselves to
obtain life's necessities, such
as housing, health care, and public
safety.

For example, several

were involved in a campaign to
improve a nearby elderly high-rise.
Hence, the felt obligation to help
others prompted their decision
to join ACORN.

Several members said that they were originally
interested

m

ACORN because it gave them an opportunity to
get involved in an

interesting organization and engage in new and
educational activities.

They felt that it would improve the quality
of their lives

via community involvement, expanded horizons and
chances to meet

interesting people.

They expressed a need to find an outlet for

excess energy or extra time in their lives, a need that
arose when
they experienced changes in their lives such as a move into a new

neighborhood or their children's leaving home.
joined ACORN for two reasons:

One woman said she
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Number one, to get out of
the house- number
two, it's
interesting.
It's very interesting]
You learn about
o her things, other
people, how they doing,
how they

Another responded similarly:

really joined because of
my daughter
growing up. She was my last
daughter.
I

S

lnS

"

te

L"

S

i

!

eav Ag

home°and
Ve g0tTtto do
d°
something for myself
I
interesting to me instead of

that s
and being bored all the time."

staying
§ home

Perhaps this motivation explains
why so many of the members
are
retired or older people, looking
for stimulation once
childraising
and work are no longer occupying
their minds and energies.
Finally, at least five respondents
mentioned specific issues
that do not fall into the above
categories.

Most of these were

interested in housing, a major campaign
in Boston ACORN.

wanted to obtain housing for themselves.
got tired of renting and it got so
high.

own."

One woman stated
And

I

I

went to ACORN.

"I

:

want a house of my

A woman, who was in a HUD program already,
stated:

having a problem with housing.

Several

"I was

Someone had given

me the information that ACORN was helping the
tenants get results."
For one interviewee, health care was the
attraction to ACORN:

I got involved because of the health
care issue....
They had started to let over half the staff go [at
the local community health program where she brings
her children] and say to us that they would still
§ive the same health care. We know that wasn*t
possible
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Thus, in addition to
place-related and self .
taprovanent issues>
ACORN has appealed to
people with individual
economic problems,
particularly housing.

ACORN therefore appears
of the same response
came when
to recruit new members,

frequently noted here.

to fill a

variety of needs.

Much

m^bers were ashed about
attempts

though neighborhood
issues were more

Thirteen respondents
emphasized the

importance of stressing the
benefits ACORN brings to
the community
or neighborhood.
One woman said:

ac tually is an organization
that is here
that you feel as though
you can’t
stand
the neighborhood. You can
call thl office at
any time and put in your
complaint. And if it's some6
M
h
le! lt,U
-etingTnd
it?
to hpl
help with anything

m

we“l

LX

Another responded:

"They need to belong to something
that is

concerned with the neighborhood and
community.
the neighborhoods."

They do come into

Four members emphasized the
opportunities to

satisfy personal needs.

At the same time, they made it
clear that

this could only be done by actively
participating in the pursuit
of needed services or goods:

I explain to them that it
is a self-help program.
A lot of people expect that you pay "X"
amount of
money per year and you want something done,
you
come to ACORN and ACORN do it for you. But
it’s
people ACORN is people. Getting together and
getting things done.

—
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I tell them that
when you come in you don’t
expecting the board to do
your work that vn U Want
done.
Because you are ACORN. As
thouch
co,e in there, *ou
to bi
there s something coming up,
you have to get it
done because you are ACORN.
Then’s a lot of misunderstanding among people "I
want ACORN tn Hn
a
RN
*° that,, AC0RN ca ™°t
do that.
You’
are ACORN° Yo° C ° me
AC0RN joins alon with
§
ton
you.^ y!
You have to work with us,
you can’t say "This
didn t get done, that didn’t
get done.” In other
rk " ith
“*> 1
«at.
A^l’tSl
that?

^
•

£

We

“

\

}

—

’

^
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Finally, the respondents noted
the effectiveness of
recruiting

new members by emphasizing the
opportunities to help others:
It s helpful to others, a
chance to help others
and serve themselves.
To get knowledge, to know'how
to handle certain things in their
life.

Thus, the respondents feel that the
incentives that were effective
in recruiting them into ACORN are also
the ones most likely to

persuade new people to make that same membership
decision, confirming that their experiences in ACORN have
met their original

expectations

Why People Stay

Members find satisfaction in their ACORN experiences that
run the gamut from solidary incentives to purposive
incentives.
In the course of the interviews, virtually every kind of
incentive

available to a political organization was articulated in some
fashion by the interviewees.

They expressed satisfaction in

working with other members, gaining status by their association

W±th AC ° RN

’

learni " 8

^
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and the world,

Roving

their

neighborhood , helping others,
making their lives
easier, contriluting to a worthy cause,
f
notiHno against
y cause
fighting
a common foe, and
so on.
Solidary incentives were
clearly expressed by
several of
the members.
One woman referred to
ACORN as "a friendly
organization where everybody is
friendly and everybody
tries to help one
another.

[They]

try to be cautious of
everybody going home in the

evening after the meetings all
by themselves."
Ear as describing ACORN as
"a big family.

One woman went as

lt 's a very friendly

bunch of people and they’re
concerned about what's going
on in
their areas, no matter how small
one might think it is, it’s
of
importance

An individual whose social
and ethnic background

differed greatly from the main body
of the ACORN membership
stated:
A iot of it is social— I met a lot
of nice people,
the organizers, the members.
I’ve met people whom
I never would have met
before.
The fact is, I
never went to Roxbury, and in the last
three years
I ve been to situations where
I’ve been the only
white man present. And there's never been
any
unpleasantness

One member also reported solidary incentives
in the form of status
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I

ve gained a lot of
ground with ACOKN

t'

I even got a chance
them
to be on the^laUto™''
m"
presidential candidate. And
1 watched
^-““o 000
wishful people Wishing they
could be there’
got there through ACORN
and I' m telline vn,’
electrifying, it really was.
™3S
I was in
SOt t0 6111131:306 Senator
Kennedy who you'll
probabl
probably never see unless
you talk to an aide
and
he 11 say what he sa
id but you're never 0
get near
these people, but I was right
there fee?
JUSt
important as they were. All
through ACORN
1

‘

L

F

™
•

^

.

Material incentives clearly
p l ay . role ln keeplng manbers
involved in the organization.
A woman, whose primary
motive for
joining was to obtain housing,
was asked why she stays
involved
though she has succeeded in her
original intentions:
stay on HUD to be sure they do
all the repairs.

"We gotta

Hot water, holes

in the hallways, no security,
no bells, leaks...."

Another respondent expressed satisfaction at the
material successes within the

neighborhood

It gets a little more interesting
every time we
accomplish something. And one thing that
came
to light yesterday. .was the fact
that we had
worked, and we worked very hard up here
with
blocking the street up here, because we
want a
streetlight up here. And to my surprise,
this
weekend, we do have a traffic cop there.
We
have accomplished the fact that the police
have
been out.
.

Hence, material incentives provide satisfaction
both at the indi-

vidual level and the collective level.

Purposive incentives were also among the responses of several
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of the members.

The satisfact ion of
working toward a goal
with
the organization was
revealed in statements
such as:

get a great deal of sat i cf
31 1
involved with this particular
thing
d
S '"a™!,,!;
h
SOme
good can come out of it
!
and irh
f°T
it-s for everybody.
J do life L-°
C °n
C 1 ° n With ° ther
people > dealing^itiTother
neo
l
people
s concerns, not only
.
mine
Hhat’e3 S °° ad for
me is good for my neighbor.
I

,

1

^

,;

Another member expressed the
sentiment that:

ACORN is the kind of organization
that...„e fight
for what we really want.
At first I thought it
was a place... like a church
that just began, it
just a place where people go
to talk over

their
problems.
It's not that. People don't
go the«
to discuss their problems,
they go there to try
to help other people that
have problems like
police problems, like the police
should solve
but they don’t.

Hence,

it

is clear that,

provides an opportunity
influence public policy.

for some of the members, the
organization
to

work on issues for the general
good-to
Thus ACORN organizing does not
limit

itself to one or several of the incentives
available to such an

organization, but rather it provides all
of those incentives in an
effort to maintain members' desire to stay
and participate in the

organization.
tive.

There is not a dependence on any one form
of incen-

In fact, for any type of incentive, there
was a respondent

who articulated the importance of that incentive
for ACORN's ability
to attract and maintain its members.
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The Decisionmaking
Proc ess

Most of the recent literature
on organising stresses
the
importance of a decisionmaking
process that is participatory
and
democratic . Respondents offered
several views on the level
of

membership control of ACORN's
decisionmaking process. The
dominant
response, however, was that
ACORN is a democratic
organisation with
an open agenda, debate on
important issues, and a
fair voting
process. Twelve of the respondents
said that it is the members
who make the important decisions
in
ACORN; two said it is a

cooperative effort between members
and organisers; one said
that
organizers make the decisions; four
said they did not know.

Naturally, it was the less active
respondents who expressed no
opinion, but the other respondents
were equally divided among the

active and less active respondents.
The interviewees who claimed that
decisions are made

democratically were enthusiastic in their
support for the process.
They expressed their view of the process
in the following manner:
The members.
All the members.
voice their opinion.

Everybody has their say.

They have a chance to

And then they decide.
We
there, and we say, "you think we
wanna do so-and-so-and-so-and-so?" And then she go
around and ask, "What are you gonna think about this?
Do you think we should do so-and-so-and-so-and-so,
or shouldn't we do so-and-so-and-so-and-so?" That's
the way they do.
It's very democratic, you can say
whatever you wanna say. At the meetings.
I don't
know what goes on further up, but they must do it the
very same way. We decide, the members themselves...
what we gonna do, and how we gonna do it.
a ii s it around
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have the member^c"^^
especially th^b "“I
members... and they'll talk
about the issue°thit
that
IS at hand and they’ll
come out w-irn u
like to see obtained from
thS meetLv
lng
This
Thi how
the goals are set

T“

*

Some members were more
critical and either
qualified their
belief in member control or
felt that organizers
had more control
over decisionmaking than
they should. One
suggested that organizers were responsible for
setting the agenda:

o^not^m

PUt

V"

the

taWe

3nd ask us whether
We
cuss it.
dLcuss
it
if there
t7 are any questions,a 8ifrouW PIf
e do or
” lth
“ hen th
-ntioned rent
control Seth
“ e ^ SUPP ° rt i,: 1
« probiem with ft
it, supporting rent control.
Everybody
ooked at me like this" and
I said there's some
new
rules so I don t mind once they
explained them to me.

12

P

^

° r n0t SUPP0

US

“

^

'

Several went further and suggested
that organizers dominate the

organization and should give the members
more control of important

decisions

The organizers will maintain their
control in the
organization.
It’s not their place.
To me, it is
not their place.
It's up to the members to get
things going. And I hate to see them
always say.
Oh, let’s organize." What about us,
can’t we free
the organizers up?
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My observation has bepn itc
or anl2ers
Y
[who make the decisions].
And
f ™
f
has been that they frequent^ that°"n
y Ejections
s Jt 5
"
lk wlth
themseives and then try
convince
think, sometimes, that as
*
6
11,ltn .“ WHat the »bersWp
say !
t
&
6
6 “''° S particl
""?
for the first time rathe"
P atln 8
than"
OWI1 aad talk and
get
his input and let him make
up his
may not
get done as well or“s quicUy
If
eighth 8 rade dropout
b^f
ultimately, that should be the
!,
wav n
zation works— the membership
not only pay their
dues"
1Clpate ln tha decisionmaking
y Pa
and
on-going
tasks

“
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Hence, given the opportunity to
criticize the decisionmaking

process or praise it, nearly all
the members praised it.

Members were also asked how they
felt when decisions are

made counter to their wishes.
areas of ACORN activity:
elections, and tactics.

These questions included three

issues, support for candidates
in

The intent behind splitting these
responses

IS to give ample opportunity for

interviewees to express their

ideas and to jog their memories for
specific events.
fell into four basic categories:
the activity,

2)

1)

The responses

dissent and abstention from

expression of disagreement; 3) disagreement
and

then consenting to majority wishes; and
4) keeping quiet on any
d

isagreement
The most common response was for a member to
abstain from

participating in an issue campaign with which they disagreed, or
not to campaign for a candidate they could not support, or
to

abstain from an action of which they did not approve.

The following

are some clear examples
of this response
That's happened once or twice.
For examnl *
8t
card registration--! just
don't beiieve In Jhat! P ?
just don t assist in
organizing for rVwt

m

•

Weli I still have to work
to maintain unity.
If I
drdn t agree on it, the
majority wins. As I »aia,
said
we
take a vote on it
Anad lf
nt twe
A
lve members are there
and T' m fh
1116
three d° n,t ’ Vm one °f
tht three tten"
1
tQ go alon « wlth
?’
the board
board.
I 11 l
support it.
That doesn't mean I'll
work on it, but I 11 support
it.
<-

*

*

T'

rn

-\

^

.

More than likely I won't support
them.
It goes back
to the type of person I am
I would say, "No,
you
can forget me this time.
I 'll catch you when
you get
.

1

d ° n,t

feSl

Uke

That has happened. And I have
managed to kind of work
around t ha
As they were working with
different
candidates.
So I get to work with a candidate
that I
liked
That has happened.
.

I would have no part of it
I wouldn't bother
There was one night they was having a
meeting... at
the church.
I had on some pants that
night and it
was kind of cold.
And I don't believe in wearing
pants to church. That night we attending
meeting
outside because I refused to go in. There was
two
or three other women in pants and they
felt the same
way.
If you feel strongly, speak your mind,
stand
.

by it

Thus, these members express their views and act on
them by

absenting themselves from the organization's activities, a
form
of democratic choice.

127

The second response that
members expressed,
disagreement,
contains an element of
obligation on the part
of the dissenter.
The following statements
express a readiness to
dissent openly
and clearly as a part of the
decisionmaking process:
I’d tell 'em.
That's as far as I'd go
with that,
Do you mean would I pull
out? If it bothered me
enough I'd just disagree with
them, that's all.
I would tell them.
The majority wins when
you start
you know.
If they decided and I
didn't agree with
e
0' t
knOW 1 dldn,t a rea with it,
«
!7'.
Jtat'ss aU
that
all
I wouldn't say
1
that I'd win.
But just

’

e
Vm ^titled to my opinion.
f
” hat they was doing, then
I wouldn't
U them.
agree with
[What if you lost?]
I'd just drop
he
te Went a § ainst me and the
majority
.y?
won, I d still
support it.

«

I

dTX
d d

el

'

I*"?
lke

*

Everything's supposed to have a leader,
yes, but
you re not supposed to be a blind
follower.
If
you disagree, disagree.
It's a democracy; you're
entitled to your own opinion.

Interestingly, these interviewees expressed
the willingness to go

along with the decision once the process
had been followed.

This

sentiment was most clearly expressed in the
following statement:
If I m outvoted, then I go along with
the organization.
Because I realize that no matter how strong I feel
like,
it doesn't make it the best way to do
it.
So I go with
the majority.

Despite the eagerness many expressed to dissent when they
were not agreeing with the ideas that were being considered,
one
member took a rather different view of the role of the dissenter:

128
1 guess I would just
have to keep quiet
Thor*'
rliere s too
many members for me to be Hip .
J
t0 P ersuade anybody,
A decision wouid
„nl H be
k made
a
by the three communities
[Roxbury, Dorchester, and
Mattapan]
"

,

Thus, the members seem
generally willing to exercise
their rights
to dissent within ACORN.

Failing that, they recognize
the oppor-

tunity to dissent by abstaining
from whatever activity they
wish to
In a similar vein, the
researcher asked if there was any

persistent conflict between
participants in ACORN.
of

The existence

such conflict and the manner in
which it is resolved would

reflect on the degree of democracy
in the organization.

viewees felt there is any serious
conflict.

Few inter-

Only five could iden-

tify any significant conflict in
Boston ACORN.

Of these, none

thought the conflict presented a serious
problem, as the following

statements suggest:

ve seen conflict, for example, where
members feel
the organizers are having too much to
say.
And that
has been the cause of a group of people
splitting off
who felt they should have a bigger say and
that the
organizers should be sitting back from it. Usually
if there is a dispute, the members speak
up and the
organizer adjusts.
They don't realize they're intruding
too much.
The organizers I've been with have universally
been well-meaning and if you tend to say, "Well, look,
I think we should do it this way
instead of that,"
they'll be reasonable to listen. And if they don't
think they should back off, they'll convince you or
if you think you're right, they'll do it.
I

Since I am the head person within the community...
the membership will call on me and make a complaint.
Then I'll go directly to the organizer.
And it's
always worked out.
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One might reasonably expect
members to be somewhat
reticent to
scuss serious dissatisfaction
with the organization's
handling
of conflict with a researcher,
but the evidence that
they provide
under the circumstances does
not suggest that it
is a serious
problem.
Thus, the interviewees expressed
rather strong endorsement
of the quality of democratic
decisionmaking in Boston ACORN.

perception is that they play the most
important role
and that organizers do not
dominate the organization.

Their

in the process

While several

of the respondents expressed
mild dissatisfaction, this was
out-

weighed by the enthusiasm of the
others.

Moreover, the interviewees

who serve on important committees
such as the Boston ACORN board
and
APAC are in a position to observe the
decisionmaking process and many
of them are very concerned that
they be able to control the organiza-

tion.

Members* Political Views

In order to assess the value of purposive
incentives in ACORN

and understand the potential conflicts that
such incentives may

create,

it

is necessary to determine the members’

and analyze them.

political views

Also, if ACORN is attempting to politicize its

constituents and involve them in

a

progressive political movement,

then one way to assess this effort and its impact on ACORN consti-

tuents is to examine the members' political views.
included two sets of questions designed to do this.

The interview
The first was
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set of opinion questions
on issues that are
generally associated
with a progressive political
agenda.
The second asked what the

interviewees' ideological views
and party affiliations
are.
The opinion questions included
a variety of issues and
allowed for five responses:
"Strongly agree," "agree,"
"disagree,'
"strongly disagree," and "don't
know." The questions
included
topics from nuclear power to a
guaranteed annual income.
TVo of
the questions were about issues
ACORN has been actively involved
in:

housing and health care.

Several issues (the Equal Rights

Amendment and abortion) were social
issues included to determine
if

responses would differ from those for
the economic issues.

Finally, there were foreign policy
and arms spending questions to

determine if they were part of a significant
pattern in the inter
viewees' political views.
is found

(The complete text of these questions

in Appendix I.)

Responses to issue questions fell into three
patterns of
consensus and dissensus among the respondents.

Table 5-3 shows a

distribution of the members’ responses dividing the
issues into
categories based on level of agreement among them.
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TABLE 5-3
MEMBERS’ ISSUE STANDS

Str

Agree

agree

DisAgree

Str.

Disag.

Don’t
Know

Strong consensus
Pass ERA
1

0

1

11

0

o

0

10

1

0

0

7

1

3

should pay for
abortions for needy

8

2

2

Women have a right
to abortions

5

1

1

Free medical care
for needy

Free housing for
needy

Dissensus

Provide guaranteed
annual income
Govt

.

Dissensus with many undecided
Should socialize
essential public
services

0

5

7

1

6

Should stop
nuclear power

3

8

4

0

4

Cease U.S. involvement
in Latin America

2

6

4

1

6

Should continue
arms buildup

1

7

5

1

5
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The three patterns one may
y discern

in
m

n, Q interviewees*
the
responses

are the "strong consensus,"
"dissensus
ensus,

undecided."

The question on ERA

•

"

nna
and

"a

•

dissensus with many

healt-v,
alth

care, and housing elicited
strong agreement among nearly
all the respondents
with only one
’

"don't know" response among
them.

This suggests, first of all,
that

the members' involvement
in ACORN campaigns on
the health care and
housing issues may have influenced
their responses. Also, since
all but one of the respondents
were women, the support for
ERA
suggests a high level of solidarity
among them on this issue.
It
is not

possible to determine if this came
before or after the
members* decision to join ACORN.
There was strong dissensus on the
issues of guaranteed

annual income and the abortion
questions.

Again, there were not

many "don’t know" responses, indicating
strong and well-developed
opinions.

The "strongly agree" and "strong
disagree" responses

suggest more than mild disagreement being
expressed on these issues.

Moreover, the dissent from the progressive
agenda is clear.

The

dissensus on the social issue of abortion demonstrates
that social

conservatism is present among the interviewees in
this study.

The

question on the guaranteed annual income also
suggests problems

surrounding government benefit programs for low- income
people.

Thus,

the group of issues labeled "dissensus" reveals problems
that pro-

gressive political organizers must deal with when they work with
this constituency.
The third category had fewer responses in the "strongly
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agree" and "strongly disagree"
categories and many ,„ re "
don t knOK „
responses. This suggests that
these Issues, vital to
many activists
on the progressive left,
aree not
nor salient
saliPnf t-o
to the interviewees.
It is
particularly noteworthy that the
issues of African involvement
in
Latin America and the arms
buildup under the Reagan
Administration
are quite similar to the kinds
of issues that the
organizers cited
as being critical to their
original involve in political
organising. Moreover, the question
on socializing essential
public
services such as electric companies
might well have struck a
.

^

’

•

responsive chord among political
activists who have been involved
in many utility rate conflicts.
Certainly, the utility issue has
not been framed in that manner,
but long-time members surely
have
had opportunities to acquaint
themselves with issues related to

public service corporations.

Hence, this third category included

some important issues that have not been
addressed directly by

ACORN but are important to the progressive
left agenda.
The contrast between the organizers’ views
and the members’

views can be demonstrated as well by comparing
their responses to
these issues.

agree

The four organizers were unanimous in their
"strongly

response to the following questions:

pass the ERA, free

medical care for the needy, housing for the needy, and the woman’s
right to an abortion.
(3)

agree

(6)

The only other responses were "don't know"

and two "undecided" responses.

(The question on

the arms buildup was transposed to correspond to progressive views.)
Thus, it is clear that the organizers adhere to the progressive
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agenda contained in the issue
questions in a way that is both
consistent and intense.
Another way to compare the political
views of the members
and organizers is to look at
their responses to the questions
on

ideology and party identification.

Table 5-4 compares the

ideologies of the two groups:

TABLE 5-4
IDEOLOGY OF MEMBERS AND ORGANIZERS

Very
Liberal

Members
Organizers

Liberal

Moderate

Conservative

3

5

8

1

1

1

2

1

0

0

0

1

Very
Cons

Don t
Know

The members show a tendency toward the middle, hence,
the eight

"moderate" responses.
selves as

Nor were they reluctant to describe them-

conservative" as two of them did.

The organizers, on

the other hand, readily referred to themselves as "liberal" or

very liberal."

One refused to classify himself since he felt his

ideology is too unlike the categories offered to be included with
them

Party identification showed differences between the members
and organizers as well.

Table 5-5 presents these differences:

’
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TABLE 5-5
PARTY IDENTIFICATION OF MEMBERS
AND ORGANIZERS

Strong
Democ

Members
Organ iz ers

6

0

Strong
Repub

Don t
Know

Democ

Ind ep

Repub

7

4

1

1

0

0

0

1

1

2

'

The organizers have either weak or
no allegiances to party while
some members have strong allegiances
showing further differences
in political views and perspective.

ACORN Activism and Political Views
Since organizers operate under the assumption
that ACORN

activism will change the way members think about
politics,

it

is

useful to compare levels and longevity of activism
with political

views on the issue questions in the interview.

The respondents'

length of membership in ACORN and the number of activities
in which
they have engaged can be multiplied to create an overall
measure of

ACORN activism or Activity Scale.

When the respondents' Activity

Scores are computed, they fall into three levels of participation.

A level of progressive ideology can also be calculated by assigning
a value of two to "strong agree" responses,

don

t

one to "agree," zero to

know," minus one to "disagree," and minus two for "strong
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disagree" with the arms buildup
responses reversed.

This presents

an estimate of the conformity
of the respondents'
responses to a
left progressive agenda, a
Progressive Index. Table 5-6
provides
the scores of all the respondents
on these indices.
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TABLE 5-6

ACTIVITY SCORES (Years in ACORN
x Activities) v

Activity
Score

Years
Member

POLITICAL VIEWS

Party

Activities

Ideology

id

Progressive
Index

18

L

D

12

14

VC

D

7

15

VL

I

10

11

M

I

8

14

L

SD

4

10

M

D

6

3

13

VL

SD

5

36

4

9

L

SD

10

30

5

6

M

R

2

4

7

M

D

2

26

2

13

L

SD

3

22

2

11

M

D

4

18

2

9

M

SD

-1

16

4

4

C

R

1

72

56

45
44
42

40
39

28

4
4
3

4
3

4

2/3

2/3

13

VL

D

7

2

1/2

4

M

SD

1

1/2

1/2

3

L

I

3

1

1/6

5

DK

D

5

3/4

3/4

1

M

D

7
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The respondents' scores
on the Activity Scale
fall into

three categories:

high, medium, and low.

The respondents with

the high scores are all
long-time members who have
engaged in most
of the activities cited in
the interview.
The middle category

includes members who have been in
ACORN for a moderate length
of
time (two years) or have been in
longer but have not participated
in a wide

variety of activities.

The respondents with the low

Activity Scores have all been in
ACORN for less than a year.

The

distinction between the categories as
determined by score— high
equals 36-72, medium equals 16-30,
and low equals 3/4-8 2/3
corresponds to distinct differences between
the interviewees’
experiences.

It

is useful,

therefore, to compare the three

categories according to ideology, party
identification, and
Progressive Index, to determine

if

there are significant differences.

Any differences, of course, would only
suggest possible differences

within the ACORN membership.

The small size and unscientific

nature of the choosing of this sample prevents making
claims about
ACORN members generally.

Table 5-7 shows the ideology and party

identifications of the thr ee groups.
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TABLE 5-7

ACTIVITY SCORES v. IDEOLOGY
AND PARTY ID

P OLITICAL

VIEWS OF RESPOND ENTS WITH HIGH
ACTIVITY SCORES

Ideology
Very conservative

Conservative

Moderate
Liberal

Very liberal

( N=8)

Party ID
1

Strong Republican

0

Republican

q

I ndependent

2

3

Democrat

3

2

Strong Democrat

3

o
2

P OLITICAL VI EWS OF RESPONDENTS
WITH

Ideology

MEDIUM ACTIVITY SCORES (N=6)
Party ID

Very conservative

0

Strong Republican

0

Conservative

1

Republican

2

Moderate

4

Independent

0

Liberal

1

Democrat

2

Very liberal

0

Strong Democrat

2

POLITICAL VIEWS OF RESPONDENTS WITH LOW ACTIVITY SCORES
(N=5)
Ideology *

Party ID

Very conservative

0

Strong Republican

0

Conservative

0

Republican

0

Moderate

2

Independent

1

Liberal

1

Democrat

3

Very liberal

1

Strong Democrat

1

*1 "Don't Know"
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There do seem to be some
significant differences between
the high activity group and the
others in the ideology responses.
They seem to identify with
liberalism more clearly. To
a lesser
degree, they express allegiance
to the Democratic Party.
What
most clearly distinguishes them
from the others, however,
is the
Progressive Index. The average index
for the high activity
group
was 7.75 with scores ranging
from four to twelve. The
medium

activity group average was 1.83 and
the range was from minus one
to four, while the low activity
group averaged 4.6 and ranged from

one to seven.
The evidence from this data shows that
intensity and duration
of ACORN activism has had an impact
on the interviewees’ political

views.

It

is noteworthy, also,

that the low activity group exceeds

the medium group in several of the categories,
which suggests that

Boston ACORN has attracted some individuals with
progressive views
from among its targeted constituency and not had
to rely solely on

ACORN participation to instill those ideas.
The differences among the interviewees, while not
conclusive

and only suggestive, raise some questions about the way that

purposive incentives operate in ACORN.

The members that fell into

the middle category, for example, who had been long-time members
yet were quite conservative, raise the question of what the members

perceive as the goals of ACORN.

In other words, why do they contri-

bute to an organization that promotes a program designed to foster

progressive leftist change in American politics yet they do not
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share those values?

The entire question of
the relationship

between ACORN activism and
ideology surely merits
further study.
The next section raises the
question of what they think
ACORN is
trying to accomplish and of
equal importance, how
likely it is
,

that ACORN will succeed, for
what ls the purpose of
contributing

when the chances of success
are small?

Organizational Goals

Members were asked about the goals
of ACORN and in particular about the goals of Boston
ACORN.

While some members

responded with specific goals, such
as rent control or more housing
for low- and moderate-income people,
others spoke in more general

terms about creating a power base,
such as the following:
We hope to gain more political power
through the
neighborhood structure. And that’s by getting
more
people involved in political issues.
Say, for
instance, ... the majority of people in the
neighborhood
don t know who their representatives are
so that’s one
of our goals we would like to give the
people, so at
least they know who their representative
is and make
the representative accountable to the
neighborhoods.

Those who responded with specific issues were asked to
be as

thorough as possible in order to obtain a numerical count
of issues
and be able to better compare answers.

One interviewee could not

cite any goals of Boston ACORN, four cited fewer than three, eight
cited between four and seven, and five either cited more than
seven or gave responses that reflected a broader, more involved
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understanding of Boston ACORN's
goals
s such
sucn as
aq the one quoted above.
6
When members were asked about
ACORN's national goals, they
gave similar responses but with
lower frequencies.
Six stated
they did not know of any
national goals that ACORN
had, some
adding they were not at all
familiar with the national
organization.
Five cited four or fewer goals,
two cited a moderate number
of goals,
and six either gave a long list
of goals or made broader
statements
such as:

All the things we've been trying to
work: unity
between low- and moderate-income people,
and that
way we can crack poverty and all the
hardships
poor people have, education-wise,
foodwise, even
in some cases, things like that.

or

:

Better conditions of the poor. That's the way
I
see it.
They want change, they want things people
are entitled to. That's the way I see it.

It

is clear from the higher incidence of

"Don't Knows" that the

members were more familiar with local than national activities
of
ACORN.

A further sense of identification with the goals of the

organization was tested when members were asked

if and

thought ACORN was successful in attaining its goals.

responses followed three themes:
ment of political clout.

why they
The positive

unity, hard work, and the develop-

Negative responses centered on the

difficulties of motivating members to participate and the
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recalcitrance of powerhold ers

m

the political system.

Thirteen

of the nineteen responded
that thev
felt ACORN
aporm was quite
y telt
successful,
one said it was unsuccessful
and three were ambivalent.
Two did
not have an opinion of ACORN
s degree of success.
’

Positive responses to ACORN’s
political success were
unreserved in their praise,
The ones who praised its
unity made
comments such as:

It s an organization.
It’s a community.
It's
working with different issues.
You work with
housing, there’s a number of
organizations that
only work on one issue, they only
work on housing.
But. if you ve got a health
problem, that’s not
their problem.
That makes a big difference in
how ACORN works and how other
organizations work.

Togetherness they have been. In dealing
with
people. They even brought people
together that
wouldn’t be together.

We fight hard. Like I said, it's a
handful of
people, but when a handful of people band
together,
it’s a whole community. All we do is
just band
together

We're always just like a big happy family. When
they come in and we all go out to a meeting they
all come back here to my house and sit down and
eat together.
They get tired out in the street,
that’s [pointing to her couch] they bed. We’re just
like a big happy family.
There’s no prejudice with us.
Further evidence of identification with the organization and its

goals was shown by statements regarding the hard work invested
in ACORN’s success:
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Communications among the people and
hard work. Very hart work

t-p

Q

"embers, and
,

Because they are very active.
And they started off
With nothing they've been working
up and I think
they’re doing good.

Finally, those who cited ACORN’s
political power as a

reason for its success displayed
a degree of pride and
identification though not as direct as the
statements of the kind made
above

Because sometimes when you call the
people e .g.,
city officials] up, they think you’re
another ACORN
group.
They have heard about ACORN.
There really
is some recognition there.
I think they’re successful where they need to be successful—
the people
that s responsible for the things we
want.
They
seem to know that we are here. We’re
not an invisible
person... as we were without the organization.
[

In the different campaigns that we
have launched, we
have ^gained more recognition, more clout and
everybody’s really acknowledged in the goals that
we’ve
had how really successful we are....

For one thing, they have the backing and support
of
the people.
And then, I notice that when we have
to go to city officials or state officials, they
kind
of fear ACORN for some reason.
I guess they're aware
that we're a group that has a lot of power and
strength behind us. When we send them a letter or
make a phone call or go to their office for an action,
nine times out of ten, they respond quickly. Because
they fear if they don’t, ACORN is going to go to the
newspapers and blow it up. So they get results
because I think they really fear they’re playing
around with a powerful organization.

Among the respondents who thought ACORN was successful, therefore,
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ee themes of unity, hard
work and power were
clearly articulated to explain that
success.
Not all of the respondents
were as sanguine about
ACORN's
level of success.
Doubts about Its
performance center on the

difficulty of developing a
powerful organization of lowand
moderate— income people:

VouVe dealing with people who are
inexperienced in
1C
n
a UraUy th6y make
mistakes sometimes,
?eopL i,;in f„d Hdr ° P ° Ut
Ultimately,
’

'

when you tensider
,i began
h
der we
with people who were just
unemployed
sharecroppers out in Arkansas, and
we're in twenty-six
twenty-seven states now, and in
three or four cities
E£feCt
the £l
s ™*re very
sLTjTuU^
-

““

“

“

’

§ Way
Wel1 mostl y» I know
S ° yet
not *1?
k
all members
can be like me, but I haven’t
been
attending the meetings and keeping
up with what’s
going on, but the rest of them don’t
do that either.
t s going to pot.
If the younger people stick
with
the meetings and keep up with
what’s going on they
can do much better.
*

’

we don’t get the members to actively
push for
these issues then we're not gonna get
anywhere.
think that Boston is a little slow compared
to some
of the other places.
If

aH

Hence, several of the members recognize that
low- and moderate-

income people lack skills and experience and,
as much of the

scholarly literature attests, are not strongly
motivated to parti-

cipate in political organizations on a sustained basis.
Finally, one respondent emphasized the resistance that

ACORN faces in working on its goals:
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At City Hall they more
or less ipnnro
§
issues, they
don't see the importance
Th!
lnteresCed
in
the business
n putting
in
putt
more money in that.
'

dStrS

’

LT

The final set of questions,
designed to determine the
members' oommitment to ACORN's
goals, asks what they
would do if
ACORN departed from its multi-issue
agenda and became a singleissue organization.
The researcher chose the
single issue the
interviewees had previously stated
was most important to them.
Many of the responses asserted
strongly that ACORN's goal was
power
or that remedying the problems
of all of the members was
the

primary goal:

I think all goals are
important.
I can’t say that
one is more important than the
other.
No matter how
small, they re all important.
Ten blocks away might
be an issue concerning street lights
that ACORN's
dealt with.
To those families over there that's
a
major importance to them because of
safety in their
area to walk and there's no streetlights
and it's
dark and there's crime, people are afraid.
So that's
important to them.
I think every issue is important.

The most important, of course, is jobs.
And the
health. And housing.
All of it is the most important.
Trying to separate is kind of hard, because
they're all like connected. You've got to have
health to work, you've got to have a house to live
in when you come home from work, so they all
connect,
so you can't say, " The most important."

The important goal is power.
People are getting some
sense of control of their own lives, rather than
simply following the drift of obeying orders from
some civil servant.
They can organize and get some
input for a little bit of control over their day-today lives.
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The same sentiments were
expressed when they considered
the
question of transforming ACORN
into a single-issue
organization
I wouidn't feel too
great about that because
that's
what makes us an organization
above all other oreani"
M ° st o£ the «her organizations
just hfve
Y Can dSal with; the y can't deal
with nth®
other issues. I think that's
a handicap.
I
would not feel good about it
at all.

“

If you just start focusing
in on just housing, on
just jobs, then you're coining
away from where you
said you were.
And I wouldn't like to see them
do
that at all.
I like the way they're
set up, I like
the way they work, I've been
happy working with them,
and if there were any changes
geared that way, in
other words, coming in from other
organizations,
focusing on just main issues, I
wouldn't like to see
that.. Because ACORN has many
goals, and the main
goal is to help the low- and
moderate-income person.

The response indicated a high degree
of confidence in the organiza-

tion and satisfaction with the multi-issue
format.

Further, many

of them articulated one of the
central themes of the ACORN organizing

strategy within their responses:

the necessity of the multi-issue

strategy for building power and realistically
addressing the needs
of the low— and moderate— income constituency.

Tactics

Given the organizers' views on tactics and their impact on
the members and the kinds of effects they are designed to create,
it

is

useful to examine the members' views on those tactics,

especially confrontive tactics.

It

is critical to the success of
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the organization that the
members are positively disposed
to the
tactics in which they are engaging.

Discussion of tactical questions
with the members took two
paths:
questions as to 1) the kinds of
groups the members feel are
good allies, and 2) the kinds
of tactics that are
effective in

achieving the organization’s goals.

The first set is designed to

determine how the members feel about
other organizations; the
second set is intended to probe
the experiences members have had

participating in these tactics, discover
their preferences, and

determine their readiness to engage in
the various tactics.
interviewees were also asked
bargaining tactics.

if

Finally,

they prefer confrontational or

This gave members an opportunity to
expand

on their preferences and cite which
features they think are most

important about the tactics the organization
uses:

respectability,

hostility, drama, camaraderie, dignity, and so
on.

Table 5-8 gives the results on questions about
coalition

partners the members feel are most effective to work
with:
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TABLE 5-8

COALITION PARTNERS

Excellent

Unions

4-1/2

Churches

2-1/2

Peace groups

2

Politic ians

1

Community
organizations
Student s

TL

2
1

Good

9-1/2

Don

Fair

0

Poor

0

5

1

5

4

0

9

9

3

0

6

6

4

0

7

7

1

0

10

5

4

4-1/2

shows little difference between organizations.

'

t

Know

The only impor-

tant difference seems to be that between
unions and other groups,

as it is the only category in which there
are no "fair" or "poor"

responses and

it

leads in "excellent" and "good" responses.

Aside

from that, members seem to be rather charitable
in their assessments.
Only one

poor" was chosen, and every choice got at least
one

excellent."

Thus, the responses do not seem to indicate a distaste

for other organizations for whatever reason, and
some sympathy for

unions, suggesting perhaps, some class solidarity.

Table 5-9 also shows few differences in responses.
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The two tactics that received
the highest number of
'Very effective"

responses were actions in a
public office and inviting
opponents to
attend ACORN meetings. Both
of these held honored
places in the
standard notions of what is
democratic in American politics.
Certainly, one must be able to
protest to public officials
for
redress of grievances, and one
should give an opponent an
opportunity
to be heard.
The two "don't knows" given to
inviting opponents to
meetings also seems to indicate that
members are familiar with this
tactic, as it is widely used by
ACORN groups. The same can be
said
about endorsing candidates, an activity
that the Boston chapter of

ACORN has done a lot of in the last
two years.

Conversely, ten

don't knows" for referenda campaigns
shows a clear unfamiliarity

with this political tactic.

Finally, the four "not effective"

responses given to blocking streets seems to
indicate
this activity among the interviewees.
it and

a

distaste for

The difficulty of executing

the risks involved could explain this figure.
The interviewees expressed several different
views on the

desirability of confrontation versus bargaining tactics.
support for confrontation was not strong.
include:

1)

Their

The categories of responses

confrontation is the most effective;

2)

bargaining works

better; and 3) one must choose the style that fits the given
situation.

People who preferred confrontation did so for a variety of reasons:
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..Everyone knows and sees and hears
about

it.
And
those things are embarrassing
to the public—
the
...they don t want to be
embarrassed.
It's more
public.. .people know more what’s
going on. We’ve
been out marching and dealing
and people they had no
ThS "° re Pe ° Ple kn °“’ the
P
8‘

Iffec^e

i?

S“

Bargaining can be a long, drawn-out
thing.
To do it
irectly is much more impressive to
the people [the
target of the action]

It s a shock to the system.
To shake you up.
Wake
up somebody.
Somebody said once they didn't think
there was a racial problem in Boston.
They needed
confronting.
Because if they can’t see a problem,
something wrong somewhere.
They probably have never
been confronted with the real issues.
Sometimes it’s
more effective.

[confrontational?]
Always. You have to meet the
person face-to-face.
In order to get whatever you
want done. You cannot, I never like an aide
writing
me back for anything. The mayor, for example,
"the
Mayor said...
There’s nothing like meeting the
Mayor face-to-face.
I'd rather hear it from the
Mayor's mouth. I want to hear it from the Senator's
mouth.
I want to hear it from the President
of the
bank’s mouth.
I don't want to hear it from his
secretary.
^

It

is clear that the

members who chose confrontational tactics

feel that opportunities to address the individual responsible for

solving a problem and express grievances directly is both more

effective and more satisfying.

Moreover, the public nature of it

draws attention to an issue that the members feel strongly about
and increases their moral leverage.

Finally, their responses

indicate they feel that confrontation conveys more information to
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the target about the gravity
of a situation and is
capable of being
more powerful in moving the target.
Not all of the respondents
share this affection for con

frontational tactics.

Several felt they hurt more
than helped

I thought they carry to
many members when they went
down to talk with city officials.
It was to get in
to talk with city officials.
It was hard to get in
to talk to them, but if they'd
had two strong mens
or a woman and a man, to... sit
down and talk to them
t ey might have talked to
them.
We couldn’t get to
Mayor White, none of them. We just
couldn't get to
them, they just wouldn't come out.

...We went there with papers demanding and
as a
result, we didn't get it.
I don't think it was a
good tactic to use.

Others seemed more pragmatic and suggested that
the tactic should
fit the situation.

Hence, bargain when the other party seems pre

pared to bargain in good faith and confront when they
do not:
They all work.
It's according to the people, but the
end is the same because you never start out confronting
them.
We always start out calling them and talking to
them.
And if that gets what we want, that's all we do.
We only confront them when they will not talk. When
they tell you they're going to a meeting and they will
not give you an appointment to come in and talk to them,
the response you get from whom you are approaching
determines what procedure you're gonna follow.

Thus, some of the answers express desire to confront, others, a

reluctance.

Still others feel it is a matter of expediency; what-

ever will succeed in a given situation.
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Conclusion

The members' comments and
responses on the Interviews provide a great deal of information
on their experiences and
perceptions of ACORN membership.
They help answer some of
the critical
questions regarding political
organizing of low-income people
in

American politics:

why they join political
organizations, what

their role is in such organizations,
and how it affects their views
on American public policy issues.
While the data from this inter-

view is limited by the number and
selection process of the respondents, it does provide substantive
and interesting data on this
topic

CHAPTER

vi

CONCLUSION

When this researcher completed
the fieldwork for the
Master’s Thesis, organizing a
neighborhood in a low- and moderateincome area of New Orleans, he
experienced two overwhelming
feelings:

satisfaction and wonder.

The satisfaction came from

looking over the neighborhood and
seeing stop signs erected and

vacant lots cleared at the request of
the newly-formed group in a
period of a few months.

Residents of the neighborhood were aware

of the problems that existed and
over the years, had made attempts
to form community organizations to
deal with them.

At no time,

however, had so much been accomplished to improve
the quality of

life in so short a time.

Moreover, the improvements came as a

result of a group effort by community residents.

This laid the

groundwork for continued improvement by and for the community.
Several years after the group was organized, an open drainage

canal that bordered two sides of the neighborhood was covered over
at a cost of several million dollars, attesting to the
continuing

impact of the organization

—and

adding to the wonder that the

researcher experienced.
The researcher had no significant political experience

prior to the fieldwork he conducted.
155

Had he gone into the
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neighborhood and begun speaking
to its residents about
the need
for improved traffic safety
or covering the drainage
canal, there
is no

reason to believe that he would
have succeeded in creating
the degree of change that
actually occurred. Nor did the
researcher,
despite many hours spent in the hot
New Orleans summer sun, sense
that he had done anything dramatic,
difficult, or brilliant.

Rather,

he simply followed the ACORN
model of neighborhood organizing

relatively closely, maintaining procedures
and schedules prescribed
by the model.

The experience was very much like
following a recipe

in cooking and creating a beautiful
dish, never having made anything

similar to it or understanding the theory
behind the process.

The

process unfolded, the members joined, the
"wins" were achieved, and
the organization succeeded.

times

m

It was a process that has occurred
many

ACORN's history— a new organizer without skills
or experience

signs on and receives training on the job in
the first neighborhood

organizing drive.
This experience goes to the heart of the study.

The satis-

faction and wonder this researcher experienced is integral
to an

understanding of the creation and maintenance of political organizations as this case study approaches it.

The two vital ingredients

to which the political science literature has not given adequate

attention are the organizer/entrepreneur and the organizing
strategy.

Both of these are implied in much of the literature, but

this case study has sought to expose them more fully and recognize

their importance for the understanding of political organizations.
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The satisfaction and wonder
this researcher experienced
point up several of the
dynamics that emerge from
the interviews
in this case study as well.
First, the satisfaction
was not what
the researcher would have
predicted. While the ideological
leaning
of the researcher was
generally to the left and
sympathetic to

ACORN rhetoric, he did not expect
that stop signs and mowed
vacant
lots would be critical to
fulfilling ACORN's fundamental
goals.
Second, he did not realize that
an individual organizer was so

critical to the success of an
organizing drive.

Neighborhood

residents made major contributions
to the organization's ultimate
success, but it was the organizer
who initiated the process,

coordinated the work, maintained the
schedule of events, and

orchestrated interests, issues, energies
and goals.

Without the

initiative of the organizer to enlist members,
either personally or

with the help of members, virtually no one
would have joined.
if an Y,

part.

Few,

joined without being asked directly to pay dues
and take
Some, in fact, only joined after being approached
several

times and, of those who participated, most did so
in response to

frequent and repeated requests to take part in a number
of specific

activities, from meetings to actions at City Hall.

The requests,

however, were not appeals to specific self-interest but were part
of the organization's routine activities as the organizer
presented

them

.

For the most part, neighborhood residents and members were

largely ignorant of the implications and significance of their

participation in ACORN.

Nor did they know if these activities were
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routine for ACORN or similar
political orga nizations

4. i

iv—

on the judgment of the
organiser and on their
sense of the

legitimacy of the organization.

Eventually, the researcher’s

notions of what would attract
npnnl p to
t people
n the
organization and sustain
their allegiance were
discarded in favor of the
members’ options
about what projects to target.
Indeed, the process taught
by the
t-

ACORN Organizing Model and the
Head Organizer who trained
the
researcher seemed to involve
little in the way of rational
calculation
or thorough organizational
planning, yet it resulted in an
organization that had a significant
impact on the quality of life for
the

neighborhood and its residents.

This study has sought to frame

that satisfaction and wonder
into a better understanding
of the

process-one that strengthens understanding

of political organizations

in general.

The data from the interviews do not
provide conclusive findings,

nor are they major departures from
the conventional wisdom regarding
the membership decision and subsequent
formation of political organi-

zations.

The analysis of incentives and the
application of the

concept of organizing strategy do not revise
thinking on political
organizations, either.

Rather, they confirm some notions and refine

others in the process of reorganizing the concepts
in a systematic
fashion.

Clearly, an additional strength of this study is that

it offers two levels of analysis and two perspectives
from which

to view these data:

organizational level.

1)

from the individual level, and

2)

from the

The perspectives are those of the constituent
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and of the organizer/entrepreneur

.

We are able, therefore, to
learn

what the entrepreneur is trying
to do and what the
constituent
reports is the impact of the
entrepreneur's efforts.
The result
is that we can evaluate the
theories of group formation and
member-

ship decision in light of each
other.

The conclusions one can draw

from the data are not new but
possess an added degree of validity
owing to their origin.

T heories of Group Formation
Revisited

Before evaluating the results of the
interviews and their
implications for the major theories of group
formation, it is useful
to review the contending theories.

Essentially, they fall into two

categories, plus a synthesis of these.

These categories are generally

referred to as the sociological theory, argued by
David Truman
the economic theory first proposed by Mancur Olson 2
.

1
,

and

Truman's

sociological theory claims that stress on a group that
shares interests
in the political system by

virtue of, for example, common socio-

economic status, will cause members of that group to increase
mutual

interaction and therefore promote the formation of groups that will

protect their shared interests.

The economic theory argues that it

is not rational for people to behave in that manner under most

circumstances since they will not benefit from it given the costs of
group formation and the likelihood of recovering these costs by the

benefits of the group activities.

Hence, the people who are under

stress calculate that their decision to join the organization to
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promote their interests will
cost them more than they
will get in
return. Thus, the focus of
study becomes the tradeoff
of contributions required and incentives
offered.
Syntheses of the two theories,
especially Terry Moe 3 argue
for a more complex process
of group formation.
Moe focuses on the
relationship of the constituent and
the entrepreneur and how
the
constituent is capable of calculating
tradeoffs of contributions
,

and incentives in the complexity
of the actual political
process.

He notes, for example, that the
entrepreneur is strongly motivated
to manipulate the information
so that the constituent is
more likely
to

decide to join.

This notion of "bounded rationality"
is clearly

more like a real interaction between
organizer/entrepreneur and
constituent than either of the theories
above.

Moe also provides

the broader categorization of incentives
that includes all of the

varieties that James Q. Wilson 4 identifies:
purposive.

material, solidary, and

With this broader categorization, it is possible
to

appreciate the complexity, again, of the actual political
interaction.
The ACORN Model of organizing, in essence, makes
claims about
the manner in which constituents make the membership
decision and

the means by which it is possible to create ACORN organizations.

In

particular, the organizing drive described in the model should be

considered as a prediction of results one should expect

if an

follows the model and attempts to organize a neighborhood.

organizer

It

is the

experience of the researcher that following the organizing drive recipe
works quite well despite the inexperience of the organizer.

Naturally,
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experience and acquired skills
improve the quality and efficiency
of organizing work. Yet.
the model, based on an
incentive system
of collective material benefits,
anger, and constituent desire
to

join forces with others in the
neighborhood, is sufficient to
recruit approximately ten per cent
of a low- and moderate-income

neighborhood one is attempting to
organize.

This has been borne

out by hundreds of successful
drives, many conducted by very

inexperienced individuals.

Thus,

it

is a case of technique based

on organizing principles applied
to constituents of similar economic

background in Organizing Committee
meetings and at their doors via
direct contact successfully persuading
people to join and create

ACORN groups anywhere in the country.
The organizers of Boston ACORN speak in
terms that are nearly

identical to those of the ACORN Model that they
all study and apply
in their organizing.

They claim, for example, that self-interest

is necessary to motivate constituents to join
an ACORN group.

The

organizers recognize that the self-interest they describe is,
perhaps, somewhat broader than the individual, i.e., it frequently

involves the quality of life for the neighborhood at large and may
not specifically affect every individual member.

They attribute

the impact of their claim to produce deliverables to be self-

interest that is then calculated in a manner very much like Olson's

analysis of tradeoffs and decisionmaking.

The purposive incentives

they cite include the opportunity to build an effective community

group and take action on what one organizer said were "aspects of
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peoples' lives that, before, they
didn't know they had any control
over." They also ad m it to using
anger-getting constituents "oiled

UP ”“ aS Per thS AC0RN Model

it

-

is the perception and expec-

tation of the Boston ACORN organizers
that the bases of the ACORN
Model are valid both as predictors
of phenomena and analyses of
the relationship between the
organization and the constituents.

Group Formation According to ACORN
Member;
The responses of the members differed
from the ACORN Model
and the organizers only in emphasis.

Even the members’ responses

were almost xdentical when they discussed
the means by which they

recruited people themselves.

The most important factor that influ-

enced members to join was the opportunity
to help the community.

While similar to the claim that the constituents
are responding to
se ‘^~ nterest writ large in the form of
community,
:*-

this appeal

shifts the emphasis to community service and away from
individual
benefit.

The category of service to the poor is an even greater

shift of emphasis away from self-interest.

The most direct

articulation of the pursuit of self-interest is the desire to work
on specific issues,

such as health care or housing, and the desire

for self-improvement expressed by several of the respondents.

The

question that helped to augment the interviewees’ contribution to
the understanding of the membership decision. How do you recruit

new members?, provided the response that most clearly resembled the

approach that the organizers used to persuade people to join.
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Hence, it seems that the answer
to the question of what
induces
people to join depends, in its
emphasis, on whether the
interviewee
is referring to his or her
self or another who is
being recruited.
The literature does not provide
any insights into this
phenomena,
nor does the data from this
study.

The case study is useful in
considering the debate between
the sociological and the
economic approaches to the membership

decision.

The members and the organizers
of Boston ACORN seem to

agree that the ACORN Model is
fundamentally sound, that some notion
of self-interest combined with
anger, a desire to serve the community,

and the purposive incentives that
ACORN offers are effective in

motivating people to join.

This conclusion supports the economic

model, more because of the involvement
of the organizer/entrepreneur

than for any other reason.

Truman's contention that increased inter-

action causes group formation fails to take into
account the potent
impact of face-to-face contact between organizer
and member that the

interviewees describe.

One organizer stated the point clearly from

a strategic point of view:

I think that s something that we really pride
ourselves
on is that that's how we recruit our members ,...
by
knocking on peoples' doors. And that's why, in a lot
of ways, our base is made up of a lot of people that
aren t necessarily gonna get themselves involved
politically or organizationally in something else.

Thus, the claim that increased interaction alone leads to group

formation is inadequate, especially in reference to a group in
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society that is nearly always
in some kind of
social or economic
stress low— income people.
When one attempts to analyze
group formation (as opposed
to
the individual's membership
decision), it is clear that
this case
study provides a basic insight
into a theoretical claim:
Robert
H. Salisbury's argument 5 for
the importance of the
organizer/

entrepreneur is strongly substantiated
by the researcher’s

experiences and observations, the
literature on and by ACORN,
and
the comments in the interviews
of both members and
organizers.
The organizer/entrepreneur is an
essential feature of group formation
and an understanding of that role
is required for an adequate
analysis
of political organizations.

The fact that the interviewees,
both

organizers and members, responded positively
to questions that
implied the economic model concepts helps
to substantiate that model
as well.

Moreover, their articulation of the goals
of the organi-

zation provides support for the expansion
of the incentives beyond

purely economic ones, despite the arguments
that Wilson offers that
low- income people require greater economic incentives
than higher
income people do.

But perhaps what is most compelling as a refutation

of the sociological model is the fact that the
actions of the

professional organizers are what is critical to the creation of
political organizations, just as it is for increasing the likelihood
that individual constituents will agree to join the organization.
Thus, from either the level of the organizer or that of the members,

the successful creation and application of an organizing strategy is
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what creates organizations and
enlists members.

Maintenance of Membership
The basic question of what keeps
members in ACORN or organi-

zations in general is closely related
to the membership decision.
This is even more so for a voluntary
activist organization of lowincome people.
Unlike organizations that require
only that members
send their annual dues, voluntary
activist organizations continually

ask their members to provide resources
that the organization requires
Hence, members ask themselves, in the
model of the economic analysis,
IS

it

in my self-interest to engage repeatedly
in the activities of

this organization?

Moreover, as Richard C. Rich argues

6
,

the nature

of the voluntary organization offers the
exit option each time the

organization requests resources.

Again, while this feature of the

organization lowers the costs of membership for the constituent,
it
raises the cost of organizational maintenance.
Given the nature of ACORN as a voluntary activist organization, David knoke and James R. Wood's analysis of social control,^
or commitment,

is

applicable to this question.

Their argument is

that commitment grows from three features of an organization:

purposive incentives, member participation, and professional
legitimacy.

The interviews treated these topics in several ways.

Purposive incentives involve either goals or ideology.
Hence, the interview questions that dealt with ACORN's goals are

pertinent as well as the questions that probed the members'
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perceptions of policy issues.

It is clear that members
did not

articulate ACORN's goals effectively,
especially its national
goals. Only the members who had
attended national conventions
had
a good sense of the national
goals or of the nature of
the national
organization. Several suggested that
issues like stop signs were
important for the national organization.
According to Gary Delgado,

realization of the members’ lack of
understanding of larger issues
in ACORM is what led to the
People’s Platform in 1980. The
process
of widespread

input into the planks of the platform
was specifically

designed to integrate the national
organization by articulating
national goals and involving members
in the creation.

The responses

of the interviewees in this study
show that this strategy did not

touch many ACORN members.
Ideological commitments of the members were
neither uniform
or strong.

The only issues on which there was solid
agreement were

ERA, housing, and health care.

While it is important to note that

the consensus on housing and health care issues
very likely resulted

from ACORN's efforts, it is also important to recognize
deep splits
on issues like abortion and, potentially, government income
supple-

ment programs.

These splits suggest limits on issues on which ACORN

can effectively mobilize its membership.

Interviewee responses to the questions relating to ideology
present more insights into this problem.

Several of the members

stated that ACORN's goal as an organization is to create power for

low- and moderate-income people.

This kind of organizational
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purpose seems sufficient as a
purposive incentive, however
vague.
Nevertheless,
apparent contradiction to
Knoke and Wood’s thesis,
these interviews suggest that
numbers are willing to
continue to
contribute to ACORN despite a lack
of commitment to goals
they
cannot articulate and an ideology
that xs not particularly
salient

m

to them.

The question of participation
as a means of enlisting
the

continued allegiance of ACORN members
raises a related question:
How much control do members have
over the decisionmaking
process
in ACORN?

Knoke and Wood argue the necessity for
involvement of

members in the decisionmaking process,
but this in fact raises
some serious problems for the
organization.

To operate an organi-

zation of low-income, inexperienced
activists effectively, an

organizer must at times make important
decisions.
has troubled ACORN greatly.

This dilemma

While the professional role of the

ACORN organizer is to promote maximum participation
in the decisionmaking process and the formal structure of the
organization is
designed to ensure member control via the board of
directors, ACORN
is faced with the classic problem that all
organizations of

type face:

its

the desire of the professional staff to control the

decisionmaking process in order to ensure the success of the

organization
The ACORN Model and the responses of the members and organi-

zers in the interviews all suggest that the organization generally

succeeds in eliciting members' participation and allowing them at
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veto over the organization's
decisions.

Moreover, many of

both types of participants
argued strongly that the
members have a
profound control over the
decisionmaking process. One
organiser,
for example, claimed that
issues never arise solely
from the orga-

nizing staff but only from the
inputs of the members via
the doorknocking process.
Delgado, a long-time ACORN organizer,
also found that when
asked, ACORN members only cited
the "technical assistance
and/or
resource development" as the role
of ACORN organizers . 9 He
goes
on to say that

Within ACORN, as within most large community
organizations, organizers do in fact call
the
shots in terms of organizational
direction;
the organization has in fact become
a staff
oligarchy.
That development is understandable:
with greater size and complexity, increased
specialization, and departmentalization, it is
simply not possible for all members to
possess
enough of the relevant information for informed
decisionmaking; therefore, communications
increasingly flow from the top down.^

The importance of this kind of dynamic for the
role of the organi-

zation in the lives of the members is that, without
genuine involvement of the members, it is not possible to change their
perceptions
of themselves as politically efficacious and as
identifying with

the organization.

Moe argues this point as pertaining particularly

to voluntary membership organizations with mixed

incentive systems:
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While Delgado refers only to decisions
of the national organization,
the fact remains that participation
in the decisionmaking process
is not possible.

Thus, at that level, members cannot
use partici-

pation opportunities to develop their
commitment to the organization.

On the other hand, local chapters
of ACORN do involve the

members, both on the board and in the local
groups.

Judging by the

interviews, however, organizers frequently
are the ones who translate
the issues they hear in their contacts
with members while in meetings
or while doorknocking into campaigns,
strategies, and tactics.

Thus,

even at that level, there appear to be limits to
membership control
of the organization and the commitment that
that engenders.

There are virtually no limits, however, on the amount of

participation that is possible for members in functions such as

member recruitment, leadership roles at lower levels, fundraising,
actions, and so on.

Organizers use every opportunity to involve

members in activities such as these, not only to lighten their load,
but to build involvement and commitment among the members.

The

members' listings of activities in which they engaged attests to
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the success of the organizers
in this effort.

Further, the members'

increased identification with the
progressive agenda that results
from the long-standing and
intense involvement with ACORN
indicates
that Knoke and Wood's thesis can
be brought to bear at a level
of

participation below that of the
decisionmaker.
The third part of the social
control concept offered by

Knoke and Wood is legitimacy of the
professionals.

The question

that this raises is the faith that
the membership has in the

integrity and abilities of the organizers.

The lack of conflict

members report with organizers is one
component of professional
legitimacy within ACORN.

The members also defer to the organizers'

ability to make important decisions regarding
tactics and issues.
Moreover, descriptions that the members gave of
their initial

reluctance to engage in some kinds of tactics, particularly
confrontive ones, and their subsequent participation in
them attests
to their faith in the judgment of the organizers.

Interviewees

also reported a willingness to change campaigns on which they
were

working without particular distress or misgivings.

Hence, when

the organizers suggest that a particular tactic or issue is vital
to

the organization, the members go along with that decision.
Thus, in applying Knoke and Wood's formula for organizational

commitment, the interviews suggest that the degree of commitment to

purposive incentives is limited, opportunities to participate in

decisionmaking are limited, though other kinds of participation are
extensive, and professional legitimacy is high.

This combination
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has been effective on those
interviewed:

nearly all were very

enthusiastic about ACORN and many
contributed their time and
energy generously. While some
of those have strong
commitment to
ACORN's goals, and are involved in
important decisions, others seem
to be active due to the organizers’
persistence combined with

tangible results and opportunities to
serve their community.

Thus,

the goal of creating an organization
of involved, informed, and

progressive low- and moderate-income people
is being achieved but
only with the support of those who join
and support ACORN without

developing the world view of the progressive
political activist.
Organizers

The professional organizer is a poorly understood
role in
the study of American politics.

Recent studies of political

organizations have given the organizer a theoretical place
in
political science literature and begun a process that
should bring
that role into a proper focus as creator and motivator
of many

political organizations, especially voluntary membership organizations.

This study began by examining some important questions

about political organizations in the light of the perceptions of

participants in a particular organization.

These perceptions have

led back to fundamental questions of organizational dynamics that

can only be appreciated if one understands the role of the organizer.

Moe argues forcefully, for example, that limited rationality is the
basis for the membership decision, and that this prompts organizers
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to "bend" the realities
of group membership
in a way that is most
likely to persuade people that
their interests will be
served by
12
joining .
Yet he does not fully develop

the concept as it applies

to continued participation
by members.

Knoke and Hood stress the

importance of social control for
the organizer's success but
do
not pursue the extent to which
the organizer devises and
implements
the organizing strategy.
The lack of attention to the
central role played by the

organizer is probably a function of
the kind of organization
studied.

Moe concentrated on economic organizations;
Knoke and

Wood examined middle class cause
organizations.
on organizers in different ways.

Both types rely

Economic groups prefer to leave

the operation of the group to professionals
entirely.

Middle-class

groups can and do call on a reservoir of
experienced and educated

members to serve in planning and organizing roles.

Boston ACORN

recruits a constituency of inexperienced, poorly
educated people
who, unlike small businesspeople and professionals,
for example,

have few organized means of expressing political interests.

The

impetus for organizing the ACORN constituency comes from outside
the constituency.

A consciously devised plan is articulated and

applied by professionals, who have a vague but compelling goal for
their constituents.

As Delgado points out, the continued operation

of ACORN requires more skill, time and energy than the membership

has available to it.

Hence, the organizers have a more demanding

role in the organization than might otherwise be the case.

It

is

173
a role that this case study,
owing to

Its methodological limits,
can

at best only suggest.

The value of a better understanding
of the organiser's role
in an organization like ACORN
yields practical as well as
scholarly

insights.

For anyone interested in creating
an organization with a

constituency similar to ACORN's, the
conceptual groundwork has been
laid by ACORN in the Organizing Model
and the incentive system, i.e.,
the organizing strategy that has proven
effective over the years for

ACORN.

For students of American politics, this
approach to political

organizations provides useful insights about the
members of such an
organization, e.g., that they are generally not highly
ideological
but are at the same time committed to the
organization and its goals.
For both practitioner and scholar,

it

is important to recognize the

significant but limited role of the organizer.

Constituents are not

controlled or even manipulated to any great degree by the
organizers,
and recognition of the limits organizational dynamics
place on the

organizers allows one to see the relationship more clearly.

The Organizers

1

Relationship to the Members

Given the connections between ideology, socioeconomic and

cultural background, and goals for involvement within ACORN, it is

necessary that a special kind of relationship be established between
the organizers and members.

This is particularly true in light of

the importance of professional legitimacy for many of the members’

continued involvement in ACORN.

This relationship centers on two
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basic ideas:

the exit option and
professionalism.

Both of the,
ise

rein in the organizers’ notions
of what ACORN should do,
both in
terms of issues and tactics. Thus,
when organizers want to pursue
issues or tactics that fit their
views on politics but do not
fit
their members’ perceptions, they
limit themselves by their
professional ideals, and the members limit
them by exercising the exit

option.

Thus, if the members perceive that
an issue, candidate,

or tactic is not desirable, given
their ideology or views on
political

life, the organizers are unlikely to
persuade members to participate

m

those activities.

In an important sense, then, the
exit option

keeps the organizers honest, keeping the
ideological differences
between organizers and members from causing serious
problems in

ACORN
It

is more,

however, than just the exit option that controls

the behavior of the organizers.
that they share.

It

is also the professional ethos

It is clear from the responses of the organizers

that they feel an ethical obligation as professionals to promote
the

maximum amount of member participation in ACORN in order to gain
the benefits thereof:

increased allegiance, improved skills,

increased resources, greater turnout and enthusiasm, and democratic

control of the organization.

One purposive incentive that drives

the organizers is the desire that ACORN play a democratizing role
in the political system, give low- and moderate- income Americans a

genuine opportunity to influence the political system without being
controlled by organizers.
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In the ease of the ACORN
organisers, the ethos of member

participation contains within

It several other

elements as well.

First, it is part of the
democratic ethos that has
shaped reformist
and radical components of
American political culture.
This is

profoundly different from the role
which the organizer/entrepreneurs
play in traditional economic
organizations. They perceive their
role as professionals akin to lawyers:

hence, they provide the

incentives, operate the organization,
lobby according to the

interests of their constituents, yet have
no desire to train their

constituents to become more effective citizens.

Lawyers have no

desire to teach their clients the law or
improve their ability to
promote their interests via legal means.

Traditional organizer/

entrepreneurs operate similarly, keeping information
costs high so
that their clients will need their services
as much as possible.

While ACORN’s organizing ethos does not prevent
ACORN organizers
from controlling many of the decisions of the
organization, it

acts as a constraint against it.

Second, the democratic ethos the

organizers articulate is as much a part of the organizing strategy
as the organizing drive itself.

It has proven an effective way to

recruit and maintain membership, as is evident in the almost mythical

quality it has attained among members and organizers.

That the

organizers also recount instances when it has benefited them in
their organizing efforts further attests to its utility.
Thus, the strains within ACORN created by cross purposes of

organizers and members are, to some extent, controlled by other
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features of the organizations:

professionalism and voluntarism.

The ethic of the organizer to
maximize member control and the
fact
that the organization is a voluntary
one with the option available
to abstain from whatever activity
is undesirable provide
clear

constraints against organizer abuse of
power within the organization.
Ideology as Incentive

The treatment of ideology of ACORN is
particularly important,

given the responses of members and organizers
to policy questions.
There are clear differences between members
and organizers, and the

way these are handled is critical to the success
of the organization.
The motives of the organizers for taking a low-pay,
high-demand job

are strongly centered on the desire to change society
and pursue

left-wing internationalist goals.

There is no indication in the

members’ responses that they share these kinds of goals.
the members have adopted the rhetoric of

people.

ACORN— power

Some of

for low- income

Taking What's Ours!" and so on, but there are clear differ-

ences of ideological perspective in specific policy areas, ideological
se lf — ident if ication , and party identification.

The organizers avoid

conflict or erosion of trust by using vague language and populist

sentiments rather than Marxist ideology or leftist rhetoric.

This

allows a degree of latitude for the organizers to pursue policy goals
that are anti-corporate without being explicitly leftist; it provides
a broad canopy for both white and black constituents; and it excludes

as few people as possible given the possible range of political views
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chat could be attracted to
such an organization both
in terms of

potential organizers and members.

Thus, ACORN's approach to

ideology serves organizational
ends of unity between
disparate
groups whose energies and commitment
are both engendered and

endangered by ideology.
The interviews suggest that
ACORN’s approach has been

effective.

The members regularly defer to
the organizers' views

on what the organization should
do.

the two groups is low.

The level of conflict between

Moreover, both members and organizers
agree

that the sources of conflict that do
exist have nothing to do with

their views on politics, but rather center
on the operation of the

organization without proper consultation by the
organizers with
the members.

The members believe the organization should
be run

by them and, when it is not, they make it
an issue.

Members and

organizers agree on how ACORN should be run and act
accordingly.
The closest thing to ideological conflict is that
which arises

occasionally about the level of confrontational tactics that
are
desirable.

As the organizers note, they sometimes have difficulty

persuading members that they should confront their targets.

The

difference surfaces not on the issue or the choice of target, but
on the degree of conflict that is appropriate for the situation.

Hence, there is an area of agreement on issues and broad goals

large enough to appeal to all the participants in the organization,

conflict only arising around the intensity necessary to pursue these
these issues and goals.
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Confrontation as Ideology
The issue of

confronts

tactics has several dimensions:

demands on the membership, tactical
effectiveness, and organizational
identity, both internal and external.
In addition, confrontive
tactics are part and parcel of the
vague ideology that ACORM has
adopted.

Confrontive tactics increase the demands
on the members in
the exchange relationship.

Members recognize immediately that one

difference between behaving with decorum
in a meeting and carrying
signs and raising hell is that more is
being asked of them.

More

energy is required; more risks are involved;
there is greater chance
of arrest;

they will not be welcomed.

Participants in prospective

confrontations commonly have doubts about the propriety
of rowdiness,
and the justification for disrespect expressed
toward the target.

Mike Silver notes that members are "sometimes ..
.most put off not by
fear of arrest or violence but by confusion, uncertainty,
and a

sense of helplessness in unknown situations." 13

Mary Kay Harrity,

writing about members of the Bridgeport, Connecticut chapter of
ACORN,
noted that the members

seem somewhat hesitant about some of the more dramatic
actions ACORN has used to make its point, like a candlelight march in Colorado that ended with demands for
changes in utility rates being nailed to wooden planks...
or claiming "squatters’ rights" in abandoned Philadelphia
homes .... "14

The cost to some members is in social status as they perceive it:
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respectability.

Thus, confrontational
tactics have costs to

members; they increase the
demands the organization
makes on the
membership

Confrontational tactics, according
to several writers on
organizing, are the bread-and-butter
of low-income organizing.
The low-income constituency has
rather limited resources
available
to it.

If their resources are
forcefully and directly applied,

the argument goes, they will be
more effective:
t isn t conflict for
its own sake, but to create
incentives for the other side to
negotiate in good
raith, to reach an agreement that
takes care of a
problem.
The point is, to have genuine bargaining
first we have to show the other
side we have power! 15

Frequently, the mass confrontation is the
most powerful weapon the

ACORN group has available to it.
it

Thus, as Lee Staples suggests,

is wise for local ACORN groups to
reserve that tactic for a

point in an issue campaign in which other
less costly and difficult

tactics have proven ineffective.^^
The importance of confrontational tactics extends
beyond

their ability to move others to respond to their
demands.

It

involves the identity of the organization in some important
ways.
First, it separates ACORN from its opponents:

utility companies,

many of the local politicians, bureaucrats, and others who are in
a

position to satisfy or deny their demands.

They also unify ACORN

internally, building identification among the membership:
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Taking demands to the extreme
and engaging in highly
expr<e s s iv e
protest creates strong ties among
the members and shared
feelings
of great intensity, especially
if the tactics pay off
in a victory.
The memory of the activity and
the expression of solidarity
builds
into the organization a sense
of unity and identity.
A tactic at
r

the 1982 Democratic National
Mid-Term Convention illustrates this

point well.

While ACORN members demonstrated in
the street for

low- and moderate-income representation
in the nominating process,
a group of ACORN members snuck
into the hotel where a fund-raising

luncheon was being held with some large
donors of the Democratic
Party.

The ACORN members worked their way into
the hotel via the

coffee shop, the gift shop, and other avenues
singly and in small
groups that would not attract attention.

When they arrived at the

service door of the luncheon hall, they burst
suddenly into the
hall chanting and demonstrating in what was a
directly confrontive

tactic.

This and other tactics that require bravado and make
noise

all serve to increase the solidary benefits of the
organization and

increase the members’ shared identity with ACORN.
In light of

the above discussion of ACORN’s approach to

ideology, the role of confrontation as ideology becomes clear.

181

While avoiding specific issues
such as abortion, ACORN has
defined
itself in terms of its opponents
and its internal solidarity.

Also
when ACORN assumes a policy
position, it expresses that
position in
terms of action and style rather
than specific points of argument.
Delgado explains the manner in which
ACORN used this technique to

express its views on housing issues:

While it is clear that tactical militancy
does not
necessarily relate to or translate into
a progressive
ideology, ACORN's recently launched
multistate
squatting efforts, in which low- income
people in
twelve cities are taking over abandoned
houses,
certainly demonstrates the organization's
attitude
toward private property and translates
the attitude
into action 0
.

The use of squatting actions gave the membership
an opportunity to

express its views without having to articulate
complex arguments or

adopt ideological stances.

For their purposes and ACORN's, the

actions were sufficient for the need to create and pursue
purposive
goals
This approach, ACORN organizers hope, will avoid internal

division over ideological issues and alienation of potential members
and allies.

Perhaps more important still is that ACORN organizers

avoid expending energies on deciding the "correct" stance to take
on issues.

Rather, as Rathke has stated, the way to organize is to

appeal to constituents' concerns, not philosophical issues:
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Hence, developing an ideology is
not a part of effective
organizing
according to ACORN organizers.
Confrontation is an important means
by which ACORN can maintain
purposive incentives while keeping

goals as vague as possible.

T he ACORN Organizi ng Strategy and
the Majority Constituency

The goal of ACORN from its inception as
an organization has

been to organize a majority constituency
of the lower 70% of the
income scale.

ACORN's history and the history of similar
organi-

zations indicates that there are formidable
problems involved in

achieving this goal.

While ACORN's organizing model is capable of

creating organizations in neighborhoods of either
low- or moderateincome people or mixes of them, difficulties have
arisen when ACORN
has pursued objectives broader than neighborhood improvement
issues

developed while doorknocking or in Organizing Committee meetings.
Moreover, the confrontive tactics have created divisions among the
low- and moderate-income groups.
The unifying feature that Rathke defines for the constituency

ACORN targets is that they are not participants in the important
decisions that shape their lives.

He claims that the important

decisions in American political and economic life are made by large
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corporations and the very wealthy.

His goal for ACORN has always

been to unite low-income and
moderate-income Americans into a
unified organization that can vie
successfully with the decision-

makers in American society.

The unity of these two groups,
however,

requires that they can be convinced
of their mutual interests.
That has not always been the casa.

This problem of unifying the targeted
constituency has

arisen in a variety of ways, including
disagreement over tactics,

dominance by moderate-income members, and
conflict over issues.
Each of these issues has been a problem
in ACORN's history that the

leaders and organizers have grappled with in
an effort to keep ACORN

moving toward its organizational goal of organizing
the majority
constituency.

Both the problems and the means by which they have

been addressed provide insights into the nature of
political

organizations and the organizing strategy they employ.
As noted above, confrontive tactics have not been popular

among all of the ACORN members.

This plays a role in the internal

divisions within ACORN as well.

Low— income members more readily

agree with organizers that the issues that concern them and the
resources they possess to promote their interests require the

adoption of confrontive tactics.

If they need jobs from construction

firms building in central city areas, they do not have resources to

pressure the job providers behind the scenes.

Rather, they must

disrupt the job site or go to City Hall with pickets in order to
get results.

This situation is quite different for moderate-income
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people.

Cloward and Piven, writing in
1979 about the differences

between community organizing among
the two groups, distinguished
between low-income organizing and
"citizen action" organizing.
They note that citizen action
organizing

produces a membership with a marked
reluctance to go
beyond conventional political channels.
Citizen
action consists mostly of meetings,
hearings
research memoranda, petitions, lobbying,
and ’ref erenda
The impulse not to demonstrate,"
says Mark Splain
[an ACORN organizer], "but to call
the alderman
because they know the alderman! "20

Moderate income members who are originally
attracted to ACORN for
community improvement are often repelled by
confrontational tactics
that hardly correlate with the genteel goals
they joined to promote
In 1979,

Pearl Ford, a board member resigned from ACORN due
to the

tactics in which she was asked to engage;

The tactics sounded good at first.
They come into a
neighborhood and ask if you need stop lights and your
trash picked up. The next thing you know they get
you involved in storming City Hall and other things
that I don’t approve of. ^

Conversely, low- income members would not respond to the same kinds
of tactics that the moderate-income members prefer.

The low-key

style of politics denies them the opportunity to participate

effectively using the resources at their disposal
and enthusiasm.

— anger,

disruption,

Moreover, the issues that they must address

housing, medical care

— for

—jobs,

their livelihood are often controlled at

a higher level of society than city services like streets, vacant
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lots, garbage removal, and
stop signs.

Thus, there is a distinct

difference between the tactics
that are usable for the two
different
ranges of income within the
intended ACORN constituency.
Writers on community organizing
have noted a tendency among
community organizations to be
dominated by moderate- income
members.
Michael Walzer argues that

n ° £ b y an y ma ans, a "poor people’s
moveThey have not done very well among
welfare
V.
recipients, tenants of public housing
projects, unemp oyed men and women.
The groups they are able to
form and sustain mostly involve
(relatively small
numbers of) better-off workers and
members of the lowto middle class.
And the politics of these groups is
clearly reformist; the neighborhood
alliances often
take on a kind of "community uplift"
character. Selfhelp against crime, the defense of
old residential
areas, improvement of local services,
beautification;
these are the goals, to which the
organizers too must
stand committed. z
>

Cloward and Piven recognize this same phenomenon
and argue that it

results from three causes:
via consumerism;

2)

1)

the search for anti-corporate issues

the ease of organizing moderate-income neigh-

borhoods; and 3) the dependence of many neighborhood
organizations
on canvassing as a source of income. 23

In an effort to forge an

an ^ -c °tporate stand that will attract members, particularly
from
the upper end of their constituency, consumer issues have been

effective and attractive.

Also, moderate-income neighborhoods have

residents that are less intimidated by political activity and

organizational membership.

Finally, the canvassing method of

fundraising in which canvassers go into upper-income neighborhoods
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and request donations has had
a conservatizing effect
on so.e groups
b

^

t0

Wlng facial
dependence
dLendence°of
of these
the
groups on canvassing contributes
their emphasis on popular
consumer issues and on
conventional politics.
"If our canvassers tell
us that
an issue or tactic won't sell
in the suburbs," one
organizer said, "we give it a second
thought." 24
the gr °

Cloward and Piven, however, excepted
ACORN from the organizations
that had adopted this course.

ACORN

s

They attribute this difference
to

organizers [who] have a commitment that
guides their

organizing and orients them to low-income
people.

Much of this

direction probably comes from Wade Rathke,
ACORN's chief organizer,

whose professionalism is tempered by a strong
sense of mission." 25
In the late 1970s, Rathke and other members
of the national

ACORN staff recognized the upward drift in the
incomes of their

members and adopted a course of action to involve more
low-income
people in the organization.

They pursued organizing drives of the

unemployed in several cities and worked to organize low— income
labor groups such as household workers in New Orleans and home

health care workers in Boston.

The result has been that ACORN has

avoided an overdependence on moderate-income members as some other
groups have.
The history of ACORN has, in fact, followed that pattern of

development, at one time pursuing one end of the income scale, at
another, the other end.

Madeleine Adamson and Seth Borgos, both

former ACORN professional staff, describe the process of alternating
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between the two ends of the income
spectrum of ACORN's targeted

constituency

For ACORN, the squatters campaign
was the culmination

of a five-year quest to recover
the audacity and
militance of its welfare rights origins

—

qualities
which had been diluted in the pursuit of
a majority
constituency. More recently, ACORN has moved
closer
to the contemporary mainstream,
organizing a national
coalition of labor, church, minority, and
peace groups
to challenge the policies of President
Ronald Reagan.
Such periodic swings are characteristic of
ACORN's
evolutionary pattern: a continual dialectic
between
low- and moderate-income, mobilization and
organization,
26
expansion and consolidation, militance and
accomodation
.

Thus, ACORN has sought a balance between the
desire to include

low- income constituents and the need for the resources
that the

moderate-income constituents can provide.

The historical evidence,

however, provides clear arguments for the difficulties of unifying

ACORN's targeted constituency.

As Adamson and Borgos claim, ACORN

has been forced to "drift towards one or another segment of their

constutuenc

[y]

or to oscillate between them, never really mobilizing

the whole.
The problem with issues within ACORN clearly demonstrates

this dilemma.

Historically, the lower-income ACORN members have

pursued more progressive issue stands than the moderate-income

membership.

This is very clear from the events surrounding the

drafting of the ACORN People's Platform.

Delgado reports that the

difference between the income groups was reflected in the age of
the groups represented:
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The older ACORN groups were
dominated by low-income
people who had fought for welfare
and Medicaid reformS ” ere ”° re llkel
y to comprise homeowner^
ed blue-collar workers. The difference
and
was especially
prevalent in the ACORN affiliates
in California
Lrth
aroiina, and Georgia, where the
lowest-income elements
were the senior citizens' groups.

"”n

Some of the Arkansas representatives
were people who had been a
part of the original drives to organize
welfare recipients in

Little Rock and who were disposed to
pursue clearly progressive
issues such as the guaranteed annual
income:
It was on this issue that the
tenuous coalition of
low- and moderate-income people on
which the organ!
zation is built was most seriously challenged.
Advocates of the plank (mostly black and
low-income
members) argued that all families were entitled
to
a basic income, health care, and
housing; opponents
of the plank (the most vociferous of
whom were also
black but more moderate-income) argued for
income
based on employment. ^

The responses of the Boston ACORN members to
the same question

showed a lack of understanding of the issue and certainly
no

unified support.

Thus, the problem of creating and maintaining

the majority constituency manifests itself in terms of
tactical

militance, the attractiveness of the moderate— income group as
organizat ion— builder s

,

and the conflict that arises between the

two groups over issues within the organization.

Nevertheless, the necessity of unifying the two groups is
clear.

If

one is attempting to oppose the political and economic

elite in American politics, it is not possible to do it with only
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part of the low- and moderate-income
constituency.

Saul Alinsky

recognized that fact late in his
career as an organizer,

while

he began his career in 1939 in
the Back of the Yards area
of

Chicago, one of the most desolate
slums in America at the time,
by the early 1970s he began
advocating for a rather different

organizing strategy.

His pursuit of a middle-class
constituency

that would promote radical or
anti-corporate goals led him to

devise the proxy strategy.

This strategy would enlist middle-class

corporate shareholders and those who are
capable of influencing
institutions that hold shares, such as
universities, to raise
issues at shareholders’ meetings of large
corporations and disrupt
their proceedings.

I m directing all my efforts today
to organizing the
middle class, because that’s the arena where the future
this country will be decided.
And I'm convinced
that once the middle class recognizes its real enemy
the megacorporations that control the country and pull
the strings on puppets like Nixon and Connally it will
mobilize as one of the most effective instruments for
social change this country has ever known. And once
mobilized, it will be natural for it to seek out allies
among the other disenfranchised blacks, chicanos, poor
whites 0

—

—

.

Alinsky did not live to pursue this strategy to its end.

Never-

theless, ACORN's experience suggests that the assumptions he made

about the natural inclination of the middle class to seek allies
among low- income and minorities is questionable.
An observer of ACORN politics, however, must recognize that

Rathke and the other top leaders and organizers in ACORN are working
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toward long-term goals.

As Rathke has stated, his
goal is power for

the majority constituency over
the fundamental decisions
in the

American political and economic
system.

Because the goal is so far-

reaching he argues that it is not
possible to predict what form that
power will take. Moreover, it
is not possible to predict
under what

circumstances that assumption of power
might occur.

conceiveable that an extraordinary turn
of events,

It is
a

crisis of great

proportions like the Great Depression,
could provide unity for the
low- and moderate-income groups.
of the situation,

In order to take full advantage

it would be necessary for ACORN
to be an operating

organization; that is, to survive and be ready
for such circumstances.
Thus,

if

there were an economic disaster, the alienation
of the middle

class from the upper class and the issues that
would naturally align

lower-income Americans with middle-income Americans would
create the

opportunity for the larger goal of ACORN organizing.

Until that

time, ACORN organizing continues in its present strategy
of fluctuating

between the desire to be radical and the necessity for organizational
survival

Organizing Strategy and Political Analysis

Organizing strategy, a notion originally conceived by

political organizers to facilitate organizing by replicating

organizational characteristics in many places at once and ensure
effective organizing, is also an effective means of analyzing
political organizations.

In this case study of Boston ACORN the
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use of the concept of organizing
strategy has succeeded in
directing
the research at the important
features of the organization
and

appreciating their interaction in
the functioning of the
participants.
Perhaps the most important
contribution of organizing strategy
to political analysis is the
stress it places on the strategic
nature
of political organizing.
Because it compares political
organizing to
product marketing, it illuminates the
kind of thinking that is
required for the organization to
succeed.

The organizers, as entre-

preneurs, must decide on a constituency
and determine what incentives
will effectively mobilize that constituency.

They must also decide

what resources the organization requires
from the constituents in

order for it to succeed.

Finally, they must determine what organiza-

tional structure will best serve the goals
of the group.

The concept

of organizing strategy requires that the
analyst see all of the above

decisions as part of a whole.

For example, the decision to use

neighborhood improvement as an incentive to initiate members
into

ACORN requires that the structure of the group be based within
neighborhoods; the desire of ACORN organizers to pursue progressive
political issues prompts them to organize a low— income constituency
that will agree to those issues in an enthusiastic way; the need for
a

broad— based constituency requires that organizers demand a maximum

amount of participation by the membership.
Finally, organizing strategy helps to explain some of the

wonder and satisfaction the researcher experienced upon completion
of organizing an ACORN neighborhood.

It makes the connection between
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mundane items like Stop signs
and great issues like
housing and
democratic control of corporations.
It helps to explain how
an
organization is capable of bending
and shaping the goals of
both
members and organizers to coincide
in a mutual effort.
It shows
how well an organization is
capable of developing the
political
skills of people who have historically
both avoided and been
excluded from political participation.

It explains how the

apparently undramatic actions of
organizers and constituents in

neighborhoods across the country have
the potential for dramatic
impact on the lives of many low- and
moderate- income people and.

conceivably, the American political system.
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appendix

INTERVIEW SCHEDULES

Member Interv iew
I.

II.

I want to start with
some qustions about how
you and others
originally get involved in ACORN.
1)

How long have you been an ACORN
member?

2)

Were you involved in politics
before you joined ACORN?
fell me about that.

3)

Why did you join ACORN?

4)

What does it mean to you now to be
an ACORN member?
do you get out of it?

What attracted you to ACORN?
What

5)

How has the experience of being in ACORN
differed from
your original expectations?

6)

When you talk to someone who is thinking of
becoming
involved in ACORN, what reasons do you give
them to°join?

Now,

I want to talk to you about your
activities and
involvement in ACORN.

1)

Do you belong to other organizations? Are you
active in
them?
Hold office in them? How many hours a week do you
spend on them?

2)

How many hours a week do you spend on ACORN?
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3)

Which of the following have you
participated in?
Attend ed a national ACORN
convention
Organized or worked for an ACORN
fundraiser
Held an office in ACORN
Signed a letter of support for
ACORN
Recruited new members
Spoken at a public hearing, like
the City Council,
as an ACORN representative
Marched in an ACORN action
Led an ACORN action
Canvassed your neighborhood - got out
on the doors
Held meetings in your home
Flyer ed a neighborhood
Talked to people about ACORN in a public
place like
a store
_Cha ir ed an ACORN meet ing
Made phone calls for an ACORN meeting or
action
Worked on an election or issue campaign
Helped provide direct member services
Attended a national action or training workshop
Served on the ACORN Political Action Committee

If

III. The next set of questions deals with ACORN’s
goals and your
feelings about them.
1)

Can you list ACORN's political goals here in Boston and
in
your neighborhood?

2)

What are ACORN's national goals?

3)

Has ACORN been successful with those issues?
If YES
what do you think makes ACORN successful?
If NO, why do you think ACORN has not been successful?
,

4)

Which goal is the most important?

5)

Are any of these goals not very important?

6)

Do you think ACORN should pursue more issues or less?

7)

If ACORN changed the way it operates
say, it only dealt
with one goal ["most important goal" above] how would
you feel about that?

Why?

—

Why?

—

Why?
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IV.

d like to learn some things
about ACORN s direct member
services. Things that only
ACORN members can get, like the
newsletter
I

1)

V.

What direct member services does
Boston ACORN offer?
you participate?

Do

2)

If ACORN stopped providing
direct member services and only
worked on political goals, would
you stay in ACORN?

3)

If ACORN stopped working on
political goals and only gave
the direct member services, would
you stay in ACORN?

Now I want to talk to you about your
views on some important
political issues.
1)

First, which of the following best describes
you?
a)

1-

2-

34b)
5672)

very liberal
liberal
moderate
conservative
very conservative
strong Democrat
weak Democrat
Independent
weak Republican
strong Republican

89Now tell me if you agree or disagree with the following
statements.
Please respond:
"Agree strongly," "Agree,"
"Disagree Strongly," or "I Don't Know."
The federal government should provide a guaranteed
income to all citizens.
The government should take over industries that provide
public services, like the utility companies.
It is important to pass the Equal Rights Amendment.
The federal government should provide free medical care
to all needy citizens.
The construction and use of nuclear power plants should
be stopped.
Government should build or subsidize housing for those in
need
The federal government should help low- income people pay
for abortions.
Abortions are a constitutional right.
The U.S. should not get involved in Latin American affairs.
10-The U.S. should continue to build up its military defense.

3)
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Is ACORN working on the
right issues'?
issues you think should be
addressed?

VI

I’m interested
tactics
1)

m

Do they ignore

how ACORN makes decisions
about issues and

Who makes the Important decisions
in ACORN?

How is it done?

2)

Are you involved in making
important decisions?

3)

If your ACORN group took a stand
on an issue that you could
not agree with, what would you do?

4)

If your ACORN group endorsed a
candidate you could not
support, what would you do?

5)

If your ACORN group used a tactic
you could not participate

in— picketed a church gathering, for example—
what would
you do?

VII.

6)

Do conflicts ever arise over important
issues within ACORN?
II so, how are they worked
out?

7)

Are there ever conflicts between organizers
and members?
What causes them? How are they resolved?

I d like to know some things about
the way ACORN pursues its
political goals. Use the choices on the sheet to
answer
these questions:
"Very effective," "Effective," "Somewhat
effective," "Not effective," or "Don’t Know."

1)

Of the following groups, tell me what you think of them
as
partners in coalitions with ACORN:

—unions
— church groups
— peace groups
— elected officials
— other community organizations
— student groups
—any left out?
I
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2)

Of the following tactics,
tell me what you think of them
as a means of achieving
ACORN's goals.
ACORN members running for office
demonstrating in public offices;
the Mayor's,’ forL
example

ing

bu^ld ing^

3)

^

prlVate offices

>

like a corporate

—demonstrating in the street
—speaking in public hearings
— inviting opponents
at ACORN meetings
— inviting supporters toto speak
speak at ACORN meetings
— blocking streets
— endorsing candidates
—campaigning for endorsed candidates
running referenda campaigns
I left out?

—anything

Which do you think are more effective:
tactics or bargaining tactics?
VIII.

confrontational

Finally, I d like to discuss with you your
feelings about
your impact on politics. Use the choices on
the page to
answer this group of questions:
"Very Likely," "Likely "
"Not Likely," "Very Unlikely," or "Don't Know."
1)

If the Mayor and City Council were
considering an
ordinance that would hurt your neighborhood, could
you help prevent it from passing?

2)

If the state legislature and Governor were
considering a
law that you considered unfair to you or your interests
could you help prevent it from passing?

3)

If the President and Congress were considering a law that
you opposed, could you help prevent it from passing?

4)

If you took an issue to a government office to express
your views on a budget question or a housing program, for
example would you be treated as well as anyone else?

—

5)

—

If you tried to explain your views on an issue to city
off ic ials, would they take your point of view into serious

consideration?
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6)

Do you think:

city politicians in Boston doMass, state politicians do
c) politicians in Washington
do

a)

b)

an excellent job?
a good job?
a fair job?
a poor job?

don't know.

PERSONAL DATA:
Race

Sex

Asian
Black
Hispanic
White
Other

Age:

Male
Female

18-25
_26-31
32-40
41-50
51-60
61 or over

Education
Completed 6th grade
Completed 9th grade
Completed high school
Some college
Completed college
Graduate school

Number in household
one
two
3-4
5-8
9 or more

Occupation

Spouse's occupation

Household Income:
under $8,000
$8 ,100-$9, 999

$10, 000-$l4 , 999
$15, 000-$19 , 999
$20,000-$29, 999

$30,000 or over
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Organizer Interview
I.

I'd like to start with a
discussion of why
px get
set
y people
F
involved in ACORN.
1)

How long have you been an
organizer?

2)

Why did you become an ACORN
organizer?

3)

Has ACORN organizing been what
you expected it to be?
Explain.
•

4)

What do you get out of ACORN
organizing?

5)

What attracts members to ACORN?

reCrUitinS

6)

make?

^

members

’

what kind of appeal do you

10)
7)

What keeps members in ACORN?

8)

When recruiting new organizers, what
kind of appeal do
you make?

9)

Do you think members’ goals for ACORN
change over time?

Do you think organizers’ goals for ACORN
change over time?
II.

Next,
ACORN.

I

d

like to discuss peoples’ level of involvement
with

1)

What kinds of members become most committed to ACORN?

2)

Do you think level of involvement enhances commitment?

3)

Do you think organizers are subject to those dynamics?

4)

What about your involvement
supervisory positions?

5)

How long do you expect to keep on with ACORN?
Other plans?

— have

you held staff or

Why?
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III.

IV.

^e\^ alk ab Ut
°

ach 1

AC0M

'

S 8 ° alS

3nd

US

abilit ^ t0

1)

What are ACORN’s political goals
locally/statewide/
nationally?

2)

Is ACORN achieving those goals?

3)

Should ACORN tackle more or fewer
issues?

4)

Do you think ACORN’s goals should
be broader or narrower?

5)

Are members flexible about changes in
goals?
more or less flexible than others?

I

Explain.

Is one type

need to learn some things about ACORN's selective
incentives

1)

What selective incentives does Boston ACORN
offer its
members

2)

What is the participation rate?

3)

Do selective incentives improve recruiting or membership?

4)

What purposes do they serve?

5)

Are selective incentive participants more or less goaloriented than non participants?

I’d like to discuss your general views on political issues.
What are your politics?
1)

First, which of the following best describes you?
a)

very liberal
liberal
moderate
conservative
very conservative

b)

strong Democrat
weak Democrat
Ind ep end ent

w eak Republican
strong Republican
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-
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38166 ° r diSagree “ Uh the
respond:
"Agree strongly
Disagree Strongly," or "I Don't
Know."

1-

s^t«eits
up..

*

snowing

Ilf"
pleas e

"
’

"Agree

"

The federal government should
provide a guaranteed
income to all citizens.
2 The government should
take over industries that
6provide
public services, like the utility
companies.
1
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Amendment.
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7 The federal
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for abortions.
Abortions are a constitutional right.
S OU
n0t get involved in La tin American
affairs.
l!
ID-The n*Q*
U.S. should
continue to build up its military defense.
5

m

1

^

3)

VI.

Is ACORN working on the right issues?
you think should be addressed?

Do they ignore issues

I m interested in how ACORN makes
decisions about issues and
tactics.

1)

Who makes the important decisions in ACORN?

2)

If ACORN took a stand on an issue that you disagreed
with,
what would you do?

3)

If ACORN endorsed a candidate you could not support,
what
would you do?

4)

If

5)

Do conflicts ever arise between members and organizers?
between members and members? between organizers and
organizers? If so, how are they resolved? Wht is their

How?

ACORN used a tactic you disagreed with, what would you do?

source?
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I d I lke to discuss some
of the ways ACORN exercises its
power tactically.

1)

Tell me what you think of the following
groups as
coalition partners. Are they "Very
Effective,"
Effective," "Somewhat Effective," "Very
Ineffective,"
or "Don't Know"?
unions
church groups
peace groups
elected officials
other community organizations
student groups
any I left out?
’

—
—
—
—
—
—
—

2)

Tell me what you think of the following tactics.
Are
they "Very Effective," "Effective," "Somewhat
Effective,"
"Very Ineffective," or "Don't Know"?
ACORN members running for office
demonstrating in public offices
demonstrating in private offices
demonstrating in the street
speaking in public hearings
inviting opponents to speak at ACORN meetings
inviting supporters to speak at ACORN meetings
blocking streets
endorsing candidates
campaigning for endorsed candidates
running referenda campaigns
anything I left out?

—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
3)

Do you have any philosophical commitments to specific
tactics or types of tactics?

4)

What is the importance of confrontational tactics? Do
they have advantages over cooperative coalition-building?

5)

Do you find that some tactics are more popular among members

than others?

VIII. Finally, I'd like to discuss the members' efficacy and
conf idenc e.
1)

How do you build efficacy among your members?
is it

How effective

?

2)

What kinds of members respond best to efficacy-building efforts?

3)

How do political officeholders and bureaucrats respond to
ACORN members? Do they take them seriously? Why or why not?
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